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“I checked it very thoroughly,” said the computer, “and that quite defi-
nitely is the answer. I think the problem, to be quite honest with you, is
that you’ve never actually known what the question is.”
— Douglas Adams, The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy
On the Day of the Answer, Deep Thought revealed the answer to Life, the Uni-
verse, and Everything. No longer did the Magratheans have to wonder about who
they were and what their purpose is in life. Or so they thought. After 7.500.000
years of computing, the super computer revealed, with infinite majesty and calm,
that the answer is 42.
The story by Douglas Adams exemplifies the incessant need for people to seek
out answers to questions of meaning. People are motivated to discover answers
that relate to their identity, their place in society, the working of the world, and
many other questions. In fact, I will argue in this dissertation that meaning can
be found even in the most trivial of questions and their answers. The main idea
that will be discussed is that people experience meaning through the experience
of understanding. This idea is captured in a theoretical model called the Meaning
Maintenance Model (MMM, Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006; Proulx & Heine, 2006;
Proulx & Inzlicht, 2012), which will serve as the guiding framework of this dis-
sertation. According to the MMM, meaning is expected relations. Through the
adoption of beliefs people come to expect events to unfold in accordance with
those beliefs. As long as this occurs, there is meaning.
The Magratheans expected to hear the answer to Life, the Universe, and Ev-
erything. They likely expected to receive a deep and complex answer that they
would immediately recognize as the correct answer. Instead, they received a num-
ber. This was not only disappointing because it does not appear to answer the
question, but it was also unexpected. It violated their expectations in terms of
not receiving an answer and also in terms of the kind of answer. If meaning can
be found in understanding, then events violating that understanding constitutes
a loss of meaning. Hence, ironically, in their quest for meaning, the Magratheans
found the opposite.
The loss of meaning is a negative experience. In certain cases it is accompa-
nied by despair, while in other cases it might be merely unpleasant. Nevertheless,
the loss of meaning is not desirable. As a result, people respond in various ways
to reduce the unpleasantness. The MMM specifies several strategies people can
perform to restore meaning. Some of these strategies, as will become clear later,
do not address the meaning violating source directly. Instead, the focus appears
to be on the unpleasant psychological state, rather than solving the source of the
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discrepancy. It is for this reason that the negative state following a meaning vi-
olation is a vital component of the MMM. According to the MMM, the violation
of meaning causes aversive psychophysiological arousal which motivates compen-
satory behavior to reduce it. Although not mentioned by Douglas Adams, the
Magratheans likely showed signs of elevated psychophysiological arousal such as
increased heart rate, elevated skin conductance, and enlarged pupil size in their
moment of despair. To rid themselves of this unpleasant state, they took action:
the construction of a new super computer that will calculate the question, rather
than the answer.
Our main question is whether physiological arousal indeed plays a role in
the quest for meaning. A significant amount of accumulated work in the existen-
tial psychology literature suggests the presence of a state of psychophysiological
arousal in responding to lost meaning. In this dissertation I review the evidence
for this view, present new studies that were aimed to build upon this literature,
and address new questions related to the role of arousal in people’s search for
meaning.
I did not conduct this work alone. The work presented in this dissertation
was conducted by me and my supervisors, dr. Travis Proulx and dr. Ilja van
Beest, so I will from this moment on abandon the ‘I’ noun in favor of ‘we’. In
our work, we address such issues as what the underlying physiological structures
are that produce the aversive arousal experienced after the loss of meaning, as
well as the structures that might promote efforts to regain it. We also conducted
multiple empirical studies to gain a better understanding of the role of arousal in
responding to meaning violations. To this end, we used pupillometry as a proxy for
physiological arousal. Recent developments in eye tracker technology have made
pupillometry an affordable and easy-to-use tool to investigate psychophysiological
arousal. Although far from a new method, pupillometry has not yet been widely
applied to the investigation of meaning violations; hence, in this dissertation, we
explore the capabilities of this method in the context of meaning.
We applied pupillometry to several areas of interest. We tested whether dif-
ferent kinds of meaning violations elicit a physiological arousal response as as-
sessed with an eye tracker. These included such experiences as being socially
excluded, the violation of held beliefs, as well as perceptual anomalies. Addition-
ally, and importantly, we investigated how arousal relates to different meaning
seeking or restoration strategies. Before discussing these studies in detail, we
provide a theoretical background that further elaborates on the Meaning Mainte-
nance Model, pupillometry as a tool to measure psychophysiological arousal and




1.1 The Meaning Maintenance Model
The Meaning Maintenance Model (MMM) is an integrative model that in-
corporates multiple theoretical frameworks in the existential psychology literature
to explain both what meaning is and how people respond to lost meaning. The
central idea is that people adopt meaning frameworks, that is, sets of beliefs that
allow them to make sense of the world. These meaning frameworks are imper-
fect, so it frequently happens that people are confronted with events that do not
fit in their meaning frameworks—thereby violating their sense of meaning. Trau-
matic experiences, disconfirmed beliefs, unpredictable situations, and perceptual
anomalies are but a few of the types of events that constitute a meaning viola-
tion. The result is a state of aversive psychophysiological arousal that motivates
people to reduce this state of discomfort. The MMM describes various ways to re-
duce the discomfort and in doing so, integrates numerous theories from the threat
compensation literature such as cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957), ter-
ror management theory (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986), uncertainty
management theory (van den Bos & Lind, 2002) and related existential threat
phenomena (e.g., reactive approach motivation; McGregor, Nash, Mann, & Phills,
2010; assumptive worlds; Janoff-Bulman, 1992; disequilibrium; Piaget, 2000; im-
balance; Heider, 1958). As will be made clear, the MMM’s central tenet is that
underlying the threat compensation theories in this literature is the presence of a
common type of psychological threat—the violation of expectations—that induces
aversive physiological arousal and motivates subsequent compensatory behavior.
The section below offers a more detailed overview of MMM and the role of arousal
in the loss of meaning and its restoration.
1.1.1 Meaning
According to the MMM, meaning is that what allows people to make sense
of their experiences. This particular interpretation of meaning might seem rather
unusual. How do prominent sources of meaning such as social relationships, par-
enthood, religious activities, personal development, or one’s career relate to sense-
making? Closer inspection, however, reveals that events people regularly catego-
rize as meaningful often consist for a large part of the attempt to make sense of
them. People consider the most meaningful events to be those events that shook
their foundations the most or that provided the largest change in their thinking.
Few will deny, for example, the incredible influence of becoming a parent on one’s
thinking and its meaningfulness.
The idea that meaning constitutes sense-making is not without precedence.
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In a review by Park (2010) on the definition of meaning, the sense-making aspect
of meaning was seen as the most commonly shared component of what constitutes
meaning. Although Park focused particularly on meaning making efforts follow-
ing trauma, it is clear from the various definitions of meaning she collected that
sense-making is an important component. To illustrate, Graham, Lobel, Glass, and
Lokshina (2008) define meaning as “a process that involves changing appraisals
of specific situations or global beliefs about the world or self”, Nolen-Hoeksema,
McBride, and Larson (1997) as “attempts to understand the loss and his own re-
action to the loss”, and DuHamel et al. (2004) as “integration of the event into
the worldview of the individual through accommodation and/or assimilation”. In
each of these definitions it is clear that sense-making is an important aspect of
meaning.
But what is it that gives people the impression that something makes sense?
From the perspective of the MMM, the answer is relationships. Meaning can be
understood as the adoption of mental representations of relationships between
committed propositions. Take water for example. Water can be understood as
wet when touched, fluid at room temperature, and refreshing when thirsty. This
collection of relationships between water and various attributes provides an un-
derstanding of water. The idea of meaning as relationships stems from both phi-
losophy and psychology. Existential philosophers such as Camus, Heidegger, and
Kierkegaard saw the importance of relations in constructing meaning (Camus,
2004; Heidegger, 2001; Hong & Hong, 2000). For example, Camus understood
the “fundamental impulse of the human drama” as a need for consistent “systems
of relations”. Psychologists followed suit by postulating various terms that refer
to the adoption of sets of expected relations to understand phenomena. In typ-
ical psychological fashion, the terms for these vary greatly but seem to refer to
the same process. Examples are paradigms (Bruner & Postman, 1949), scripts
(Nelson, 1981), narratives (McAdams, 2001), worldviews (Thompson & Janigian,
1988), systems (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004), assumptive worlds (Janoff-Bulman,
1992), and also meaning itself (Baumeister, 1991). These terms all refer to sets of
expected relationships between propositions.
Meaning is, however, more than simply relationships. According to the
MMM, meaning is expected relationships. People expect that water feels wet and
that it feels refreshing to drink after a hot day. This expectation of specific rela-
tionships reflects the motivational component of meaning. People are committed
to their expectations, which is particularly noticeable in the experienced discom-
fort upon seeing their expectations violated. The expected relations also vary in
how committed people are to them. Some expectations are held with greater cer-
tainty and are considered more important than others. For example, many people
9
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associate good events with good people and bad events with bad people (Lerner,
1980). This belief is important to them, as observed by the extent to which people
defend this worldview when they observe events that do not match it, such as in
the case of victim derogation following robberies or sexual assault (van den Bos
& Maas, 2009). Other beliefs are more trivial, like beliefs related to the color of
playing cards (Bruner & Postman, 1949). People expect that a two of hearts is
colored red. Sometimes, however, they might be faced with a trick deck (likely
while participating in a psychology experiment). Although this violates their ex-
pectations, it would be unjust to put this on the same par as facing the violations
of beliefs in a just world. Nonetheless, the MMM posits meaning is found in each
of these expected relations. All beliefs that shape expectations provide meaning,
and any violation of those beliefs result in lost meaning.
1.1.2 The loss of meaning
Due to imperfect meaning frameworks it frequently happens that expecta-
tions are violated. We see bad things happen to good people, we find out that
we were wrong about another person’s character, perhaps even about ourselves,
or we discover certain factual beliefs to be entirely mistaken. When these expec-
tations are violated, a loss of meaning is experienced. This loss of meaning is a
negative experience. Just like beliefs vary in the commitment by which they are
held, so does the extent of discomfort. This can range from traumatic events,
like sexual assault or natural disasters, to trivial violations of expectations like the
aforementioned trick playing cards. In the case of trauma, Janoff-Bulman (1992)
has made the case for a double-dose of anxiety following trauma. The first dose
of anxiety relates to the threat of the event towards our well-being. This reaction
is straightforward—a negative event occurs that poses a physical threat, so we
react appropriately defensively. The second dose of anxiety relates to the shat-
tering of worldview assumptions. Not only did something bad happen, but it is
also not understood. Often asked questions such as “Why did this happen?” or
“How could this happen to me?” follow traumatic events. Scientifically, these
questions are relatively easily answered; certain natural disasters, for example,
are well-understood. Yet there is nonetheless a violation of expectations. These
are expectations such as an incorrect sense of invulnerability (Weinstein, 1987)
or beliefs like the aforementioned belief in a just world (Lerner, 1980). How can
something as bad as a natural disaster happen to so many good people? It is the
violation of these expectations that creates a second dose of anxiety.
Traumatic events are but one example of situations in which an expectation,
and therefore meaning, is violated. At other times, people might discover that
10
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their sense of control is vastly overestimated (Langer, 1975), that they behave
in ways inconsistent with who they think they are (Steele & Liu, 1983) or even
their own attitudes (Festinger, 1957), or that significant life events could have
very easily turned out differently (Kray et al., 2010). In the interpersonal domain,
people might be faced with often unexpected social exclusions (Williams & Nida,
2011), violations of stereotypes (Mendes, Blascovich, Lickel, & Hunter, 2002),
betrayal (Koehler & Gershoff, 2003) or any breach of social contract. Additionally,
people might be faced with perceptual anomalies (Bruner & Postman, 1949), or
they discover that facts about the world they believe to be true might be wholly
false, such as the fact that chameleons do not change their color to match their
surroundings, that Vikings did not wear horned helmets, or that the capital of
Australia is Canberra, not Sydney.
Psychologists have long investigated the experience associated with the afore-
mentioned events, and similar to the various ways that the initial beliefs are de-
scribed (e.g., world views, schemas, narratives, etc.), the described experience fol-
lowing those events is equally varied. In other theories this aversive state has been
referred to as disequilibrium (Piaget, 2000), imbalance (Heider, 1958), dissonance
(Festinger, 1957), anxiety (Janoff-Bulman, 1992), terror (Greenberg, Solomon, &
Pyszczynski, 1997a), uncertainty (van den Bos, 2001), and anxious uncertainty
(McGregor et al., 2010). It is one of the central tenets of the MMM that all these
various terms refer to the same psychological discomfort, caused by the violation
of expectations. In the case of cognitive dissonance, one could entertain the pos-
sibility that the most commonly researched cause of cognitive dissonance—the
observation that one’s own behavior is not in line with one’s attitude—constitutes
a violation of expectations. People’s need for consistency shapes their expecta-
tions about the behaviors they will perform, given the attitudes they hold. Thus,
observing that one’s behavior is not in line with one’s attitude violates the ex-
pectancy that the behavior will be in line with that attitude. Similarly, in the case
of terror management theory it might not be that the thought of death inherently
causes a sense of terror, but rather that any encounter with death violates specific
expectations. These expectations can be found in commonly observed beliefs in
immortality and other overly positive self-related beliefs (Perloff & Fetzer, 1986;
Taylor & Brown, 1988; Weinstein & Klein, 1996). This is not to say that specific
sources of violations of meaning do not have unique attributes that may moderate
defensive reactions to their occurrence, but there appears to be a commonality
across the various phenomena that can potentially be attributed to the violation
of expectations.
Besides integrating numerous threat compensation theories, the notion that
a violation of expectations is the cause for a loss of meaning also leads to novel pre-
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dictions. Specifically, it leads to the prediction that any violation of expectations,
no matter how trivial or its source, constitutes a loss of meaning. This prediction
that even trivial expectations cause meaning has been supported by multiple stud-
ies. Violated expectations resulting from visual anomalies (Proulx & Heine, 2008;
Proulx & Major, 2013), absurd literature (Proulx, 2009) and incongruous word-
pairings (Randles, Proulx, & Heine, 2011) elicit identical behavioral responses that
have been observed in response to other meaning violations, such as being con-
fronted with one’s own mortality (Proulx, Heine, & Vohs, 2010). These findings
lend support for the MMM’s tenet that the violation of expectations is central to
the loss of meaning.
1.1.3 Restoring meaning
Naturally, after a loss of meaning has occurred, people are motivated to re-
store meaning. A wide variety of behaviors have been observed following the
loss of meaning. Some examples of these behaviors are that socially excluded
people increase their social affiliative efforts to again be included (Carter-Sowell,
Chen, & Williams, 2008; Maner, DeWall, Baumeister, & Schaller, 2007; Williams,
2007, 2009), people who experience cognitive dissonance change their attitudes
to resolve the inconsistency responsible for their dissonance (e.g., Festinger, 1957;
Harmon-Jones, Gerdjikov, & Harmon-Jones, 2008), and sometimes people appear
to affirm meaning frameworks unrelated to the initial source of the meaning vi-
olation, such as affirming a moral value following perceptual anomalies (Proulx
& Major, 2013). This latter form of compensatory behavior, termed fluid com-
pensation (Allport, 1943), has seen a lot of academic interest and seems to occur
after many different kinds of meaning violations. It has been observed follow-
ing dissonance (Steele & Liu, 1983), mortality salience (Pyszczynski, Greenberg,
& Solomon, 1999), personal uncertainty (van den Bos & Lind, 2002), as well as
absurd jokes (Proulx et al., 2010), and a secretly switched experimenter (Proulx
& Heine, 2008). Consequently, it appears that meaning violations can be resolved
with fluid compensation behaviors.
According to the MMM, people can adopt five different strategies to restore
meaning: assimilation, accommodation, affirmation, abstraction, and assembly.
The first two strategies can be distinguished from the other strategies in that they
directly or indirectly address the meaning violation. Assimilation refers to reinter-
preting the meaning violation in such a way that it fits within the existing meaning
framework, while accommodation refers to adjusting the existing meaning frame-
work to incorporate the meaning violation. This can be illustrated by the common
belief in a just world. One frequently hears of horrible events such as car accidents
12
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or sexual assaults in which there is one or more victims. The initial reaction, and
source of the meaning violation, is that the victims did not deserve such fate. If
the world was truly good, no such bad thing would happen to them. However,
using an assimilation strategy, one can interpret the scenario by assuming the vic-
tims are to blame. Perhaps the driver was irresponsible, having had a drink too
many, or perhaps the sexual assault victim dressed too provocatively, thus ‘asking
for it’. By blaming the victim, the world view is maintained, and the meaning vio-
lation resolved. Alternatively, one’s view can accommodate the meaning violation.
Adopting the belief that the world is not always just, and that people can simply
be at the wrong place at the wrong time, incorporates the meaning violation and
thus also resolves it. This latter strategy is, however, a more effortful one, and
people are likely to favor reinterpreting an event than to change their meaning
frameworks.
The third strategy, affirmation, consists of the increased tendency to declare
one’s commitment towards a specific value or belief after a meaning violation. Of-
ten this involves the affirmation of beliefs related to the source of the meaning vi-
olation. For example, violations regarding our sense of control in one domain can
elicit increased affirmation of control in other domains (Kay, Whitson, Gaucher, &
Galinsky, 2009) or violations in social justice beliefs can lead to affirmation of the
social system, even though it’s the social system that is responsible for the injustice
(Jost et al., 2004). However, an additional, and novel, tenet of the MMM is that
meaning frameworks are radically substitutable, meaning that the loss of mean-
ing in one domain can be regained by affirming meaning frameworks of another
domain. For example, students who see themselves arguing for a tuition increase
later affirm unrelated moral and political beliefs (Steele & Liu, 1983) or seeing
reverse colored playing cards leads to the affirmation of liberal political beliefs, at
least for those who are committed to those beliefs (Proulx & Major, 2013). Or, as
the vast literature on terror management has shown, meaning violations related
to death can elicit affirmations of seemingly unrelated values, such as one’s cul-
tural identity (Burke, Martens, & Faucher, 2010). It thus appears that meaning
violations can lead to the affirmation of beliefs unrelated to the source of meaning
violation. In fact, it has been demonstrated that a range of different meaning vi-
olations can elicit an identical affirmation response. This has been demonstrated
with the bond for prostitute measure. In this measure, participants set a bond
(ranging from $0 to $999) for a prostitute arrested for having sex in a bathroom
stall. Assuming that many adhere to the norm that such an act is inappropriate
and thus violates their values regarding sexual conduct, not to mention potential
civil laws, this offers an opportunity to affirm that particular value. And indeed,
people show an increased affirmation of that value by setting a higher bond, no
13
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matter the kind of meaning violation. It has been demonstrated in the case of mor-
tality salience (e.g., Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989),
absurd humor (Proulx et al., 2010), surrealism (Randles, Heine, & Santos, 2013),
an unexpected and unnoticed change in experimenter (Proulx & Heine, 2008),
cognitive dissonance (Randles, Inzlicht, Proulx, Tullett, & Heine, 2015), meaning-
less word-pairs (Randles et al., 2011) and arguing against one’s own self-unity
(Proulx, 2009).
The final two strategies, abstraction and assembly, refer to the creation of
meaning. Abstraction involves finding patterns in the environment to find struc-
ture and thus, potentially, meaning. Proulx (2009) demonstrated that in response
to a meaning violation (reading an absurd story or arguing against a unitary self-
concept) can lead to increased performance on learning novel patterns in an ar-
tificial grammar task. Relatedly, one can go beyond trying to detect patterns and
create a new meaning framework altogether. One particular display of this strat-
egy is increased creativity following meaning violations (Maddux, Adam, & Galin-
sky, 2010; Markman, Lindberg, Kray, & Galinsky, 2007). Experimental work on
this topic has shown that, for example, thinking about how events could have eas-
ily turned out different increases abstract thinking and creative problem solving
(Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000). One may also refer to the somewhat informally
observed relationship between experienced anxiety and high-quality creative work
of certain artists, like Van Gogh or Beethoven.
1.1.4 The state of meaninglessness
As previously noted, many events can constitute a meaning violation and
a variety of behaviors are performed following the loss of meaning. In-between
meaning violations and the compensatory behavior they induce is the experience
of meaninglessness. But what exactly does this state of meaninglessness entail?
According to the MMM, the state of meaninglessness is a state of aversive psy-
chophysiological arousal. Unlike the tenet that meaning violations consist of the
violation of expectations and that meaning violations in one domain can be ad-
dressed by the affirmation of values in unrelated domains, the specific claim that
meaning violations result in aversive psychophysiological arousal has received rel-
atively less attention (although see Proulx & Heine, 2008). Nevertheless, sev-
eral lines of research offer empirical support for the MMM’s prediction of aversive
arousal following meaning violations.
Previous psychological phenomena that are reinterpreted as meaning vio-
lations in the MMM were already considered to result in physiological arousal.
Festinger (1957) suggested that the experience of dissonance should be accompa-
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nied by elevated levels of arousal and this relationship has indeed been found
(Croyle & Cooper, 1983; Elkin & Leippe, 1986; Gerard, 1967; Harmon-Jones,
Brehm, Greenberg, Simon, & Nelson, 1996; Losch & Cacioppo, 1990). Similar
increases in arousal have been found following self-view inconsistencies (Ayduk,
Gyurak, Akinola, & Mendes, 2012), worldview violations (Townsend et al., 2010),
category-based violations (Mendes, Blascovich, Hunter, Lickel, & Jost, 2007), and
unexpected social rejection (Gunther Moor, Crone, & van der Molen, 2010). These
elevations in arousal were assessed with a variety of different measures of arousal,
such as finger amplitude, galvanic skin response, and heart rate.
Further evidence can be found in so-called misattribution of arousal studies.
In these studies, participants are given an opportunity to attribute any felt arousal
to a secondary source, thus eliminating the need for compensatory behavior (In-
zlicht & Al-Khindi, 2012; Kay, Moscovitch, & Laurin, 2010; Losch & Cacioppo,
1990; Proulx & Heine, 2008; Zanna & Cooper, 1974). For example, Proulx and
Heine (2008) introduced participants to a particular experimenter, who changed
halfway throughout the experiment without notification. This change was unno-
ticed by the participants, but nonetheless violated their expectations as seen in
the increased affirmation of a moral belief relative to the control condition. Some
of the participants were given a placebo and believed that it could produce mild
arousal or anxiety. As a result, they attributed the arousal from the meaning viola-
tion to the placebo and did not feel the need to affirm one of their moral beliefs. In
a different study it has been demonstrated that the effect of a meaning violation
on compensatory behavior is also reduced when participants receive a sedative
(Cooper, Zanna, & Taves, 1978). These findings demonstrate the role of arousal
in producing compensatory behaviors following meaning violations.
Recent theorizing suggests that the aversive arousal may consist of specific
neurocognitive structures in the brain that form the Behavioral Inhibition Sys-
tem (BIS). The BIS was described by Gray (1982) in his book entitled “The Neu-
ropsychology of Anxiety” (since updated Gray & McNaughton, 2003). Any kind of
threat activates the BIS and produces behavioral inhibition, heightened arousal,
and increased vigilance. This stops ongoing behavior and focuses attention on
the environment to scan for further threats and solutions. Several potential brain
structures have been identified to underly BIS activation. These studies suggest the
involvement of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). The ACC receives input sev-
eral brain areas related to the processing of emotional and motivational factors,
such as the limbic lobe, which includes the orbitofrontal cortex and the amygdala
(Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000; Morecraft & van Hoesen, 1998; Pandya, van Hoe-
sen, & Mesulam, 1981; van Hoesen, Morecraft, & Vogt, 1993; Vogt, Sikes, & Vogt,
1993). The exact function of the ACC is still controversial but it appears to relate
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to such processes as conflict monitoring (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Co-
hen, 2001; Yeung, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2004) or prediction errors following from
expectations derived from one’s learning history (reinforcement-learning theory;
Holroyd & Coles, 2002).
Not only has the ACC been linked to the underlying source of meaning, ex-
pectations, but the ACC has also already been empirically linked to meaning viola-
tions. The ACC is activated when people are made aware of their mortality (Quirin
et al., 2012), when people experiences cognitive dissonance (Kitayama, Chua,
Tompson, & Han, 2013; van Veen, Krug, Schooler, & Carter, 2009), when people
have less control (Salomons, Johnstone, Backonja, & Davidson, 2004), and dur-
ing social exclusion (Bolling, Pelphrey, & Vander Wyk, 2012; Bolling et al., 2011;
Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003; Gunther Moor et al., 2012; Lelieveld,
Moor, Crone, Karremans, & van Beest, 2012; Masten et al., 2009). This has led to
the suggestion that the ACC, and more generally the BIS, is the root cause of the
aversiveness that follows from meaning violations (Proulx & Inzlicht, 2012); and
that it is this state of aversive arousal that motivates subsequent compensatory
behavior to alleviate that aversive arousal.
The subsequent compensatory behavior is theorized to in turn activate the
behavioral activation system (BAS). The BAS is wholly different from the BIS and
instead of focusing on threats, it focuses on rewards, non-punishment, and escape
from punishment. The BAS is a state associated with feelings of hope, elation
and happiness. It is believed that the BAS is responsible for the compensatory
behaviors that follow in response to meaning violations. Activation of the BAS
results in a down regulation of the BIS, thus serving a palliative function.
1.2 Limitations of the meaning-physiological
arousal link
The main idea of the MMM is that meaning violations cause a common syn-
drome of aversive arousal which motivates subsequent compensatory behavior,
thereby reducing the aversive arousal. Although there is an abundant literature
demonstrating a link between meaning violations and a psychophysiological re-
action, the relationship between the physiological reaction and the compensatory,
palliative, response is empirically weaker. Indeed, studies in which the the entire
process of meaning violation, physiological response, and compensatory behavior
is tested are rare.
The absence of such studies is unlikely due to a lack of interest from re-
searchers in the field. Rather, this absence is likely due to challenges associated
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with the methodological requirements to test this relationship. For instance, one
of the lines of evidence offering support for the role of arousal in responding to
meaning violations is the use of the misattribution of arousal paradigm. Multi-
ple studies have shown that when participants can misattribute their arousal to a
source secondary source, the typical relationship between the primary source and
outcome measure disappears (e.g., Croyle & Cooper, 1983; Fazio, Russell, Zanna,
& Cooper, 1977; Proulx & Heine, 2008). Ironically, although this paradigm is one
of the most convincing pieces of evidence for the relevance of arousal in respond-
ing to meaning violations, its very mechanism can also prevent the demonstration
of relating the arousal to compensatory behaviors. That is, most assessments of
physiological arousal consist of placing electrodes or using special equipment that
puts varying demands on the participant. These assessment techniques are likely
to evoke arousal in and of itself, thus providing participants with a source to at-
tribute any felt arousal to. This eliminates the possibility for manipulated meaning
violations to induce the expected compensatory behavior. This unfortunate possi-
bility has been demonstrated by Croyle and Cooper (1983). They first conducted
a typical counter-attitudinal essay experiment and revealed the standard cogni-
tive dissonance effect—students in the high choice condition arguing in favor of a
lower drinking age became more in favor of a lower legal drinking age than those
who had no choice. In their second study they used skin conductance to assess
the arousal associated with cognitive dissonance and found such relationship, but
the relationship between cognitive dissonance and attitude change disappeared.
The authors interpreted this absence of an effect due to participants misattributing
their arousal to the physiological recording device.
A further limitation of physiological assessments is that they often require a
relatively long period of measurement time to attain a reliable signal. This con-
flicts with the typical design setup of studies in the literature on compensatory
behavior. The standard study consist of a between-subjects design, in which the
presence or absence of a meaning violation is manipulated, followed by a few
minutes delay, after which the compensatory response is assessed. This kind of
methodological design is practically incompatible with most physiological arousal
recording techniques, whose designs often consist of a within-subjects design and
consist of many repeated trials. Applying such techniques to a typical compen-
satory response study would involve a substantial delay between the meaning
violation and compensatory behavior, as well as a loss of power due to the use of a
between-subjects design. For these reasons, it should be no surprise that evidence
for this link is mixed.
Therefore, a potential solution might reside in the use of physiological assess-
ment techniques that do not have the limitation of placing a large and noticeable
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burden on the participant and that can be used to investigate a wide range of
psychological phenomena. Such a technique is pupillometry. Recent advances in
eye trackers have made the technique both affordable and easy to use. More im-
portantly, eye trackers have become significantly less intrusive, thus making it less
likely for participants to attribute their arousal to the eye tracker device. Pupillom-
etry also has a productive historical background that demonstrates the reliability
of the tool in assessing arousal.
1.3 Pupillometry
The human eye serves first and foremost for seeing. Through the pupil, light
enters the eye and reaches the retina. Here a cascade of chemical and electrical
events trigger nerve impulses that are transmitted through the optic nerve to vi-
sual cortices in the brain, ultimately resulting in vision. Of particular interest is
the pupil. The pupil determines the amount of light that enters the eye by varying
its size through two sets of muscles, the sphincter and dilator pupillae. According
to Steinhauer, Siegle, Condray, and Pless (2004) these two muscles are differen-
tially influenced by activity in the sympathetic and parasympathetic branches of
the nervous system. Increased sympathetic activity increases the activity of the
dilator muscle, prompting dilation, increases in parasympathetic activity increases
activity of the sphincter muscle, prompting constriction. Alternatively, inhibition
of parasympathetic activity lessens constriction of the sphincter muscle, resulting
in dilation. Thus, increases in pupillary diameter can be caused by activity in
either division of the autonomic nervous system.
The most likely causes for changes in pupil size are the light reflex and the
accommodation reflex. The light reflex is the change in pupil size in response to
the intensity (luminance) of light that falls on the retina. The accommodation
reflex is the change in pupil size resulting from focusing between near and far
objects. Yet, aside from the relatively large changes in pupil size caused by these
reflexes, there are also small, visually insignificant fluctuations in pupil diameter
that do not seem to serve any visual function. Instead, these small fluctuations,
often less than 0.5 mm, reflect cognitive processes and serve as the basis for the
technique called pupillometry. The relationship between pupil size and cognitive
processes was proposed near the end of the 19th century (e.g., Schiff, 1875) and
shortly after the turn of the century Oswald Bumke concluded that:
“Every active intellectual process, every psychical effort, every exertion
of attention, every active mental image, regardless of content, particu-
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larly every affect just as truly produces pupil enlargement as does every
sensory stimulus” (Translated in Hess, 1975, pp. 23-24)
1.3.1 Measuring pupil size
In the 1960s pupil size was measured using motion picture photography
(Hess & Polt, 1964; Kahneman & Beatty, 1966). This method consists of first
taking a picture of a ruler at a distance equal to that of the pupil which is to be
recorded. Then, the camera was centered on the iris and pictures of the pupil
were taken once every 0.5 to 1 second. The images were projected onto a large
surface and the pupil was measured with a simple ruler. Thankfully, technological
advances greatly improved on this labor- and time-intensive process. High res-
olution infrared video-cameras were developed that could continuously measure
the size of the pupil, at a much higher frequency than before. This was usually
accompanied by a head rest so that participants would not be able to move their
heads and disturb the recording. Even more advanced models can also record the
pupil without the use of a head rest, such as the Tobii T60 eye tracker. This eye
tracker uses near infrared illumination to create reflection patterns on the cornea
and pupils of the eye, which are captured by an image sensor, allowing the posi-
tion of the eye and pupil size to be derived using image processing algorithms and
a mathematical model of the eye.
The result is a stream of data that, among several other measurements such
as gaze direction, contains the size of the pupil of each eye separately. For each
data point there is also a validity score ranging from 0 to 4, indicating the cer-
tainty of the system that the estimated data is correct and belongs to the correct
eye. Uncertain data can be discarded and the remaining data points of each eye
can be averaged together into a single measure of pupil size. Following this, the
data should be inspected for eye blinks and artifacts. Eye blinks can be observed
by short gaps in the data and artifacts can be seen in rapid jumps in pupil size,
often near gaps of missing data. To clean the data, gaps can be filled using linear
interpolation. Blinks can cause sudden jumps in pupil size that are unlikely to be
the result of cognitive processes. To solve the issue of these artifacts and noise,
filters are applied that smoothen the data. After this, the average pupil size can
be calculated during the period of interest. This is often the period following the
presentation of a stimulus. Because the presentation of a stimulus is often accom-
panied by a difference in luminosity, a light reflex is likely to occur. As a result,
a small window of time (up until half a second) following the presentation of a
stimulus is often not used in the calculation of the average. Finally, to control for
differences in pupil size at the moment of stimulus presentation, a baseline aver-
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age is calculated and subtracted from the measurements following the stimulus
presentation. The end result is a measure indicating the change in pupil size after
specific stimuli. These can then be compared and interpreted.
1.3.2 The meaning of pupillometry
In his monograph entitled ‘Attention and Effort’, Kahneman (1973) suggested
that pupil dilation can be a psychophysiological marker of mental effort. This idea
was later confirmed by Beatty (1982), who performed a review on the variety
of ways pupil size was used to assess cognitive demands. These ways include
processes related to memory, language, reasoning, and perception. To illustrate,
trying to memorize larger sequences of numbers was associated with greater pupil
size than memorizing smaller numbers (Kahneman & Beatty, 1966); and the same
finding was found for multiplication exercises (Ahern & Beatty, 1979, 1981; Hess
& Polt, 1964), language exercises (Wright & Kahneman, 1971), and perceptual ex-
ercises (Hakarem & Sutton, 1966; Kahneman & Beatty, 1967), with more difficult
exercises being associated with greater pupil size.
More recent studies have provided evidence that the pupil is also associated
with emotional arousal. One important psychological construct related to emo-
tional arousal is the experience of pain. Multiple studies have been conducted
that link the size of the pupil with noxious stimulation and self-reported pain
(Chapman, Oka, Bradshaw, Jacobson, & Donaldson, 1999; Ellermeier & Westphal,
1995; Höfle, Kenntner-Mabiala, Pauli, & Alpers, 2008). For example, the pupil
dilates when one is being subjected to painful ice spray and appears to decrease
in size when the pain is experienced as less severe (Connelly et al., 2014; Walter,
Lesch, Stöhr, Grünberger, & Gutierrez-Lobos, 2006). On the opposite side of the
spectrum of stimuli, Aboyoun and Dabbs (1998) presented sexual stimuli to par-
ticipants and found more pupil dilation in response to pictures of naked people
than of clothed people, for both men and women. Bradley, Miccoli, Escrig, and
Lang (2008) also investigated the relationship between pupil size and emotional
arousal by presenting participants with pleasant, unpleasant, and neutral pictures.
They found that pupil size increased in response to both positively and negatively
valenced pictures. This crucial finding shows that pupil size is not determined by
the valence direction (positive or negative), as was once believed (e.g., Hess &
Polt, 1960), but that instead the pupil is determined by general arousal.
In fact, recent studies have linked pupillary reactivity to neuroaffective arousal
due to its close association with the locus coeruleus-norepinephrine system (LC-
NE; Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005; Joshi, Li, Kalwani, & Gold, 2016; Murphy, O’Connell,
O’Sullivan, Robertson, & Balsters, 2014; Varazzani, San-Galli, Gilardeau, & Bouret,
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2015). The LC-NE system is responsible for the control of behavior by regulating
engagement or withdrawal from a task through the release of NE by the LC in the
forebrain. This system is relevant for such processes as stress responses, mem-
ory retrieval, attention, the sleep-wake cycle, and general state of arousal. Pupil
size appears to co-vary with LC activity in both monkeys (Gilzenrat, Nieuwenhuis,
Jepma, & Cohen, 2010; Joshi et al., 2016; Varazzani et al., 2015) and humans
(Gilzenrat et al., 2010; Murphy et al., 2014). Additionally, Beatty and colleagues
have demonstrated that pupil reactivity is consistent with LC responses (Beatty,
1982; Jackson, 1982; Richer & Beatty, 1987).
In summary, pupillometry reflects psychophysiological arousal that can be
used to infer a broad range of psychological phenomena, whether it’s cognitive
processes such as cognitive load, memory, and language, or emotional processes
such as pain and motivationally relevant stimuli. This broad applicability of pupil-
lometry makes it an attractive tool in the investigation of meaning. In this context,
from the perspective of the MMM, we are interested in the arousal response fol-
lowing meaning violations. Some research has been conducted that links pupil
size to processes closely associated with the experience of a meaning violation.
These include studies on task error (i.e., providing an incorrect answer in the
task at hand) or the pupillary reaction to incongruent Stroop trials, as this too
constitutes cognitive conflict. Studies using these methods have shown that both
are associated with increased pupil dilation (Brown et al., 1999; Critchley, Tang,
Glaser, Butterworth, & Dolan, 2005; Laeng, Ørbo, Holmlund, & Miozzo, 2011).
Additionally, pupillometry has also been successfully applied to the study of social
rejection (Silk et al., 2012; Vanderhasselt, Remue, Ng, Mueller, & De Raedt, 2015).
But most importantly, multiple studies have demonstrated that the pupil dilates
in response to violations of expectations (Preuschoff, ’t Hart, & Einhäuser, 2011;
Raisig, Hagendorf, & van der Meer, 2012; Raisig, Welke, Hagendorf, & van der
Meer, 2010). It thus appears that pupil size can be used a valid proxy for the in-
vestigation of meaning related phenomena. With this potential, pupillometry can
be used to address the role of arousal in the link between meaning violations and
compensatory behavior, as well as related questions.
1.4 Main research questions
In this dissertation we are interested in the role of physiological arousal in
responding to violations of meaning, using the MMM as our guiding theoretical
framework. The integrative efforts of the MMM have produced various novel con-
tributions to the literature, but certain aspects, particularly those related to the
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role of arousal, have not yet received equal attention. Consequently, multiple
questions remain. What are the underlying physiological structures that govern
the reaction to meaning violations and the compensatory behavior that follows? Is
the physiological response identical across multiple kinds of meaning violations?
How does it relate to specific compensatory behaviors, such as assimilation, ac-
commodation, and affirmation? In this dissertation, we review the existing litera-
ture and report empirical studies to address these questions. In so doing, we hope
to expand the literature on existential psychology more generally, and the MMM
specifically.
In our empirical work we use pupillometry as a proxy for physiological arousal.
We test whether meaning violations reliably induce a change in pupil size consis-
tent with the theorized aversive arousal response as predicted by the MMM. We
will use a variety of meaning violations, such as perceptual anomalies, social ex-
clusion, and belief feedback, as well as multiple ways to assess compensatory be-
havior. According to the MMM, we should find that meaning violations cause an
increase in physiological arousal, i.e., increase in pupil size, and that this arousal
predicts the occurrence and magnitude of compensatory behavior.
Finally, at the same time we see these studies as further validation of pupil-
lometry as a tool in the study of psychological phenomena. Pupillometry already
has a rich history as a way of assessing mental events but recent technological
developments are making it easier and cheaper to use, potentially resulting in an
increased popularity of this technology. For that reason, it is fruitful to better
understand to what extent this tool can be applied in typical psychological exper-
iments. We hope this dissertation will provide more insight into pupillometry as
part of the experimenter’s toolkit.
1.5 Overview of chapters
This section contains an outline of the work we have done on the topic of
physiological arousal and meaning violations. Each chapter is based on individual
papers that are either published or currently in the submission process. Conse-
quently, they can be read separately or together as a set of studies that address the
questions of this dissertation. Below follows an overview of each chapter.
Chapter 2 is a theory paper in which we review the literature on the underly-
ing physiological structures responsible for reacting to meaning violations. In line
with the MMM, we show that the current literature is consistent with and shows
support for the view that compensatory behaviors are palliative efforts to reduce
the aversive physiological arousal induced by meaning violations. We discuss the
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relevant literature to show that meaning violations consistently induce a state of
aversive arousal and theorize on the underlying physiological substrates responsi-
ble for this state. Additionally, we discuss the potential underlying physiological
substrates responsible for compensatory behavior and the potential for a palliative
function of compensatory behavior to reduce the aversive experience of meaning
violations.
In Chapter 3 we investigated the role of arousal in response to belief-feedback
and assimilation. We applied pupillometry to the context of receiving positive and
negative feedback about commonly held, but incorrect, beliefs, i.e., misconcep-
tions. We hypothesized that negative feedback should result in greater pupil di-
lation compared to receiving positive feedback, thereby demonstrating a state of
arousal following a meaning violation. Additionally, we investigated the role of
commitment towards the beliefs, expecting that negative feedback would result
in greater pupil dilation when commitment towards the belief is higher. Crucially,
however, we tested how arousal relates to one of the MMM’s meaning seeking
strategies, specifically that of assimilation. By providing ambiguous feedback we
could investigate whether people show a tendency to assimilate negative feedback
in such a way as to prevent a disconfirmation of their beliefs. Aside from providing
data on the validity of pupillometry in the context of belief disconfirmation, this
chapter reveals an initial relationship between physiological arousal and meaning.
In Chapter 4 we investigated the link between meaning violations, arousal,
and another compensatory behavior: affirmation. Using perceptual anomalies—
reverse colored playing cards—we investigated whether these anomalies cause
an increase in pupil dilation, thereby demonstrating that even trivial violations
induce a state of arousal. Additionally, we investigated whether these meaning
violations lead to an increased affirmation of a moral value and tested whether
this affirmation could be predicted by the physiological response to the meaning
violation. We also investigated the role of extremism. Adherence to extreme val-
ues might in part be explained by an extreme tendency to affirm values following
meaning violations. We investigated this possibility by measuring extremism re-
garding multiple moral values and linking it to the pupillary response following a
meaning violation. This chapter thus informs not only on the role of arousal and
compensatory behavior, but also the psychological phenomena of extremism.
In Chapter 5 we investigate the crucial link between physiological arousal
and a third form of compensatory behavior, accommodation. We use the hind-
sight bias, or the ‘knew-it-all-along’ effect, to investigate whether unexpected an-
swers to factual questions elicit greater pupil dilation and whether this increase
in arousal is associated with an increased likelihood to show the hindsight bias,
seen as a compensatory accommodation effort. This design addresses some often
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found methodological shortcomings in studies investigating the role of arousal in
predicting behavioral outcomes such as compensatory responses.
In Chapter 6 we applied the use of pupillometry to the social domain to in-
form us on whether meaning violations induce an identical physiological reaction
in a different domain of meaning violations. Two competing hypotheses are tested
regarding social exclusion. Being socially excluded can be predominantly a con-
flict of expectations, as being excluded for seemingly no reason likely constitutes
of a violation of the norm to include people, or it can be predominantly a pain-
based response, as social pain has been likened to physical pain. We used pupil-
lometry to see whether we could find support for either the first interpretation, a
conflict-based process, or the second interpretation, a pain-based process, thereby
informing us on the role of arousal in the social domain of meaning violations.
In Chapter 7 the aforementioned studies and their results will be summa-
rized and related to the research questions of this dissertation. Limitations and
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Abstract
People maintain systems of beliefs that provide them with a sense of belong-
ingness, control, identity, and meaning, more generally. Recent research shows
that when these beliefs are threatened a syndrome of negatively valenced arousal
is evoked that motivates people to seek comfort in their ideologies or other per-
sonally valued beliefs. In this paper we will provide an overview of this process
and discuss areas for future research. Beginning with the neural foundations of
meaning violations, we review findings that show the anterior cingulate cortex is
responsible for detecting inconsistencies, and importantly, that this is experienced
as aversive. Next, we evaluate the evidential support for a psychophysiological
arousal response as measured by cardiography and skin conductance. We discuss
how current theorizing proposes that subsequent behavioral approach ameliorates
the negative arousal and serves as an effective, well-adapted coping response, but
we also aim to further integrate this process in the existing threat-compensation
literature. Finally, we speculate on whether approach motivation is likely to result
when one feels capable of handling the threat, thereby incorporating the biopsy-
chosocial model that distinguishes between challenge and threat into the motiva-
tional threat-response literature. We believe the current literature on threat and
meaning has much to offer and we aim to provide new incentives for further de-
velopment.




Over the course of the last half a century, research on coping has identi-
fied a plurality of ways that people deal with stress (Zimmer-Gembeck & Skinner,
2011). To illustrate, people commonly find comfort in actions such as seeking
out social contacts, engaging in wishful thinking, eating comforting foods and tak-
ing hot showers. As we will argue in this review, people will also approach and
affirm committed values, ideals, ideologies, and worldviews. Generally, comfort
is sought in response to threatening experiences, and we believe that the threat-
compensation literature has much to offer on the topic of self-comforting strate-
gies. In this literature an integrative picture is emerging that states motivational
processes underlie the response to a certain class of stressors we describe as mean-
ing violations (e.g., McGregor et al., 2010; Proulx & Inzlicht, 2012). It is argued
that when faced with a meaning violation, people show an initial defensive reac-
tion marked by anxiety, vigilance, and avoidance, which subsequently switches to
a motivational state of behavioral approach that ameliorates this anxiety, thereby
serving a palliative, self-comforting function. In this review, we will provide an
overview of the neuroaffective and psychophysiological processes that have been
linked to the typical compensation behavior of the threat-compensation literature,
and suggest directions for future research in this field.
2.1 Defining meaning violations
The threat-compensation literature is filled with psychological theories aimed
at describing and understanding people’s reactions to particular types of threat
(Proulx & Inzlicht, 2012). Of these threats, traumatic experiences (e.g., sexual
abuse, natural disasters, violent attacks) undoubtedly rank among the most im-
pactful. These experiences threaten core motivations such as our desire to avoid
death and attain personal control—two motives that have received much attention
in the social psychological literature, framed in terms of prominent perspectives
such as terror management theory (Burke et al., 2010) and compensatory control
theory (Kay et al., 2009). Traumatic experiences, however, do not simply create
a single dose of proximal anxiety. In addition to the clear physical hazards they
often represent, they also impact the way in which we understand ourselves and
our world. Instead of living in a safe and just world—a common assumption—
they force us to realize we live in a world of danger and injustice. This implication
initiates a second dose of anxiety (Janoff-Bulman, 1992), whereby the threat to
physical safety is compounded by shattered assumptions. Although the context
of a traumatic experience easily evokes the understanding that related cognitions
are important for well-being, Bruner and Postman (1949) used a relatively trivial
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perceptual anomaly to reach similar conclusions. They presented people with re-
verse colored playing cards (e.g., a black two of hearts) an experience that did not
match their expectations and elicited signs of personal distress.
Cognitive dissonance theory has formally described this mismatch between
beliefs and experiences along with the aversive feeling of dissonance that results
(Festinger, 1957; or see Brehm, 2007). Subsequent theorists have developed this
focus on cognitive consistency and uncertainty. For example, lay epistemic theory
(Kruglanski, Orehek, Dechesne, & Pierro, 2010), self-verification theory (Swann &
Read, 1981), and uncertainty management theories (e.g., Uncertainty Reduction;
Hogg, 2007; Uncertainty Management; van den Bos, 2001; van den Bos & Lind,
2002) all focus on a motivation to replace dissonant cognitions with consonant
cognitions and perceived clarity. One way to achieve this is by assimilating expe-
riences so that they are consistent with one’s expectations. Bruner and Postman
(1949) found that people often reported not seeing a black two of hearts, but actu-
ally an expectancy-congruent black two of spades. Alternatively, they could have
accommodated their understanding by realizing they were perceiving an altered
deck of playing cards. This form of dissonance reduction was commonly reported
in classic cognitive dissonance paradigms where participants—mostly students—
were induced to behave in ways that contradicted their attitudes (e.g., argue in
favor of a tuition increase). Subsequent accommodation of the dissonant behav-
ior took place in the form of a change in attitude toward the tuition fee, thereby
resolving the dissonance. In sum, assimilation, and accommodation can be seen
as compensatory responses to resolve inconsistencies in cognitions.
Psychologists have furthermore observed that in addition to assimilation and
accommodation, people can show a heightened commitment to alternative beliefs
or values following many of the same inconsistencies that elicit assimilation or
accommodation behaviors. For example, arguing for a tuition increase results in
a change in attitude toward the tuition fee, but not if participants are first given
the opportunity to affirm of unrelated values such as political beliefs (Steele &
Liu, 1983). Hundreds of subsequent studies have shown active affirmation of
values following reminders of mortality (Burke et al., 2010), lack of control (e.g.,
Kay, Gaucher, McGregor, & Nash, 2010), and the experience of uncertainty (e.g.,
van den Bos et al., 2006).
The abundance of threat-related theories almost invariably led to the devel-
opment of more integrative perspectives. According to the Meaning Maintenance
Model (MMM; Heine et al., 2006; Proulx & Inzlicht, 2012), any inconsistency
between experience and expectation evokes a syndrome of negative arousal that
motivates compensation efforts. According to the Reactive Approach Motivation
model (RAM; McGregor et al., 2010), threats represent cues to goal conflicts that
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cause anxious uncertainty and in turn elicits an approach motivation to resolve the
anxiety. More generally, these integrative models all frame threat-compensation
effects in terms of discrepancies between perceptions, beliefs, or conflicting mo-
tivations. We see these discrepancies as affecting meaning, or the expected rela-
tionships that allow us to make sense of our experiences. To distinguish between
threats that stem from negatively self-relevant situations (e.g., a dangerous preda-
tor, a robber) and sources of inconsistency (e.g., paradigm violations; Bruner &
Postman, 1949; prediction errors; Hajcak & Foti, 2008) that affect psychological
motivation, we refer to the latter as meaning violations. While meaning violations
may also have negatively self-relevant implications (e.g., worldview-violating per-
sonal tragedies; Janoff-Bulman, 1992), the presence of inconsistency may be both
necessary and sufficient to evoke the state of uncertainty that underlies the com-
mon aversive reactions, whether they follow from existential reminders, lack of
control, behavioral dissonance, epistemic uncertainty or goal conflicts. This is fol-
lowed by a compensatory reaction that resolves the aversive uncertainty caused
by the meaning violation.
2.2 The physiology of meaning violations
2.2.1 Behavioral approach and frontal asymmetry
In 1982, Gray (1982) published “The Neuropsychology of Anxiety” (since
updated; Gray & McNaughton, 2003) that describes anxiety as activity of the be-
havioral inhibition system (BIS). A threat, however, generated, activates the BIS
and produces behavioral inhibition, heightened arousal, and increased vigilance.
As a result, ongoing behavior is halted and the environment is scanned for further
threatening cues. In contrast to the behavioral inhibition system, a second system
is responsible for reengaging behavior, known as the behavioral approach system
(BAS; also known as the behavioral activation system). The BAS responds to re-
ward cues, non-punishment and escape from punishment. This state is marked by
attentional narrowing and feelings of hope, elation, and happiness.
Gray’s model of anxiety is mainly a neuropsychological model and, and while
it is based in large part on animal models, several human neurophysiological sub-
strates have been proposed to underlie the BAS and BIS. Some of these substrates
are now being investigated in the context of meaning violations. These involve
the frontal areas of the brain, potentially the lateral and orbital regions of the pre-
frontal cortex. This is based on studies showing asymmetrical activation in frontal
areas during approach and avoidance motivations (see Coan & Allen, 2003; David-
son, 1992). Various psychological states elicit a frontal asymmetry that is consis-
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tent with a BAS state interpretation. For instance, Sutton and Davidson (1997)
measured prefrontal asymmetry using EEG and linked this to self-report measures
of BIS and BAS, using the BIS/BAS scale developed by Carver and White (1994).
The BAS scale assesses people’s tendency to experience positive affect and
behavioral activation in goal-oriented situations. The BIS scale assesses the ten-
dency to experience negative affect and behavioral inhibition in the face of threats.
Sutton and Davidson (1997) found that greater left prefrontal activation was cor-
related with higher levels of BAS strength, whereas those with greater relative
right prefrontal activity reported greater BIS strength. They also ruled out alter-
native explanations such as positive and negative affect confounds that are asso-
ciated with BAS and BIS, respectively. These findings have also been shown in
a study by Harmon-Jones and Allen (1997), who linked frontal cortical activity
to self-report measures of BIS and BAS. To gain more insight into the underlying
structures responsible for the asymmetry, Pizzagalli, Sherwood, Henriques, and
Davidson (2005) performed a source localization study and found a correlation
between activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal and medial orbitofrontal regions
and a bias for reward-related cues (also see Berkman & Lieberman, 2010). This
further supports not only the relationship between frontal asymmetry and BAS,
but also provides some insight into the anatomical details of this relationship.
At first, however, it was believed that frontal asymmetry was related to emo-
tional valence, with greater left frontal asymmetry being linked to positive af-
fective processing styles and vice versa (Fox, 1991; Jones & Fox, 1992; Wheeler,
Davidson, & Tomarken, 1993). Yet, the previously discussed studies show the func-
tioning is less related to emotional valence, and actually favor a motivational ori-
entation interpretation. One particular study by Berkman and Lieberman (2010)
has demonstrated that prefrontal asymmetry is associated with action motivation
and not with stimulus valence. In their study, they compared approach/avoidance
actions vs. stimulus valence using a novel goal pursuit task. Functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) revealed an increased left activation in the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex during approach (vs. avoidance) actions irrespective of the va-
lence of the stimulus. No such asymmetry was observed for pleasant compared
to unpleasant stimuli. Additionally, individual differences in approach-avoidance
motivation moderated the effect such that increasing trait approach motivation
was associated with greater left-sided asymmetry during approach actions.
This interpretation, that frontal asymmetry reflects BAS, is further bolstered
by studies linking frontal asymmetry to psychological constructs related to BAS
motivation, such as depression and anger. Depression is argued to consist partially
of a lack of motivation to approach. Consistently, depression has been linked
to lower levels of relative left frontal activity (Allen, Iacono, Depue, & Arbisi,
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1993; Henriques & Davidson, 1990). Anger, despite having a negative affective
valence, has also been linked to greater left frontal activity (Harmon-Jones, 2003;
Harmon-Jones & Allen, 1998). The link between anger and frontal asymmetry has
also been supported through means of transcranial magnetic stimulation; which
has shown that decreasing activity in the left prefrontal cortex lowers a memory
bias for angry faces (van Honk & Schutter, 2006). Frontal asymmetry has also
been shown in people who are in a promotion-oriented state (i.e., focused on
gaining reward instead of avoiding losses), as opposed to an avoidance orientated
state (Amodio, Shah, Sigelman, Brazy, & Harmon-Jones, 2004). Finally, affecting
frontal asymmetry through biofeedback techniques has been shown to increase
self-reported affect and facial muscle activity in response to emotionally evocative
film clips (Allen, Harmon-Jones, & Cavender, 2001). These findings thus support
the interpretation that frontal asymmetry is related to behavioral activation.
2.2.2 Behavioral inhibition and the anterior cingulate cortex
Although many studies show a link between frontal asymmetry and behav-
ioral activation-related outcome measures, the link between frontal asymmetry
and behavioral inhibition is not always shown (Coan & Allen, 2003). Often stud-
ies lack the potential for greater insight into to the anatomical functioning of the
underlying structures (Davidson, 2004), mostly due to the fact that non-spatial
sensitive measures such as EEG are being used (see Berkman & Lieberman, 2010,
for an exception). EEG studies have, however, found other potential markers for
BIS activation, and these markers have also been linked to meaning violations.
These markers suggest the involvement of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC).
The ACC receives input from the limbic lobe, including the orbitofrontal cortex
and the amygdala, as well as other nociceptive sources. For this reason it has been
argued that the ACC serves a critical function for emotional and motivational fac-
tors (Bush et al., 2000; Morecraft & van Hoesen, 1998; Pandya et al., 1981; van
Hoesen et al., 1993; Vogt et al., 1993). The exact function of the ACC is still
controversial. Research on error related negativity (ERN) suggests various possi-
bilities. The ERN is a negative voltage deflection measured over the fronto-central
scalp that appears to reflect activation of the ACC (Dehaene, Posner, & Tucker,
1994; Miltner, Braun, & Coles, 1997). The ERN is elicited when people commit
errors, or specifically, when they receive feedback about having committed an er-
ror, and usually appears between 250 and 300 ms after the feedback (Falkenstein,
Hohnsbein, Hoormann, & Blanke, 1990; Gehring, Goss, Coles, Meyer, & Donchin,
1993; Nieuwenhuis, Holroyd, Mol, & Coles, 2004). Various models of the function
of ERNs exist and they suggest that the ERN reflects either a conflict monitor-
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ing function (Botvinick et al., 2001; Yeung et al., 2004) or an evaluative function
based on expectations developed during learning history (reinforcement-learning
theory; Holroyd & Coles, 2002). In the latter construal, the ERN is an indication
that events are worse than anticipated, or better than expected. Luu, Collins, and
Tucker (2000) have proposed that the ERN may signify affective processing in re-
sponse to errors. This proposal is based on evidence that the magnitude of the ERN
is affected by motivational and affective variables. Individuals with symptoms of
depression (Chiu, Deldin, Pearl H. Chiu, & Patricia J. Deldin, 2007), obsessive-
compulsive disorder (Gehring, Himle, & Nisenson, 2000; Hajcak, Franklin, Foa, &
Simons, 2008; Hajcak & Simons, 2002), and generalized anxiety (Hajcak, McDon-
ald, & Simons, 2003, 2004) show greater ERNs. Additionally, ERN activity has
been associated with stronger skin conductance responses (Hajcak et al., 2004)
and a more pronounced startle response following threat (Hajcak & Foti, 2008),
while removal of this brain structure is associated with flat affect and a lack of dis-
tress (Corkin, Twitchell, & Sullivan, 1979; Critchley et al., 2003). Similar to previ-
ously mentioned studying linking self-reported BAS to frontal asymmetry, Amodio,
Master, Yee, and Taylor (2008) have linked self-reported BIS to ACC functioning.
They found that self-reported BIS was uniquely related to the ERN in a Go/No-Go
task, but not self-reported BAS. Moreover, BIS was also related to the N2, a neg-
ative potential that peaks about 250 ms after the onset of a No-Go trial; and is
believed to arise similarly from the ACC (Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, van den Wilden-
berg, & Ridderinkhof, 2003; van Veen & Carter, 2002). These findings, and those
discussed earlier, point toward the ACC being a crucial component of the BIS.
One of the most relevant findings in the threat-compensation literature has
been that the ACC responds similarly to what we describe as meaning violations.
For example, Quirin et al. (2012) showed that by letting participants answer ques-
tions about their fear of death, increased ACC activation could be observed (as well
as activation in the amygdala and the caudate nucleus). The ACC activated rela-
tive to answering questions about dental pain, indicating this effect can go beyond
that of negatively self-relevant events. ACC activation has also been demonstrated
in response to the experience of cognitive dissonance. For example, Kitayama et al.
(2013) asked participants to make decisions regarding CDs that differed in attrac-
tiveness, sometimes facing an easy choice (between two CDs that differ greatly
in attractiveness, i.e., no cognitive dissonance) and a sometimes difficult choice
(between two CDs that are similar in attractiveness, i.e., cognitive dissonance).
They found that the cognitive dissonance eliciting choices resulted in activation of
the dorsal ACC. Additionally, they found that these choices also resulted in acti-
vation of areas related to emotional distress (left anterior insula). Furthermore,
they could predict a change in attitude toward the CDs that resolves the cogni-
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tive dissonance with activity in the posterior cingulate cortex. A similar setup was
used by van Veen et al. (2009) to also predict attitude change based on neural
activity in the cingulate cortex. They scanned participants with fMRI while they
argued that the scanner environment—an uncomfortable environment—was, in
fact, comfortable. Activity in the dorsal ACC, as well as activity in the anterior
insula, predicted their change in attitude. These findings point toward a role of
the ACC in resolving cognitive dissonance.
Additional studies have linked the ACC to meaning violations. For example,
Salomons et al. (2004) manipulated the controllability over a painful stimulus and
found that having less control was associated with increased ACC activity. Goal
uncertainty has also been found to affect the ACC (Tullett et al., 2013), and a line
of research has revealed that the ACC also plays a prominent role in how people
respond to experiences of social isolation. In this line of research, participants play
a ball tossing game (ostensibly) with other participants, who at a certain point
stop throwing balls to the participant, or do so with such a low frequency that
the participant experiences a lack of social inclusion. These studies consistently
show cues of ostracism (not receiving the ball) evoke activity in the ACC (Bolling
et al., 2012, 2011; Eisenberger et al., 2003; Gunther Moor et al., 2012; Masten et
al., 2009). Some argue that part of the role of the ACC is due to the unexpected
nature of not receiving a ball, and thus point to violation of expectations (e.g.,
Bolling et al., 2011). Indeed, expectancy violation as been argued to be the root
cause of the aversiveness that follows from meaning violations (Proulx & Inzlicht,
2012) and is related to ACC activity (Oliveira, McDonald, & Goodman, 2007).
2.2.3 Behavioral inhibition and the cardiovascular threat
response
Physiological indications of meaning violations are not limited to neural re-
sponses. The biopsychosocial model (BPSM) of arousal regulation (Blascovich,
2008; Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996) defines specific patterns of cardiovascular re-
sponses to threats. Specifically, the model states that when an individual faces a
threat (i.e., negative appraisal of the situation) a malignant pattern of increasing
cardiac or myocardial performance should occur, accompanied by stable or in-
creasing vascular resistance caused by activation of the pituitary-adrenal-cortical
(PAC) axis. PAC activity is thought to be under the control of the brain centers
previously discussed as BIS (Gray & McNaughton, 2003).
Substantial evidence has accumulated supporting the contention that mean-
ing violations also produce marked changes in sympathetic nervous activity. As
early as the late 1960s, it has been shown that participants forced to choose be-
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tween similar alternatives—and therefore experience cognitive dissonance—show
greater decreases in finger pulse amplitude (Gerard, 1967), an index of a physio-
logical readiness response as blood flows away from the periphery of the body. As
well, studies showing that performing attitude-discrepant behaviors also leads to
an increased galvanic skin response (GSR; Croyle & Cooper, 1983; Elkin & Leippe,
1986; Harmon-Jones et al., 1996). Losch and Cacioppo (1990) have offered addi-
tional evidence that cognitive dissonance increases arousal as measured by GSR,
and have further shown that subsequent attitude change only occurs when people
experience this arousal as explicitly unpleasant.
Other meaning violations, produce similar modes of arousal. For exam-
ple, uncertainty about interacting with out-group members has revealed patterns
of cardiovascular reactivity consistent with threat (Blascovich, Mendes, Hunter,
Lickel, & Kowai-Bell, 2001), and so too has the case of uncertainty produced by
the possibility of experiencing an electric shock (Monat, Averill, & Lazarus, 1972).
Similarly, cardiovascular responses indicating aversive arousal have been observed
in participants interacting with partners that violate expectancies (Mendes et al.,
2007, 2002), social threat (Hawkley, Williams, & Cacioppo, 2011; van Beest &
Scheepers, 2013) and a combination of these dimensions: unexpected social re-
jection (Gunther Moor et al., 2010).
2.3 Approach as a palliative
After the initial aversive response to a meaning violation, people show an
array of compensatory behaviors. Often, these are direct attempts to resolve the
source of the violation. For example, people excluded from social interaction in-
crease their interest in interaction with other people—strangers included (Maner
et al., 2007)—and they try to fit in with others more by increasing their compliance
(Carter-Sowell et al., 2008; Williams, 2007, 2009). Or, in the case of behavioral
dissonance, students who are asked to argue in favor of a tuition increase will sub-
sequently change their attitudes to resolve this attitudinally inconsistent behavior
(Harmon-Jones et al., 2008). Alternatively, people may compensate for meaning
violations in a manner wholly unrelated to the initial source of the violation, by,
for example, increasing their commitment to unrelated personal values. This latter
process, termed fluid compensation (Allport, 1943), has received much attention
and is the basis of several integrative models that now see the pursuit of commit-
ted values as a palliative effort to subdue the negative arousal caused by meaning




What is palliative about the pursuit of committed values? As we have dis-
cussed, the initial response to threat is the activation of the behavioral inhibition
system that increases vigilance, arousal, and avoidance. Behavior is halted and
the environment is scanned for an opportunity to either escape from the threat
or address the threat directly. Instead of behavioral inhibition, the person under
threat would prefer a state of behavioral activation, which will ensue once an op-
portunity to act has been detected. Such action can be directly aimed at resolving
the threat (domain-specific compensation), or can also involve indirect, relatively
abstract goals and values (domain-general compensation) that are associated with
positive affect. In other words, BIS must be turned into BAS. The defining char-
acteristic of BAS is the approach of a new goal, be it a change in attitude or the
affirmation of abstract ideals.
More recent research has demonstrated that the response to meaning vio-
lations may indeed result in an increased approach motivation. McGregor et al.
(2010) have shown that in response to uncertainty about academic aptitude, stu-
dents show a rightward error bias in the line-bisection task, which indicates in-
creased left cerebral hemisphericity. Increased activation in the left hemisphere is
in turn associated with the motivation to approach (Drake & Myers, 2006; Nash,
McGregor, & Inzlicht, 2010), as described earlier. In a second study, they showed
that students also associated their own self more with an approach motivation
after the uncertainty manipulation, as measured through an adapted implicit as-
sociation test (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), especially if the students’
ideals have been made salient (McGregor, Prentice, & Nash, 2012).
Research on the predicted positive affect associated with the motivation to
approach has so far not been thoroughly investigated. Existing research is mostly
limited to correlational work that does not fully disentangle positive affect caused
by the positive associations in the environment (e.g., the presence of food or an
attractive person) or the actual approach oriented mindset. Nonetheless, many
studies do show there is a link. Anhedonia—a diminished capacity to experience
pleasure—has been associated with a decreased approach motivation, and could
even serve as a better measure of hedonic deficit than commonly used measures
of anhedonia (Germans & Kring, 2000). More generally, approach motivation
has been linked to well-being (see Elliot, 2008, ch. 24) and many models link
approach to positive emotional states such as excitement and elation, whereas an
avoidance motivation is linked to anxiety and fear (Carver, 2004).
Additional evidence for the positivity associated with approach comes from
research comparing a personal goal either in approach-oriented terms or avoidance-
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oriented terms. An approach-oriented goal (e.g., “I will try to be more entertaining
at parties”) versus an avoidance-oriented goal (e.g., “I will try not to be such a bore
at parties”) leads to greater reports of subjective well-being. These results have
been found for a variety of types of goals, ranging from general goals to specific
life goals such as academic and social pursuits (Elliot, Gable, & Mapes, 2006; El-
liot & Sheldon, 1997). Furthermore, it has been shown that neural correlates of
well-being indicate a link to approach motivation. Greater left vs. right supe-
rior frontal activation has been associated with hedonic well-being and positive
affect (Urry et al., 2004). More direct evidence for this contention can be found
in a study by Nash, Inzlicht, and McGregor (2012). They used EEG to measure
approach-related frontal asymmetry and subsequently measured ERN as a result
of errors during a Stroop task and a multi-source interference task. In both tasks
they found that a higher leftward frontal EEG asymmetry predicted a reduced
ERN amplitude. A higher rightward frontal asymmetry predicted the opposite, an
increased ERN amplitude. This BIS marker is therefore affected by motivational
orientation in such a way that approach seems to reduce the experience of con-
flict. Although more evidence is required, there is support for the contention that
the motivation to approach is associated with positive affect and could serve as an
effective comforting strategy.
2.4 Individual differences in palliative
compensation
We have thus far reviewed evidence for the proposition that meaning viola-
tions induce a state of anxiety and inhibition, which in turn must be overcome by
approach-oriented behavior. We now address the extent to which this process is
impacted by individual difference factors, with specific emphasis on the BPSM of
threat and challenge (Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996). The BPSM of arousal distin-
guishes between physiological states associated with threat and challenge. Chal-
lenge results when an individual evaluates one’s own resources as meeting the
demands of the situation. Threat is the result of demands that we (subjectively)
determine cannot be met. This distinction is often discussed as an either/or reac-
tion, in that a situation is either perceived as challenging or threatening. However,
this model can be linked to the response to meaning violation findings we have
reviewed here. Instead of a meaning violation being immediately categorized as
something that can be overcome, we argue that meaning violations (e.g., expe-
riences of mortality reminders, behavioral dissonance, or perceptual errors) are
responded to as initially ‘threatening’, that is, affecting our appraisal of the situa-
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tion as a conflict that potentially exceeds our demands. After this initial response,
various factors influence whether the meaning violation is dealt with, or in BPSM
terminology, is seen as a challenge that can be met. Support for this integration is
not new and initial steps have already been made by Blascovich (2008). He has
argued that threat can be mapped onto behavioral inhibition avoidance and chal-
lenge onto behavioral approach. The question becomes: which factors influence
the transition from threat to challenge?
2.4.1 Self-esteem
One such factor is self-esteem. Self-esteem can be considered a trait that
determines the extent to which one feels they possess the resources necessary to
cope with obstacles and attain goals. High self-esteem should make one feel capa-
ble of dealing with obstacles, which are therefore experienced as more challenging
and less threatening, facilitating the switch to a behavioral approach state. High
levels of trait self-esteem are linked to behavioral approach (Baumeister, Tice, &
Hutton, 1989; Heimpel, Elliot, & Wood, 2006) and it has also been shown that peo-
ple with high self-esteem favor approach-oriented goals over avoidance-oriented
goals (Cavallo, Fitzsimons, & Holmes, 2009; Tice, 1991). With low self-esteem,
the transition to approach might take longer, or fail to occur at all.
In general, self-esteem is related to positive outcomes in life (Swann, Chang-
Schneider, & Larsen McClarty, 2007; Taylor, Lerner, Sherman, Sage, & McDowell,
2003a, 2003b), but self-esteem has also been specifically linked to increased de-
fensiveness against meaning violations. In response to mortality reminders, for
example, people with high levels of self-esteem do not show the typical defensive
behavior seen in response to these violations (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon,
Arndt, & Schimel, 2004). For low self-esteem people, however, we observe the
opposite. They appear more cautious and inhibited following meaning violations
(Cavallo et al., 2009; McGregor, Nash, & Inzlicht, 2009; Vohs & Heatherton, 2001),
and it appears as though they reside longer in the BIS state than people with high
self-esteem. This has negative consequences for well-being, and could even result
in serious psychological disorders, as prolonged exposure to anxious arousal can
lead to depression and PTSD (Pyszczynski & Kesebir, 2011; Routledge, Ostafin,
Juhl, Sedikides, & Cathey, 2010).
2.4.2 Neuroticism
A second important factor that influences the transition from BIS to BAS is
the personality trait neuroticism, such that many of the responses to meaning vi-
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olations are enhanced for those high in neuroticism. Neurotic people are more
likely to interpret evocative cues as a violation. For example, they find reminders
of sex a greater violation of meaning because it possibly reminds them of their
mortality (Goldenberg, Pyszczynski, McCoy, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1999) and
they respond more strongly when their mortality is made more salient explicitly
(Arndt & Solomon, 2003). Physiologically, they respond with increased severity
to experiences that arouse uncertainty by demonstrating a higher negativity re-
sponse after receiving no feedback about how they performed, as compared to
receiving positive or negative feedback about their performance (Hirsh & Inzlicht,
2008). In fact, more than half a century ago, Eysenck (1951) already proposed
that neuroticism is linked to general cortical arousability.
Although the conceptualization of a general physiological arousal is too vague
and likely inaccurate, research has accumulated that demonstrates reliable biolog-
ical correlates to neuroticism (Canli, 2004; DePascalis, 2004). Several theories
suggest that neuroticism is the result of an especially sensitive neural comparator,
a mechanism that detects mismatches between actual and expected states of the
world (Carver & Scheier, 1990; Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Satpute, 2005). As dis-
cussed in an earlier section, the ACC is responsible for the detection of violated
expectations or conflicts in general. People high in neuroticism should therefore
show increased activity in the ACC in response to discrepancies; a prediction sup-
ported by the findings of Eisenberger et al. (2005). They found that activity in
the ACC during a discrepancy detection task was positively correlated with self-
reported neuroticism. In line with the use of the BPSM in this review, neuroticism
has been linked to threat appraisals of stressors, as opposed to challenge appraisals
(Schneider, 2004). As a result, they will show prolonged BIS activation and could
benefit from strategies aimed at adopting an approach orientation.
2.4.3 Value and goal commitment
A final example of an individual difference factor that is relevant to deal-
ing with meaning violations is the extent to which one is committed to readily
activated values and goals. Fluid compensation processes imply that as long as
a given meaning violation does not require an immediate response, there is al-
ways the possibility of pursuing more abstract and situation-independent goals,
such as reaffirming one’s ideals and establishing new goal pursuits. Having these
values and goals readily available might affect the appraisal of violations in terms
of challenge. Support for this idea can be found in an experiment performed by
Inzlicht and Tullett (2010), who primed participants with religion or let partic-
ipants affirm their religious convictions. Interestingly, this led to reduced ERN
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activity (i.e., reduced BIS activation) compared to the control conditions, but only
for committed believers. The presence of a readily available value to pursue can
be interpreted as having the resources to deal with the meaning violation—to feel
challenged instead of threatened. This effect on ERN activity has also been found
for trait levels of religious zeal and belief in God (Inzlicht, McGregor, Hirsh, &
Nash, 2009). Additionally, the affirmation of personal values buffers neuroen-
docrine and psychological stress responses, especially so among people with high
self-esteem (Creswell et al., 2005). Adopting meaningful ideologies, values, or
worldviews could therefore be an important step in not just living a philosophi-
cally satisfying life, but also defending oneself against various meaning violations.
2.5 Future directions
It is clear that much progress has been made in the threat-compensation liter-
ature in determining how people respond to various meaning violations. However,
certain areas remain relatively underinvestigated.
Research on the palliative function of approach motivation is limited. Al-
though it has been shown that approach motivation leads to reduced signs of
BIS activation (Nash et al., 2012), this has only been shown in the case where
approach is measured before a meaning violation. Nash et al. (2012) measured
baseline levels of approach-related left frontal EEG activity and found that this pre-
dicted a reduced ERN amplitude in response to conflicts in a task that followed.
Ideally, we would also observe physiological markers of approach following mean-
ing violations. Current research has thus far only demonstrated indirect measures
of approach motivation, for example through self-report, implicit measures of ap-
proach, or the line-bisection task (McGregor et al., 2010). Direct measures of BAS
activation have yet to be investigated.
The findings we have presented here mostly relate meaning violations to only
a few possible neural substrates of BIS and BAS activation. However, BIS and BAS
are complex psychological states that involve many different brain areas. These in-
clude structures related to regulatory functions such as the frontal areas (e.g., dor-
solateral prefrontal cortex, inferior frontal regions), but also areas related to stress
such as the amygdala, insula, substantia nigra, and bed nucleus of the stria termi-
nalis complex (Schlund, Hudgins, Magee, & Dymond, 2013; Schlund, Magee, &
Hudgins, 2011). Although these structures could undoubtedly enhance our under-
standing of how people respond to meaning violations, the threat-compensation
literature has yet to research the link between meaning violations and these struc-
tures more concretely.
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Most importantly, the literature is in need of experimental designs in which
the full process, from violation to approach, is tested. These experiments would in-
volve participants being presented with a meaning violation: a reminder of mortal-
ity, goal uncertainty, the loss of control, perceptual anomalies, or cognitive conflict
more generally. This should result in activation of the BIS as reflected by activity
in the ACC or related neural structures and peripheral measures of arousal such as
cardiac activity or skin conductance. After a delay, or when an opportunity is pre-
sented to affirm one’s personal values, the motivation to approach should be made
visible, through measures such as the line bisection task (indirectly) or neural ac-
tivity in the prefrontal lobe (directly). Following this approach state, measures
of BIS should show reduced activity, thereby confirming the palliative function of
approach. So far no studies have been reported that fully present this process.
Further research might also focus on practical applications of these findings.
Research on individual differences has shown that readily available sources of
meaning can help reduce anxiety following threats. Also, framing goals in an
approach-oriented manner is conducive to well-being. These findings could po-
tentially translate to therapeutic settings where greater emphasis is put on having
valued sources of meaning in one’s life. Abstract sources—ideologies, moral sys-
tems, worldviews—have the benefit of being relatively easily accessible and their
abstract nature might also make them less likely to be thwarted by situational
constraints (see McGregor et al., 2012). Their pursuit can largely go unhindered,
therefore serving as an effective coping strategy.
2.6 Conclusion
Meaning violations evoke a stress response that begins with a defensive re-
action marked by anxiety, vigilance, and avoidance—a state of behavioral inhibi-
tion. People respond to this aversive state by approaching their values, ideologies,
and worldviews. We suggest, in line with the BPSM of arousal regulation and
other threat compensation theories, that all meaning violations initially cause an
inhibitory threat-response that subsequently switches to a state of approach; espe-
cially when factors such as self-esteem, personality, and the availability of commit-
ments impact one’s appraisal of the situation. Nevertheless, it is not the content
of affirmed values, ideologies, or worldviews that alleviates stress, but rather the
state of approach that people find comforting. This integration of findings across
the threat-compensation literature is but one among many in a recent surge of
integrative efforts in this field (e.g., Jonas et al., 2014). We expect these devel-








Pupillary Response to Error Feedback about Mis-
conceptions
Based on Sleegers, W.W.A., Proulx, T., & van Beest, I. (2017a). Assimilation and





People adopt many beliefs that are contrary to scientific findings, i.e., mis-
conceptions. These misconceptions are prevalent and resistant to change. Several
cognitive processes have been proposed to explain the prevalence and resistance of
misconceptions, but empirical evidence remains scarce. Working from the Mean-
ing Maintenance Model (MMM), we argue that people are motivated to affirm
their existing beliefs and assimilate ambiguous feedback as though it confirmed
these beliefs. In two experiments, we presented participants with multiple mis-
conceptions and provided feedback about the veracity of each misconception. Us-
ing pupillometry, we demonstrate that participants show an increase in arousal
when they receive belief-violating feedback. Crucially, we also demonstrate phys-
iologically distinctive responses to clear and ambiguous feedback. We find the
pupil responds to ambiguous confirmatory feedback as though it were wholly con-
firmatory. No such assimilation response was found when feedback violated the
beliefs. Additionally, we show a moderation by commitment towards the miscon-
ception. When the feedback is confirmatory, increasing levels of commitment are
associated with a faster diminishing of arousal, but not when feedback is violat-
ing. In accordance with the MMM, these findings demonstrate that people respond
with increased arousal to disconfirming feedback, which is moderated by relative
commitment to the beliefs, and assimilate ambiguous information to appear con-
vergent with expectations.
Keywords: assimilation bias; pupillometry; misconceptions; error-feedback; arousal
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People believe a great many things about a great many topics. A sizable
portion of these beliefs are inconsistent with historical and scientific findings, that
is, they are misconceptions (Hamza & Wickman, 2007; Taylor & Kowalski, 2004).
For example, people believe that during the Middle Ages most people died around
the age of 30, that Marco Polo imported pasta from China, and that humans use
only 10% of their brain.
Though these beliefs are incorrect, they remain common; with prevalence
rates ranging from 28% to 71% (Lilienfeld, Lynn, Ruscio, & Beyerstein, 2010).
Despite this high prevalence, research on misconceptions is relatively scarce. Most
of the research on misconceptions has been conducted in the field of educational
psychology because of potential challenges that misconceptions pose for educa-
tors (Hughes, Lyddy, & Lambe, 2013). For example, it has been conjectured that
misconceptions negatively impact the learning of new information (Chew, 2006;
Hammer, 1996; Posner, Strike, Hewson, & Gertzog, 1982) and serve as indicators
for a need of more critical thinking. Another challenge is that misconceptions
are highly resistant to change. Exposure to psychology courses has been found to
reduce several misconceptions but fails to eliminate many others (Gregg, Winer,
Cottrell, Hedman, & Fournier, 2001; Lamal, 1995; Landau & Bavaria, 2003). To
illustrate, 30% of students believe that someone experiencing schizophrenia has a
‘split personality’, even after completing psychology courses that teach this belief
is false (Gardner & Dalsin, 1986).
Not much is known about the origin of misconceptions and their persistence.
Some research has attempted to identify their sources. These studies reveal that
people attribute their misconceptions to sources such as the media, personal expe-
rience, reading, and classroom learning (Higbee & Clay, 1998; Landau & Bavaria,
2003; Taylor & Kowalski, 2004). Several cognitive biases have also been argued to
lay at the foundation of the adoption and persistence of misconceptions, such as
illusory correlations, a tendency to infer causation from correlation, selective sam-
pling and confirmation bias (Lilienfeld et al., 2010; Schick Jr. & Vaughn, 2014).
Importantly, support for these suggestions is limited due to lack of empirical in-
vestigation and “have generally been more supported by argument rather than
empirical evidence” (Hughes et al., 2013, p. 22; Chew, 2006).
Confirmation bias in belief feedback
One of the proposed reasons for why people maintain misconceptions is the
confirmation (Hughes et al., 2013) or verification (Poletiek, 2001) bias. Confirma-
tion bias is the tendency to search for, interpret, favor, and recall information in a
way that confirms one’s preexisting beliefs or hypotheses. This bias manifests it-
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self in different ways, such as neglecting disconfirming evidence, an unwillingness
to change the belief in face of contradicting evidence, or even by altering percep-
tions (Rassin, 2008). Naturally, when evidence is clear, cognitive biases such as
the confirmation bias can be overridden. When evidence is ambiguous, however,
judgments are more likely to succumb to prior beliefs (Risinger, Saks, Thompson,
& Rosenthal, 2002), in that they are interpreted in such a way that they are assim-
ilated into these existing beliefs (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979). This is also more
likely when commitment towards the prior belief is high (Jonas, Schulz-Hardt,
Frey, & Thelen, 2001). These findings support the probable involvement of the
confirmation bias in the persistence of misconceptions.
However, even if a confirmation bias is one of the underlying cognitive pro-
cesses that play a role in the persistence of misconceptions, such a bias fails to
explain why people are motivated to assimilate events into existing beliefs. Hence,
in the present paper we will apply a more general model that describes humans as
meaning seekers through the adoption of a variety of beliefs: the Meaning Main-
tenance Model (MMM).
The Meaning Maintenance Model
According to the MMM, people have a need to adopt a variety of beliefs
that allows them to perceive the world in a comprehensible manner—a sense of
meaning (Proulx & Inzlicht, 2012). These beliefs range from highly important
beliefs such as beliefs about the existence of an afterlife to more trivial beliefs
such as the color of a Two of Diamonds playing card (e.g., Proulx & Major, 2013).
Each belief in some way organizes people’s perceptions of the world and shapes
their expectations for what may happen in any given situation.
Frequently it happens that one’s expectations are not met, and events unfold
differently from what was expected—a meaning violation. These violations elicit
a state of negative arousal that motivate compensatory behavior to counteract this
aversive state. The MMM describes an array of possible compensatory behaviors
following a meaning violation. For example, the meaning violation can be solved
by assimilating the violation into an existing worldview, which is done by reinter-
preting the event in such a way that it fits in the existing worldview. Alternatively,
beliefs can be accommodated to fit in the violation, in which case the belief itself is
adjusted. Third, people can affirm beliefs unrelated to the belief that was violated.
For example, following exposure to reverse colored playing cards, people become
more supportive of positive discrimination (if they are committed to the belief that
social inequality is unjust; Proulx & Major, 2013). The affirmation of an unrelated
belief shows that people are not always motivated to correct their incorrect be-
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liefs. Instead, it has been theorized that the main motivation to maintain meaning
following meaning violations is to reduce the negative arousal experienced as a re-
sult of the violation (Sleegers & Proulx, 2015). This aversive physiological arousal
has consistently been demonstrated following expectancy violations, whether it is
an expectancy violation caused by a perceptual anomaly (Sleegers, Proulx, & van
Beest, 2015), cognitive dissonance (Gerard, 1967), self-view inconsistencies (Ay-
duk et al., 2012), social justice worldview violations (Townsend et al., 2010) or
category-based violations (Mendes et al., 2007).
Physiological response to inconsistent feedback
A vast number of studies have shown that inconsistent feedback, when in-
terpreted as such, increases physiological arousal. Negative feedback increases
ACC activation in the brain (e.g., Miltner et al., 1997; Yeung et al., 2004) and also
affects sympathetic nervous system markers, such as skin conductance, cardiogra-
phy, and pupillometry (Critchley et al., 2005; Hajcak et al., 2003, 2004). In our
studies we will use pupillometry as a marker of physiological arousal. Pupillary re-
activity (i.e., changes in pupil size) can serve as an index of neuroaffective arousal.
This relationship between pupil size and arousal stems from its association with
the locus coeruleus-norepinephrine (LC-NE) system. This system plays a role in
the regulation of engagement or withdrawal from a task by releasing NE through
projections from the LC in the forebrain (for a review, see Aston-Jones & Cohen,
2005). Research has shown that pupil size correlates with LC activity in monkeys
(Rajkowski, Kubiak, & Aston-Jones, 1993) as well as in humans (Gilzenrat et al.,
2010), and work by Beatty and colleagues on the pupillary system has demon-
strated that pupil reactivity is consistent with LC responses to task-events (Beatty,
1982; Jackson, 1982; Richer & Beatty, 1987). The link between pupil size and
the LC-NE system allows researchers to infer a broad range of both cognitive and
emotional processes from the extent of pupil dilation. Notably, the pupil dilates
in response to task error (Brown et al., 1999; Critchley et al., 2005) and viola-
tions of expectations (Preuschoff et al., 2011; Raisig et al., 2012, 2010; Sleegers
et al., 2015). Sleegers et al. (2015) have shown, for example, that repeated pre-
sentations of reverse-colored playing cards (e.g., black Two of Spades) cause an
increase in pupil dilation relative to normal playing cards. Based on these findings,
it seems that pupillary reactivity can serve as an index for physiological arousal in
a broad array of psychological processes, including cognitive biases that relate to
the experience of inconsistency.
One such bias that can be empirically demonstrated, using pupillometry, is
the confirmation bias. As prior research has shown (Risinger et al., 2002), events
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are likely to be assimilated into prior beliefs when the belief violation is ambigu-
ous. When feedback is ambiguous, it can be interpreted as either confirming or
violating the expectations that follow from prior beliefs. Given that people are
motivated to maintain these belief systems, especially when they are highly com-
mitted to their belief (Jonas et al., 2001), they will be likely to assimilate this
ambiguous feedback in such a way that it wholly confirms these existing beliefs.
Consequently, this interpretation should affect physiological arousal levels follow-
ing feedback. If the ambiguous feedback is interpreted as confirmatory, the feed-
back should not evoke elevated levels of arousal, while if feedback is interpreted
as violating, elevated levels of arousal should follow.
3.1 Hypotheses
In two studies we use pupillometry to investigate the impact of clear and
ambiguous feedback about misconceptions on arousal, with an aim to gain greater
insight into the psychological processes that underlie the persistence of false be-
liefs. Consistent with prior work and the MMM, we hypothesize that (H1) when
participants receive feedback about the veracity of their beliefs, they will show an
increase in pupil dilation when the feedback is belief-violating relative to when
the feedback is confirmatory, and that (H2) relative commitment to these beliefs
will moderate the pupillary response, heightening both the increased (violation)
and decreased (confirmation) arousal that corresponds to belief veracity feedback.
Finally, we also hypothesize that (H3) ambiguous feedback will be interpreted as
assimilating to existing beliefs, thus evoking a pupillary response identical to the
pupillary response following wholly confirmatory feedback. In both studies, we
report how we determined our sample size, all data exclusions, all manipulations,
and all measures.
3.2 Study 1
In Study 1, we investigated whether negative feedback indeed elicits greater
pupil dilation than positive feedback (H1) and that this is enhanced under high





Participants were 30 psychology undergraduates (86.67% females) from Tilburg
University, aged 17 to 28 (M = 20.57, SD = 2.79). All received course credit for
participation. We employed a within-subjects design to test the effect of feedback
and commitment on pupil dilation. Sample size was based on prior research (e.g.,
Bradley et al., 2008; Laeng et al., 2011; Partala & Surakka, 2003) and no data was
collected after data analysis.
Procedure
Participants were welcomed into the lab and seated in standardized cubicles.
The eye tracker was calibrated using the calibration extension from E-Prime 2.
Hereafter, the misconceptions task began and throughout this task the participants’
pupil size was recorded. At the end, we assessed demographics, debriefed, and
thanked participants for their participation.
Materials
Task. The task contained 50 trials. Trials began with a fixation cross (Courier
New, 30pt, black) that was displayed for 2000 ms on a gray background, followed
by a fact (i.e., the misconception; Arial, 18pt, black). Participants could press
the ‘1’ key to indicate that the fact is correct or ‘2’ for incorrect, with a response
window of 10s. Next, participants answered three commitment questions about
the misconception. Hereafter the words “Your answer is...” appeared. When
the participant fixated on the words for 1500 ms, the words disappeared and the
feedback appeared. The feedback was either a red ‘Incorrect’ or a green ‘Correct’
and was visible for 1500 ms.
Misconceptions. Participants were presented with 50 misconceptions in random
order. These were selected from a list of 83 pretested misconceptions. The pretest
was administered via Qualtrics (Provo, UT) to 25 Dutch participants that were
recruited using social media (age range: 20 - 74, M = 34, SD = 18.40, 7 male,
12 female, 6 unknown). The misconceptions were collected from various sources
(e.g., Internet, books, literature). Misconceptions were presented one by one and
accompanied by two questions. The first question assessed whether the participant
thought the statement was ’true’ or ’false’. The second question assessed their level
of certainty (1 ‘absolutely not sure’ to 10 ‘very sure’). For each misconception, we
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calculated the percentage of participants who responded with ’true’ and selected
the 50 misconceptions that were believed to be ’true’ by most participants.
Because misconceptions are always false it was possible for participants to
notice this pattern and adopt a response style of always responding with ‘false’. To
address this potential problem in the present study, we rephrased a portion of the
misconceptions (28%) so that the correct answer for those misconceptions would
be ’true’.
Commitment. To assess commitment, we asked three questions about each mis-
conception: “How certain are you of your answer?”, “How important is the fact
to you?”, “How much fun do you think the fact is?”. Each question consisted of a
Likert scale that ranged from 1 (‘Not at all’) to 7 (‘Completely’). The commitment
measure was created by averaging the responses on the certainty, importance, and
fun measure together. Cronbach’s α was calculated for each of the 50 misconcep-
tions and was found to be acceptable (M = 0.74, SD = 0.11).
Pupillometry. Pupil data was collected using a Tobii T60 eye tracker (Tobii,
Stockholm, Sweden). The Tobii T60 is integrated in a 17′′ TFT monitor and records
at a rate of 60 Hz. Each measurement has a validity indication that ranges from 0
(the system is certain that all data belongs to the particular eye) to 4 (gaze data is
missing or incorrect). Only recordings with a validity score of 0 were used. Pupil
size from each eye were averaged together to create a single pupil size score and
filtered with a modified repeated median filter (outer width: 25, inner width 15)
using the ‘robfilter’ package (Fried, Schettlinger, & Borowski, 2014). Gaps (e.g.,
blinks) were filled using linear interpolation using the ‘zoo’ package (Zeileis &
Grothendieck, 2005). Hereafter, the pupil size was controlled for baseline differ-
ences by subtracting the average pupil size during a 500 ms pre-trial period from
the subsequent pupil measurements (Beatty & Lucero-Wagoner, 2000), so pupil
size descriptives should be interpreted as pupil size change relative to the baseline
period.
Data analysis
The ‘lme4’ package (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015) was used for
the mixed model analyses in combination with ‘lmerTest’, which adds p-values
and degrees of freedom for the t-test on the model parameters.
We defined random intercepts for each participant in our models. Feedback
was effect coded and added as a categorical predictor (correct/incorrect) and com-
mitment was added as a (mean centered) covariate. Both their main effects and
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interactions were investigated. In the case of an interaction, both simple slopes




Participants believed that about half of the facts were true (M = 53.47%, SD
= 10.84). This shows that participants did not adopt a response style of predomi-
nantly indicating the facts to be false.
Pupil dilation
To test our main hypotheses about the role of feedback and commitment on
pupil dilation, we performed a linear mixed model with feedback, commitment,
and their interaction term as fixed effects. The analysis revealed a main effect of
feedback, t(1436.90) = 10.403, p < .001, b = 0.033, 95% CI [0.027, 0.039], no





























Figure 3.1: Average pupil dilation in response to positive and negative feedback as
a function of commitment in Study 1. Error bars reflect 95% confidence intervals.
52
Assimilation and Arousal
0.0043], and an interaction effect between feedback and commitment, t(1433.70)
= 3.147, p = .0017, b = 0.0070, 95% CI [0.0030, 0.012], see Figure 3.1. The
average pupil size in response to negative feedback was greater (M = 0.0046, SD
= 0.13) than to positive feedback (M = -0.067, SD = 0.15). Simple slope analyses
revealed that commitment was negatively linked to the average pupil size when
the feedback confirmed the participant’s belief, t(1456.40) = -2.22, p = .026, b =
-0.0085, 95% CI [-0.016, -0.00074], but not when the feedback was in violation
with the participant’s belief, t(1457.90) = 1.70, p = .090, b = 0.0055, 95% CI [-
0.0017, 0.012]. Additionally, there was no effect of feedback at the lowest level of
commitment, t(1431.90) = 1.89, p = .059, b = 0.013, 95% CI [-0.0010, 0.027],
but there was at higher levels of commitment, with the largest effect of feedback
at the highest level of commitment, t(1436.30) = 7.01, p < .001, b = 0.055, 95%
CI [0.038, 0.073]. At the lowest level of commitment, the average pupil size in
response to negative feedback was similar to the average pupil size in response to
positive feedback (negative feedback: M = 0.046, SD = 0.093; positive feedback:
M = 0.038, SD = 0.12), but when commitment was high, there was greater pupil
dilation in response to negative feedback (M = -0.021, SD = 0.18) than to positive
feedback (M = -0.13, SD = 0.13).
3.2.3 Discussion
In Study 1, we found increased pupillary dilation following belief-violating
feedback about a held misconception compared to receiving confirmatory feed-
back. This response was moderated by commitment towards the misconception,
such that there was a negative relationship between pupil size and confirmatory
feedback, and that the pupil size difference between violating and confirmatory
feedback was largest at higher levels of commitment. These findings support our
hypothesis, and more broadly the MMM, that the violation of expectations causes
an increase in physiological arousal (H1), and the effect of feedback was larger at
higher levels of commitment, indicating that relative commitment to misconcep-
tions moderates the increase in arousal (H2). We also found that when response
feedback was negative, commitment was not significantly related to the amount
of pupil change. This finding suggests the presence of a negativity bias, which we
will return to in the General discussion of this chapter.
3.3 Study 2
In Study 1, we found that we can distinguish between feedback that vio-
lates or confirms misconception beliefs using pupillometry. In Study 2 we use this
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technique to further delve into the cognitive processes underlying this response to
feedback about misconceptions. In addition to presenting participants with pos-
itive and negative feedback, we additionally manipulated the ambiguity of this
feedback by adding the possibility that the participant’s belief was partly correct
or partly incorrect. We opted for manipulating the ambiguity of the positive and
negative feedback, rather than only ’partly correct’ or only ’partly incorrect’, in
order to investigate whether the framing of the feedback affects the pupillary re-
sponse. Semantically the two ambiguous options should be processed identically,
but framing effects have been shown to be prevalent (e.g., Schwarz, 1999), hence
we decided to include both options and test for the possibility of a framing effect.
We predict that ambiguity provides an opportunity for participants to inter-
pret the ambiguous feedback as a violation, as a confirmation, or as genuinely
ambiguous. According to our hypothesis (H3), if people are indeed motivated to
assimilate information in a way that confirms one’s pre-existing beliefs and ex-
pectations, we should see that participants are more likely to interpret ambiguous
feedback as wholly confirmatory, therefore showing the same degree of pupil di-
lation in response to ambiguous and confirmatory feedback. In contrast, if people
view ambiguous feedback as genuinely ambiguous or violating feedback, then we
should see greater pupil dilation in response to this feedback compared to confir-
matory feedback, where the greater dilation may even equal the pupillary response
to wholly violating feedback.
3.3.1 Method
Participants
We recruited a total of 51 undergraduate psychology students from Tilburg
University who took part for course credit. They had an average age of 19.65 (SD
= 1.84, min = 17, max = 24) and again the majority of the participants were
female (82.35%).
Design
The design of the present study was similar to that of Study 1, except that
we added an extra feedback factor called feedback ambiguity (clear/ambiguous)
on top of the previous feedback factor (correct/incorrect), creating four different
feedback options: correct, incorrect, partly correct, partly incorrect.
Procedure




Task. Since we added an extra factor, we doubled the number of trials to 100.
The increase in trials led to a longer study and increased burden for the partici-
pant. To counteract this increased burden, we shortened some of the durations in
the misconceptions task. Both the initial fixation cross duration and the required
fixation time before the feedback period was lowered to 1000 ms.
Unlike Study 1, participants were given false feedback instead of accurate
feedback to make sure that all feedback options were presented equally often.
Additionally, the feedback was now presented in black, rather than the previously
used green color for positive feedback and red color for negative feedback. Since
we used ambiguous stimuli in this study, we did not want the color to indicate how
the feedback should be interpreted. The task was identical in every other way.
Misconceptions. More common misconceptions were selected to reach a total
number of 100 misconceptions. The majority of misconceptions from Study 1
were used, as well as new misconceptions from various sources (e.g., van Maanen,
1994). A full list of the used misconceptions is available in section 8.1 of the
Supplemental Materials.
Commitment. The commitment measure was again created by averaging the
responses on the certainty, importance, and fun measure. Cronbach’s α scores
were acceptable (M = 0.68, SD = 0.11).
3.3.2 Results
Response descriptives
Participants again believed, on average, that the majority of facts were true
(M = 67.86%, SD = 8.86). This indicates participants did not adopt the response
style of simply stating each fact was false.
Pupil dilation
We first reproduced the original analysis from Study 1 by subsetting the data
and only taking trials in which the feedback was clear (e.g., ‘correct’ and ‘incor-
rect’). This revealed an effect of feedback, t(2470.40) = 7.03, p < .001, b = 0.017,
95% CI [0.012, 0.022], no effect of commitment, t(2447.40) = -0.92, p = .358,
b = -0.0020, 95% CI [-0.0061, 0.0028], and an interaction effect, t(2475.10) =
2.76, p = .0058, b = 0.0049, 95% CI [0.0013, 0.0084], thus replicating the re-
sults from Study 1, see Figure 3.2. There was greater pupil dilation in response to
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negative feedback (M = 0.088, SD = 0.14) than to positive feedback (M = 0.053,
SD = 0.14). Inspecting the interaction effect, we again found that commitment
was negatively linked to the average pupil size when the feedback was positive,
t(2525) = -2.46, p = .014, b = -0.0069, 95% CI [-0.013, -0.0018], but not when
the feedback was negative, t(2513.30) = 1.05, p = .29, b =0.0029, 95% CI [-
0.0026, 0.0081]. Additionally, we replicate the finding that there is no significant
effect of feedback at the lowest level of commitment, t(2474.20) = 0.66, p = .51,
b = 0.0036, 95% CI [-0.0064, 0.016], but there is at higher levels of commitment,
with the largest effect at the highest level of commitment, t(2474.40) = 5.26, p
< .001, b = 0.033, 95% CI [0.041, 0.070]. At the lowest level of commitment,
the average pupil size in response to negative feedback was similar to the average
pupil size in response to positive feedback (negative feedback: M = 0.095, SD =
0.13; positive feedback: M = 0.048, SD = 0.13), but when commitment was high,
there was greater pupil dilation in response to negative feedback (M = 0.060, SD
= 0.12) than to positive feedback (M = 0.022, SD = 0.076).
We extended this model by adding ambiguity of feedback (i.e., clear/ambiguous)





























Figure 3.2: Average pupil dilation in response to positive and negative feedback as
a function of commitment in Study 2. Error bars reflect 95% confidence intervals.
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We again found a significant main effect of feedback and its interaction with com-
mitment (see previous model). There was no three-way interaction between feed-
back, feedback clarity, and commitment, t(4988) = -0.44, p = .66, b = -0.00054,
95% CI [-0.0031, 0.0020], but we did find an interaction effect between feedback
accuracy and feedback clarity, t(4985) = -2.47, p = .014, b = -0.0041, 95% CI
[-0.0073, -0.0011]. When participants receive feedback that confirms their belief,
there is no significant effect of feedback ambiguity on pupil change, t(4985) =
0.37, p = .72, b = 0.00087, 95% CI [-0.0039, 0.0056]. However, when feed-
back violates the belief, clear feedback elicits greater pupil change than ambigu-
ous feedback, t(4985) = -3.13, p = .0018, b = -0.0074, 95% CI [-0.012, -0.0027].
Additionally, ambiguous negative feedback results in greater pupil dilation than
ambiguous positive feedback, t(4985) = 3.73, p < .001, b = 0.0089, 95% CI
[0.0041, 0.014], see Figure 3.3. These results are largely consistent with our hy-
pothesis that people are motivated to interpret ambiguous feedback as confirming




































Figure 3.3: Average pupil dilation in response to feedback accuracy (cor-
rect/incorrect) and feedback clarity (clear/ambiguous) in Study 2. Error bars




Consistent with Study 1, we again found an increase in pupil dilation in re-
sponse to feedback that violates beliefs relative to feedback that confirms beliefs.
We replicated that this arousal was moderated by commitment when this feedback
was confirmatory. When feedback was confirmatory, increasing levels of commit-
ment were associated with less pupil dilation. Crucially, we found that when the
confirmatory feedback is ambiguous (‘partly correct’), the pupillary reaction is
identical to the reaction in response to clear positive feedback (i.e., ‘correct’), as
though it had been interpreted as wholly confirmatory. This finding is consistent
with the presence of an assimilation bias. We also found that when feedback is am-
biguously negative, the amount of pupil dilation is lessened, but greater compared
to positive feedback, suggesting that ambiguously negative feedback is interpreted
as partially confirmatory. This finding is also consistent with a general assimilation
bias.
3.4 General discussion
In two studies we investigated the physiological response to feedback about
held misconceptions. The results generally support predictions following from the
MMM. By observing and manipulating both the valence and clarity of the feed-
back we demonstrated that feedback-violating beliefs (i.e., being mistaken) led to
an increase in pupil size compared to feedback confirming beliefs (i.e., being cor-
rect). We also found that the amount of arousal was moderated by commitment
towards the misconception belief. At low levels of commitment, we found no
effect of feedback on arousal, but at higher levels of commitment there was an in-
creasingly larger difference in arousal between confirming and violating feedback.
Additionally, positive feedback was associated with less arousal with increasing
levels of commitment, to the extent that committed expectation were being con-
firmed. When the feedback was negative, commitment did not affect the level
of arousal. This could be an indication of a negativity bias in response to explic-
itly disconfirmatory feedback (e.g., Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs,
2001), whereby otherwise negative feedback evokes greater arousal regardless of
the extent of belief commitment.
We also observed that ambiguity affected arousal levels in response to both
confirmatory and violating feedback. When feedback was confirmatory but am-
biguous (‘partly correct’), the amount of pupil dilation was identical to that in
response to wholly confirmatory feedback (‘correct’). Moreover, when feedback
was belief-violating but ambiguous (‘partly incorrect’), this led to less pupil dila-
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tion compared to whole violating feedback (‘incorrect’), but to more pupil dilation
compared to feedback that wholly confirmed beliefs. These findings are consistent
with an assimilation bias. Assimilation bias is a ubiquitous phenomenon, with
many studies demonstrating this bias, but there have not been any empirical in-
vestigations of an assimilation bias in response to misconceptions, despite their
presupposed relevance (Hughes et al., 2013). Our studies thus contribute to this
literature by demonstrating an assimilation bias in response to feedback about
misconceptions, as assessed with a direct psychophysiological measure.
Assimilation vs. negativity bias
Several of the findings also point at a negativity bias. This negativity bias
refers to the notion that negative stimuli have a greater effect on one’s psycholog-
ical state and processes than do neutral or positive stimuli. Myriad studies have
demonstrated this bias (for reviews, see Baumeister et al., 2001; Cacioppo, Gard-
ner, & Berntson, 1999; Peeters & Czapinski, 1990; Taylor, 1991). We found that
disconfirmatory feedback resulted in greater pupil dilation, compared to confir-
matory feedback, irrespective of whether it was clear or ambiguous. Clear discon-
firmatory feedback did lead to greater pupil dilation compared to ambiguous dis-
confirmatory feedback. Additionally, commitment did not moderate the amount
of pupil dilation when feedback was clearly disconfirmatory, which could be inter-
preted as negativity trumping the effect of commitment.
However, visual inspection of the moderating effect of commitment shows a
positive slope, indicating that commitment may be positively related to pupil dila-
tion in response to disconfirmatory feedback. More participants or a larger number
of trials might have revealed that commitment would also moderate disconfirma-
tory feedback. Nevertheless, the fact that a moderating effect was observed in
response to confirmatory feedback, and not disconfirmatory feedback, does indi-
cate a relatively robust response to otherwise negative feedback. Evolutionarily
speaking, it is adaptive for bad to have a greater impact than good. Ignoring
or missing the possibility of a positive outcome may merely result in regret or a
missed opportunity. In contrast, ignoring or missing danger may result in physical
harm or even death. Consequently, we would indeed expect that in response to
negative feedback, there should be less variance, and thus less moderation by ex-
traneous factors such as commitment. Our results are thus both in support for an




A possible limitation is that we provided direction for participants on how
to interpret the ambiguity by giving valenced information (’partly correct’/’partly
incorrect’). This potentially made the ambiguous feedback less ambiguous. Al-
though beyond the scope of the present research, this suggests that it may be pos-
sible to vary the impact of ambiguity on arousal, sometimes even matching that
of clear negative feedback. In fact, Holroyd, Hajcak, and Larsen (2006) demon-
strated that ambiguous feedback elicited heightened feedback error-related neg-
ativity to the same extent as negative feedback. Additionally, Hirsh and Inzlicht
(2008) revealed individual differences in response to ambiguous feedback, with
some individuals reacting more strongly to ambiguous feedback than negative
feedback (see also Gu, Ge, Jiang, & Luo, 2010). We suggest that these differences
in findings could be due to variations in the level of ambiguity.
3.5 Conclusion
In two studies we presented participants with feedback about their miscon-
ceptions. In keeping with the MMM, we observed that feedback violating beliefs
elicits more physiological arousal, as measured through pupil dilation, than feed-
back confirming beliefs. This response was moderated by a commitment towards
the misconception, but only when the feedback was confirmatory. Higher levels of
commitment led to less physiological arousal when the feedback was confirmatory,
but not when it violated beliefs. This points to an additional bias towards gener-
ally negative stimuli. Importantly, we also found evidence for an assimilation bias.
Ambiguous confirmatory feedback was interpreted in the same manner as wholly
confirmatory feedback, while ambiguously belief-violating feedback appeared to
be partially interpreted as confirmatory. With this data we have empirical support




Extremism and Meaning Violations
Extremism Reduces Conflict Arousal and Increases
Values Affirmation in Response to Meaning Vio-
lations
Based on Sleegers, W.W.A., Proulx, T., & van Beest, I. (2015). Extremism reduces
conflict arousal and increases values affirmation in response to meaning violations.
Biological Psychology, 108, 126-131. doi:10.1016/j.biopsycho.2015.03.012
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Abstract
In the social psychological threat-compensation literature, there is an ap-
parent contradiction whereby relatively extreme beliefs both decrease markers of
physiological arousal following meaning violations, and increase the values affir-
mation behaviors understood as a palliative responses to this arousal. We hypoth-
esize that this is due to the differential impact of measuring extremism on be-
havioral inhibition and approach systems following meaning violations, whereby
extremism both reduces markers of conflict arousal and increases values affirma-
tion unrelated to this initial arousal. Using pupil dilation as a proxy for immediate
conflict arousal, we found that the same meaning violation (anomalous playing
cards) evoked greater pupil dilation, and that this pupillary reaction was dimin-
ished in participants who earlier reported extreme beliefs. We also found that
reporting extreme beliefs was associated with greater affirmation of an unrelated
meaning framework, where this affirmation was unrelated to physiological mark-
ers of conflict arousal.
Keywords: meaning; threat; extremism; pupil; affirmation; inhibition
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In the social psychological threat-compensation literature, there is an ap-
parent contradiction whereby relatively extreme beliefs both decrease arousal fol-
lowing meaning violations, and increase affirmation behaviors understood as pal-
liative responses to this arousal. In this literature, it has been commonly demon-
strated that people affirm their values following violations of how they understand
themselves and their world (i.e., meaning violations; for a review, see Proulx & In-
zlicht, 2012). For example, after being presented with playing cards that violate
people’s expectations—by reversing the color of the card such as a black two of
hearts (Bruner & Postman, 1949)—people show an heightened commitment to be-
liefs relevant to social equality (Proulx & Major, 2013). These affirmation efforts
are understood as palliative responses to a syndrome of negative physiological
arousal caused by the meaning violation (Proulx & Inzlicht, 2012). Although re-
search on the mediating effect of this arousal is limited, studies have shown a link
between meaning violations and arousal. For instance, cardiovascular measures
indicate a threat response when interacting with partners who violate one’s ex-
pectations (Mendes et al., 2007, 2002) and when social rejection is unexpected
(Gunther Moor et al., 2010). On a neural level, it has been shown that the an-
terior cingulate cortex (ACC) is active when expectations are violated (Oliveira
et al., 2007), and also during other kinds of meaning violations, such as mor-
tality salience (Quirin et al., 2012), cognitive dissonance (Kitayama et al., 2013;
van Veen et al., 2009), lack of control (Salomons et al., 2004), and social isola-
tion threats (Eisenberger et al., 2003; Nash, Prentice, Hirsh, Mcgregor, & Inzlicht,
2014).
It has also been demonstrated that the physiological response to meaning
violations is affected by the extremity of the beliefs one possesses. People holding
relatively extreme beliefs display reduced ‘distress signals’ such as error related
negativity (Inzlicht et al., 2009; Inzlicht & Tullett, 2010)—an index of ACC activ-
ity (Dehaene et al., 1994; Gehring et al., 1993). Yet they also demonstrate greater
affirmation following meaning violations (e.g., mortality reminders; Weise, Ar-
ciszewski, Verlhiac, Pyszczynski, & Greenberg, 2012; or anomalous playing cards;
Proulx & Major, 2013). If compensatory affirmation is indeed a palliative response
to arousal following meaning violations, how can extreme beliefs both reduce
markers of conflict arousal and increase affirmation efforts? In this study, we
apply a novel perspective from the threat-compensation literature to aid in the
understanding of this apparent contradiction (for an extensive overview of this
perspective, see Jonas et al., 2014).
According to this perspective, any given meaning violation evokes arousal
that primarily activates the Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS; Gray & McNaughton,
2003)—a system that produces heightened anxiety, avoidance motivation, and in-
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creased vigilance. After a delay, the Behavioral Approach System (BAS) becomes
predominantly active and initiates behavior that underlies compensatory efforts
such as the affirmation of values (McGregor et al., 2010). Each system is asso-
ciated with distinct physiological substrates. The BIS’ neural substrates consist of
the septa-hippocampal region and the amygdala, which are innervated by seroton-
ergic projections of the raphe nucleus and noradrenergic projections of the locus
coeruleus (LC; Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005 and Amodio et al., 2008). Importantly,
LC activity can be derived from autonomic measures of arousal such as pupil di-
lation (Rajkowski et al., 1993). Indeed, research has shown that task-processing
is accompanied by changes in pupil dilation consistent with LC functioning (e.g.,
Gilzenrat et al., 2010; Jepma & Nieuwenhuis, 2011; Smallwood et al., 2011).
Pupil size has also been linked to increased physiological arousal (Bradley et al.,
2008; van Steenbergen, Band, & Hommel, 2011) and specific BIS-related con-
structs such as surprise (Preuschoff et al., 2011), fear and avoidance (White &
Depue, 1999), and conflict detection (Critchley et al., 2005; Laeng et al., 2011).
Conversely, the BAS’ main substrate is the dopaminergic neurotransmitter system
with projections in the lateral and orbital regions of the prefrontal cortex (Rolls,
2000).
Following from this distinction, we posit that extremism differentially affects
these behavioral systems. Intuitively, it could be reasoned that those with extreme
values should be well-equipped to deal with violations of meaning, and would not
be motivated to display strong compensatory reactions. Nevertheless, the relevant
literature leads us to postulate that those who hold extreme beliefs will initially
display diminished conflict arousal BIS, in response to meaning violations, even as
they subsequently demonstrate heightened BAS induced affirmation. This predic-
tion is consistent with previous theorizing that BIS and BAS are discrete systems
(e.g., Gray & McNaughton, 2003; Jonas et al., 2014) that are triggered indepen-
dently following the experience of violation (Hirsh, Mar, & Peterson, 2012). While
BAS-initiated behaviors may serve a palliative function with regards to initial BIS
activation, these subsequent BAS behaviors may not be caused by BIS conflict-
detection arousal, nor must they vary in any linear manner with the magnitude
of this initial arousal—in fact, they likely show an inverse linear relationship for
those with extreme beliefs, insofar as this extreme disposition differentially im-




We conducted a single experiment that could demonstrate the extent to
which extremism has a dampening effect on initial markers of conflict-detection
BIS activation (pupillary dilation), and an amplifying effect on BAS-activated com-
pensation behaviors (values affirmation) in response to the same meaning viola-
tion. Participants were exposed to repeated meaning violations (anomalous play-
ing cards) during which time their pupil dilation was measured; followed by sev-
eral opportunities to affirm moral values. Our first hypothesis was that meaning
violations would increase pupil dilation, and that this relationship would be mod-
erated by extremism, such that participants with extreme values would show a
diminished pupil response compared to those upholding moderate views. Our
second hypothesis was that participants with extreme beliefs would demonstrate




Sixty-eight students at Tilburg University in the Netherlands (18-32 years of
age; 33 male) participated. We excluded participants on the basis of two crite-
ria. First, we excluded participants with over 20% missing eye tracker data to
increase the reliability of our results. Second, we excluded participants who re-
ported seeing the anomalous feature of the anomalous playing cards during the
experiment, leaving 22 participants in the experimental condition and 31 partici-
pants in the control condition. This latter exclusion criterion is based on previous
research using implicit perceptual anomalies (e.g., Proulx & Heine, 2008; Proulx
& Major, 2013), and follows from findings demonstrating that the explicit recog-
nition of anomalous perceptual features leads participants to accommodate their
relevant schemata and subsequently expect future anomalies (e.g., Bruner & Post-
man, 1949). As such, explicitly noted and subsequently expected anomalies no
longer constitute expectancy violations, and we reasoned that the relatively small
number of participants who explicitly noted the anomalies would not be suited to
testing the effect of pupillary dilation and compensatory affirmation on expectancy
violations. We assessed the explicit anomaly-awareness of participants by means
of a typical funnel debriefing, whereby participants are asked whether they notice
anything generally out of the ordinary regarding the cards, and if so, what it is
that they believe is out of the ordinary. If they made an explicit mention of the
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colors of the cards, we excluded them from the analyses.
Design
The study consisted of a 2 (cards: normal vs. normal + anomalous) between
subjects design. We opted for a between subjects design to be able to optimally
compare the pupillary response to normal and anomalous playing cards, as the
initial presentation of an expectancy-violating stimulus may affect subsequent re-
actions to the same type of stimulus. To minimize this possibility, we used a task
that draws the attention away from the anomalous feature, and we excluded par-
ticipants who reported noticing the anomalous feature (see Section 4.1.1.1 and
Footnote 1). Research has shown that conscious awareness of anomalies is not
needed for compensatory efforts to be evoked (Proulx & Heine, 2008; Randles et
al., 2011).
Procedure
Participants were seated in illuminated cubicles, in front of the eye tracker
monitor at a distance of approximately half a meter. They began by answering
an ideological extremism and positive discrimination attitudes questionnaire, fol-
lowed by a card task. Participants in the control condition were presented with
normal playing cards while participants in the experimental condition saw both
normal and reverse colored playing cards. This was followed by two affirmation
measures. At the end of the experiment, participants were verbally debriefed, and
asked whether they noticed any anomalous features during the card task. If so,
they were asked to specify what they thought was anomalous.
Materials
Card task. Participants viewed 260 trials that started with a fixation cross (2000
ms), followed by a playing card for a duration of 1000 ms. Participants were in-
structed to memorize each card’s parity, but to respond only to intermittent probe-
trials on which they had to indicate the parity of the card seen in the previous trial,
pressing ‘1’ for ‘odd’ and ‘2’ for ‘even’ using their preferred hand (see Smallwood
et al., 2011). The parity of the card was determined by the cards value, with Aces
being valued at either 1 or 11, face cards at 10, and the remaining cards valued
according to their number. Probe trials appeared between 2 and 5 non-probe tri-
als in a fixed-random pattern and consisted of a card-sized frame with a question




Figure 4.1: A subset of the playing cards, both anomalous (left column) and
normal (right column).
The cards were standard poker-sized playing cards, 320 x 425 pixel in size.
Anomalous card were created by reversing the color of the card. Hearts and di-
amonds were colored black, and clubs and spades were colored red. Figure 4.1
contains several examples.
Pupillometry. Pupil data were collected using a Tobii T60 eye tracker (Tobii,
Stockholm, Sweden) and E-Prime Professional 2.0 software (Psychology Software
Tools, Inc., Sharpsburg, PA). The Tobii T60 is integrated in a 17′′ TFT monitor
and records various pupil characteristics for each eye, non-intrusively, at a rate
of 60 Hz. Each measurement has a validity indication that ranges from 0 (the
system is certain that all data belongs to the particular eye) to 4 (gaze data is
missing or incorrect). If the pupil size for each eye was considered valid (0), the
pupil size measurements were averaged to create a single pupil size measurement.
Spikes were removed with a median filter (span 10) and artifacts (e.g., blinks)
were corrected using linear interpolation in SPSS (Version 20.0). Additionally,
pupil size was z-transformed for each participant. To correct for differences in
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baseline before the start of each trial, the average pupil size was calculated over a
period of 500 ms before the presentation of the stimulus, and subtracted from each
subsequent pupil size measurement of that trial. For the between subject analyses,
only the trials that contained an anomalous card in the experimental condition
were used and compared to their respective trials (e.g., a reverse colored two of
hearts compared to a normal two of hearts) in the control condition by taking the
average pupil size of the relevant trials.
Extremism. Extremism was measured using a version of the Social Conservatism
Scale (Wilson & Patterson, 1968, α = .67), consisting of 11-items describing a
societal issue (e.g., ‘gay rights’). For each item, participants could indicate to
what extent they were in favor of, or against the particular issue. The items were
anchored by ‘0’ (totally not agree) to ‘100’ (totally agree). Extremism was defined
as the deviation from the neutral point (50), which was calculated for each item
and averaged into a single extremism score.
Affirmation. Compensatory affirmation was measured in two ways. First, partic-
ipants were asked to indicate their general attitude toward positive discrimination.
Positive discrimination (or affirmative action) is the policy of favoring members of
disadvantaged groups and was assessed by first measuring their baseline attitude
using a 5-item scale (α = .74), that consisted of concrete instances where positive
discrimination may be applied (e.g., “Women must be given more opportunities,
compared to men, to occupy chief executive or general management positions”).
After the manipulation, their attitude toward positive discrimination was mea-
sured again with two general items (“I am in favor/against acts, policies, measures
that are driven by the idea of positive discrimination”), each on a 7-point Likert
scale, α = .94. These two items were combined and the average baseline atti-
tude was subtracted, so that higher scores indicated greater affirmation. Second,
with two counterbalanced scenarios involving a crime (prostitution and viewing
pornography in public), in which participants are asked to set a bond between e0
and e999 (e.g., Proulx et al., 2010, α = .73). These items were averaged together,
with higher bonds indicating greater values affirmation.
Analyses
Linear regression analyses were conducted that included the effect of con-
dition (anomalous/normal cards), extremism (mean-centered), and their interac-
tion term, in order to predict both pupil and affirmation responses. Additionally,
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we performed a linear regression with average pupil dilation, condition, and their
interaction term on both affirmation responses separately.
4.1.2 Results
Supporting Hypothesis 1, we found that anomalous cards elicited greater
pupil dilation in the experimental condition (M = 0.11, SD = 0.12) than normal
cards in the control condition (M = 0.03, SD = 0.13), F(1, 49) = 6.89, p = .012,
µp
2 = .123, and that this pupil reactivity was moderated by extremism, F(1, 49)
= 7.66, p = .008, µp2 = .135 (see Figure 4.2). In the experimental condition, a
higher level of extremism was associated with decreased pupil dilation, b = -0.008,
t(49) = -2.12, p = .039. In the control condition this relationship was reversed,
with higher levels of extremism being associated with greater pupil dilation, but
of marginal significance, b = 0.006, t(49) = 1.78, p = .081.
Supporting Hypothesis 2, extremism moderated the affirmation of positive
discrimination values, F(1, 49) = 6.42, p = .015, µp2 = .116. In the control
condition, extremism was related to less support for positive discrimination, b =
-0.11, t(49) = -2.68, p = .01 and somewhat more support in the experimental con-






























Figure 4.2: Interaction between extremism and card condition on average pupil
change.
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4.3). Stronger support for extremism as a moderator was found on the bond items,
F(1, 49) = 4.01, p = .051, µp2 = .076 (see Figure 4.4). In the experimental condi-
tion, higher extremism was marginally associated with a higher bond, b = 13.40,
t(49) = 1.84, p = .071. The simple slope in the control condition was not signif-
icant, p = .354. No significant moderations of pupil dilation were found on the
affirmation measures, ps > .559. Within-cell correlations revealed non-significant
correlations between average pupil size and the affirmation measure, in both the
control condition (r = -.108 (bond), r = -.128 (positive discrimination) and ex-
perimental conditions (r = -.124 (bond), r = -.338 (positive discrimination)). All
ps > .05.
Inclusion of the participants who consciously detected the anomalous cards
shows similar results. Extremism moderated the pupillary response to normal
and anomalous playing cards, F(1, 59) = 6.752, p = .012, µp2 = .103. In the
experimental condition, a higher level of extremism was marginally associated
with decreased pupil dilation, b = -0.008, t(59) = -1.99, p = .051. In the control
condition higher levels of extremism were associated with greater pupil dilation,
also of marginal significance, b = 0.005, t(59) = 1.68, p = .099. Extremism
moderated responses to the positive discrimination items, F(1, 58) = 4.41, p =































Figure 4.3: Interaction between extremism and card condition on the change in









































Figure 4.4: Interaction between extremism and card condition on the average
bond set for a criminal act.
for positive discrimination, b = -0.10, t(58)= -2.70, p = .009 and somewhat more
support in the experimental condition, although not significant, b = 0.014, t(58)
= 0.35, p = .728. The interaction with extremism and condition on the bond items
was found to be of marginal significance in this re-analysis, F(1, 58) = 3.581, p =
.06, µp2 = .058. In the experimental condition, higher extremism was marginally
associated with a higher bond, b = 12.20, t(58) = 1.90, p = .062. The simple
slope in the control condition was not significant, p = .46. Again, no significant
moderations of pupil dilation were found on the affirmation measures, ps > .479.
4.1.3 Discussion
In the present study we provide the first evidence for both decreased error de-
tection and an increased compensatory reaction in response to the same meaning
violation for people with extreme beliefs. We demonstrated an increased pupillary
reaction to anomalous playing cards and a moderating role of extremism—more
extreme participants showed a diminished pupillary reaction. However, extremism
was found to be related to greater affirmation of societal values. This shows that
extremism differentially affects initial markers of BIS activation and subsequent
behavior related to BAS activation. These findings support the contention that
BIS and BAS are separate systems. Even though these systems are both activated
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in the wake of experienced violations, researchers in the threat-compensation lit-
erature have separately investigated either BIS or BAS motivated effects. This
approach has limited our understanding of how these systems differently manifest
in the threat-compensation behaviors commonly reported in this literature. In this
experiment, we have investigated the temporally inclusive threat-compensation
response and shown that BIS activation is dampened by the presence of extreme
values, and the BAS response is amplified. We show that our proxy for BIS, pupil
dilation, does not appear to cause the BAS motivated responses, thus supporting
our contention that BIS and BAS are distinct systems that are distinctly influenced
by commitment to relatively extreme values.
Additionally, we are also among the first to show this in a setting where the
error is in the stimulus and not in action tendencies that are relevant to the task.
Participants did not need to react to all card trials, and on trials requiring a re-
sponse, the judgment (odd/even number) involved a different and task-irrelevant
feature of the card (card number vs. anomalous color of the suit). It has been sug-
gested that meaning violations create conflicts in behavioral responses and that
this motivates subsequent compensatory reactions (e.g., Harmon-Jones, Amodio,
& Harmon-Jones, 2009; Hirsh, 2012). Our data shows that, although general be-
havioral tendencies are still likely to play a role, these need not be content-related
to the ongoing task. Instead, meaning violations can elicit compensatory reactions
outside of conscious awareness and without direct bearing on the task.
We found a moderating effect of extremism on both affirmation measures,
yet more affirmation on the latter dependent measure. This is consistent with the
literature showing a delay is required between the meaning violation and the affir-
mation opportunity to maximize the compensatory response (Burke et al., 2010;
Jonas et al., 2014). Since we did not implement a delay, it was likely the case
that some participants were still in an inhibitory state after the violation task and
switched to approach soon after, responding with increased zeal to the second set
of affirmation items. We must note, however, that this is only speculation, and a
counterbalanced design is needed to test this interpretation.
It may be noted that our participants were students in a socially liberal coun-
try, and extremism was overwhelmingly present in what would typically be in-
terpreted as a socially liberal direction. Although some views in the literature
paint those holding conservative beliefs (by North American standards) as a group
particularly sensitive to threat and uncertainty (Jost et al., 2007), our results
show that people who uphold relatively liberal beliefs (by this same standard)
also show a typical threat response. This suggests that relative extremism plays a
content-general role in the amplification of BAS-induced affirmation, rather than
one where the content (e.g., ‘right’ or ‘left’ wing) of extreme beliefs determines
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the amplitude of compensation (see e.g., Brandt, Reyna, Chambers, Crawford, &
Wetherell, 2014; Brandt, Wetherell, & Reyna, 2014; Greenberg & Jonas, 2003).
Limitations and future research
In this study we investigated the effects of perceptual anomalies on pupil
dilation. We see perceptual anomalies as but one inconsistency among many com-
mon meaning violations, including the experience of ostracism, loss of personal
control, and mortality salience. We have shown that pupil dilation is affected
by the threat of perceptual anomalies, but it is not yet known whether the same
reaction would occur in response to other meaning violations such as mortality
salience. Future research can replicate this study’s design with these other viola-
tions.
Future research should also investigate a greater variety of compensation
strategies and affirmation opportunities. In our design we have used both atti-
tudes toward positive discrimination and punishment decisions for two criminals.
Both of the reported crimes contained elements of sexuality; nevertheless, we be-
lieve that those who breach any committed social norm should incur a heightened
punitive, and therefore affirmative, response following a meaning violation. Fu-
ture studies could include more varied crimes in order to see whether our results
generalize to other punitive domains. Additionally, the affirmation of personal
projects, religious affirmation, and the affirmation of explicit political values could
be used to further investigate the extent to which extremism affects the tendency
to affirm values, more generally, in these domains.
In contrast to previous studies using these dependent measures (e.g., Proulx
& Heine, 2008), no main effects were found of condition on our bond affirmation
measures. There are several reasons for this possible absence. First, our design dif-
fered in several respects from this prior research, with one notable difference being
the measurement of social value attitudes prior to the experimental manipulation.
Research has shown that the activation of one’s values can suppress the effect
of meaning violations (see e.g., Inzlicht & Tullett, 2010). Second, our relatively
liberal sample could have suppressed an otherwise detectable main effect. Corre-
lational tests, however, did not show a suppressing effect of social conservatism
with the bond measures, thereby ruling out this explanation. Third, contrary to
US participants, it may be the case that Dutch participants do not generally have
strong enough commitments regarding prostitution for this punishment scenario
to constitute a general affirmation opportunity. As such, only those of relatively
extreme dispositions affirmed punitive attitudes, as shown in our data.
Finally, our conclusions regarding the relationship between BIS and BAS
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activation—specifically, the lack thereof—is bounded by the specific markers that
characterize the seeming contradiction that we attempted to address, namely,
markers of immediate conflict-detection BIS, and subsequent BAS-activated affir-
mation. While these distinct systems did not appear to causally interact (i.e., BIS
conflict arousal appeared unrelated to the magnitude of subsequent BAS compen-
sation), it may still be the case that other markers of downstream BIS arousal may
causally impact the extent of subsequent BAS activation (e.g., retrospective felt
anxiety following explicitly experienced meaning violations; McGregor, Prentice,
& Nash, 2013, 2009). Future experimental work can determine this possibility.
4.2 Conclusion
We found that extremism reduces the pupillary response to a violation and
increases subsequent affirmation of personal values, demonstrating that extrem-
ism differentially impacts markers of conflict-detection BIS and BAS compensation
in response to meaning violations.
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Pupillometry and Hindsight Bias
Physiological Arousal Predicts Compensatory Be-
havior
Based on Sleegers, W.W.A., Proulx, T., & van Beest, I. (2017b). Pupillometry and
hindsight bias: Physiological arousal predicts compensatory behavior. Manuscript in
preparation.
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Abstract
Humans have a need for meaning, that is, they have a need to understand
the world and form expectations that connect people, places, objects, and events
to each other. Often, however, events unfold differently than expected, violating
our sense of meaning. This causes a state of aversive arousal that motivates com-
pensatory behavior to reduce this arousal. Although there is abundant empirical
support for the link between expectancy violations and aversive arousal, it has not
frequently been demonstrated that this aversive arousal predicts compensatory
behavior, despite theories in the threat compensation literature (e.g., Meaning
Maintenance Model; MMM) assuming such process. We believe this might be
the result of misattribution processes in which arousal is mistakenly attributed to
the equipment used to measure arousal and the difficulty of repeatedly measur-
ing changes in arousal to multiple opportunities of compensatory behavior within
a single experiment. To counteract these limitations, we applied a noninvasive
technique to measure arousal, pupil dilation, and used hindsight bias as an instan-
tiation of compensatory behavior. In two sessions, participants answered a series
of factual questions with surprising answers. After first answering all questions,
participants were presented with the true answers to the questions, during which
their pupil size was measured. Following each correct answer, they were asked to
indicate their previous answer. We found that pupil dilation predicted the extent
to which participants adjusted their second answer to be closer to the correct an-
swer, thus displaying compensatory behavior, and supporting the MMM and other
threat compensation theories.




Humans adopt a multitude of beliefs. These range from grand worldview
beliefs to trivial fun facts. People believe that the world is fair, that behavior
follows from attitudes, and that people eat an average of 8 spiders per year in
their sleep. This range of beliefs reflects a ubiquitous need for meaning. That is,
people have a need to understand the world and form expectations that connect
people, places, objects, and events to each other (e.g., Baumeister, 1991; Heine et
al., 2006; Proulx & Inzlicht, 2012). According to the Meaning Maintenance Model
(MMM), meaning stems from the adoption of beliefs that causes one to expect
relationships. People expect that water feels wet, that seasons follow a specific
order, and that good things happen to good people. When these expectations
are met, a sense of meaning is experienced. Their sets of beliefs, or meaning
frameworks, functionally allow people to make sense of their environment and
ultimately serve as guidelines for how to act.
But meaning frameworks are imperfect. It turns out the world is not always
fair (Lerner, 1980) and that people do not eat 8 spiders in their sleep on an an-
nual basis (Sneed, 2014). These events violate the sense of meaning and cause
a state of discomfort, referred to by various psychologists as disequilibrium (Pi-
aget, 2000), imbalance (Heider, 1958), dissonance (Festinger, 1957), uncertainty
(van den Bos, 2001), anxiety (Janoff-Bulman, 1992), and anxious uncertainty
(McGregor et al., 2010), or summarized in the MMM as disanxiousuncertlibrium
(Proulx & Inzlicht, 2012). It is this state that is argued to motivate compensatory
behavior to find meaning (Proulx & Inzlicht, 2012).
One form of compensatory behavior is that people can assimilate events so
that they appear consistent with initial expectations. For example, a misfortune
that befalls an innocent person can be interpreted as deserving rather than unfair,
such as a rape victim being accused of having provoked it by dressing provocatively
(Lerner, 1980). This assimilation maintains a sense of consistency with the belief
of a just world. Alternatively, a disconfirmed set of expectations can be accommo-
dated. For example, after finding out that people do not eat 8 spiders in their sleep
every year, this estimate can be adjusted downwards to account for the new in-
formation, whereby they may even adopt the wholly correct belief that people do
not eat any spiders during sleep. A third possible response to meaning violation is
that beliefs unrelated to the initial violation are more strongly affirmed, a behavior
that is also called fluid compensation (Heine et al., 2006). For example, partici-
pants that were manipulated to feel insecure about their intellect or relationships
subsequently showed greater religiosity (McGregor et al., 2013), or participants
who saw reverse colored playing cards (e.g., a black Two of Hearts) subsequently
demonstrated greater affirmation of affirmative action (Proulx & Major, 2013). As
can be seen in these examples, the violation of both broad worldviews and trivial
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beliefs can evoke compensatory behavior.
Arousal motivating compensation
According to the MMM, the commonality between the various names that de-
scribe the experience of meaning violation, along with the convergent behaviors
following a meaning violation, point to a common syndrome of aversive arousal
underlying these behaviors. The role of arousal in cognitive conflict reduction,
more generally, has been raised in the past. Festinger (1957) suggested that the
dissonance reduction behaviors are motivated by aversive arousal following expe-
riences of cognitive inconsistency, where in the case of dissonance research, these
behaviors often involved attitude change to restore a sense of cognitive consis-
tency (i.e., accommodation). Yet, just like it was the case then, direct evidence for
the physiological aversive state playing a causal role in producing compensatory
behavior remains limited.
If it is the case that an aversive arousal state underlies the response to
meaning violations, then at least two lines of evidence should be found (see
also Townsend, Eliezer, & Major, 2013). First, meaning violations should reli-
ably induce a state of heightened physiological arousal. Second, this physiolog-
ical arousal should be linked to the compensatory behavior that frequently fol-
lows a meaning violation. Evidence for the former can be found in abundance,
whether it’s an expectancy violation caused by a perceptual anomaly (Sleegers et
al., 2015), cognitive dissonance (Gerard, 1967), self-view inconsistencies (Ayduk
et al., 2012), worldview violations (Townsend et al., 2010), or category-based
violations (Mendes et al., 2007).
Evidence for the second link, however, is less frequently observed. The main
line of research that offers indirect support for the second link utilizes a misattri-
bution of arousal paradigm, whereby, participants are given a possible explanation
for any arousal they may experience following a meaning violation (Inzlicht & Al-
Khindi, 2012; Kay, Moscovitch, & Laurin, 2010; Losch & Cacioppo, 1990; Proulx &
Heine, 2008; Zanna & Cooper, 1974). For example, Proulx and Heine (2008) pre-
sented participants with an implicit perceptual anomaly (the experimenter switch-
ing midway through the experiment without the participant noticing) and then
had them take a placebo. Those who were informed that the placebo caused side
effects of arousal did not affirm a moral belief they held (setting a bond for a pros-
titute) compared to those who were not informed of such side effects. Relatedly,
the effect of a meaning violation on compensatory behavior is also reduced when
an actual sedative is given. For example, Cooper et al. (1978) gave some partic-
ipants amphetamine, while others got phenobarbital (i.e., the sedative). Those
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who received the sedative showed less attitude change following a high-choice
counterattitudinal essay than those who received the amphetamine.
Self-report assessments of aversive arousal
Some additional evidence for the second link has been found using self-
report measures to index the aversive arousal and its association with compen-
satory behavior (e.g., Laurin, Kay, & Moscovitch, 2008; McGregor et al., 2013;
Plaks, Grant, & Dweck, 2005, experiment 4). For example, Plaks et al. (2005,
experiment 3) violated participant’s meaning by confirming or disconfirming their
theories of personality. Following the confirmation or disconfirmation, partici-
pants’ compensatory behavior was assessed with a task in which they had to press
a button in response to seeing a row of A’s. The row of A’s would either turn into
a row of B’s or remain a row of A’s. Their task was to determine the percentage of
trials on which they had control over whether the A’s turned into B’s. By playing
a greater number of trials, participants would be more certain of the correct per-
centage of trials they had control over. Self-reported anxiety was measured before
and after the confirming or disconfirming feedback. Results showed an increase
in anxiety following disconfirming feedback, which mediated the relationship be-
tween the meaning violating feedback and compensatory behavior, i.e., higher
need for certainty. However, despite this example evidence for the mediational
link remains elusive (also see McGregor et al., 2013, p. 550).
There are multiple potential reasons for why self-report measures fail to
demonstrate a mediational link between meaning violations and compensatory
behavior. The first reason is that meaning violations often do not produce in-
creased negative affect. Researchers from different backgrounds in the compen-
sation literature have repeatedly demonstrated an absence of negative affect, or
even elevated positive affect, immediately after a meaning violation (e.g., DeWall
& Baumeister, 2006; Dodgson & Wood, 1998; Pyszczynski et al., 1999; Wichman,
Brunner, & Weary, 2008). This might be the result of methodological limitations,
such as poor reliability, of self-report scales, but it can also be due to the phe-
nomenon in question. According to this second possibility, self-report measures
can provide a compensatory opportunity to respond to the meaning violation. By
explicitly reporting that the meaning violation was in fact not distressing, one
can persuade oneself to feel less distress. For example, in the case of cognitive
dissonance it has been empirically demonstrated that asking about the degree of
psychological discomfort has the effect of reducing the amount of dissonance felt
(Elliot & Devine, 1994; Galinsky, Stone, & Cooper, 2000; Pyszczynski, Greenberg,
Solomon, Sideris, & Stubing, 1993).
80
Pupillometry and Hindsight Bias
Physiological assessments of aversive arousal
If self-report measures are unreliable assessments of the predicted aversive
arousal state, one might conclude that more direct measures such as physiologi-
cal assessments should be used. However, research has shown that there is only
a weak intercorrelation between self-report measures, changes in physiological
arousal, and associated behavioral outcomes (Mauss, Levenson, McCarter, Wil-
helm, & Gross, 2005), indicating that here too there is a second set of potential
problems. In fact, the problems associated with self-report measures easily apply
to physiological assessments as well. One issue is that physiological arousal mea-
surement tools themselves evoke arousal. The placing of electrodes on the skin or
having your head put between metal braces can be arousing or at least is expected
to evoke arousal. Consequently, it is possible that participants feel aroused be-
cause of the measurement tool itself or attribute arousal caused by a manipulation
to the measurement tool, ironically showing the efficacy of misattribution studies
that in other contexts serve as evidence for the role of arousal in the threat com-
pensation process. For example, Croyle and Cooper (1983) performed a standard
induced compliance paradigm involving the enforcement of a new legal drink-
ing age and found the predicted pattern of attitude change—students in the high
choice condition arguing in favor of a lower drinking age became more in favor of
a lower legal drinking age. This effect disappeared in Study 2, which contained a
physiological arousal assessment in the form of skin conductance. The authors in-
terpreted this absence of an effect due to participants misattributing their arousal
to the physiological recording device.
An additional limitation of many physiological assessment tools is that they
are noisy. Repeated trials are necessary to detect a reliable signal. This means that
when testing the link between physiological arousal and compensatory behav-
ior, a significant amount of time passes in between the induction of the meaning
violation and the subsequent measure of the compensatory behavior. Although
the threat compensation literature has demonstrated that some time should pass
before assessing compensatory behavior (e.g., Burke et al., 2010), this period is
likely still too long when measuring a physiological response. Due to this elon-
gated period between meaning violation and compensatory behavior it is perhaps
no surprise then that evidence for this link is mixed.
In summary, according to many models in the threat compensation literature,
and the MMM in particular, it should be the case that meaning violations induce a
state of aversive arousal (link 1) and that aversive arousal motivates compensatory
behavior (link 2). A myriad of findings are in support of the first link, but the sec-
ond link remains uncertain in terms of direct empirical support. In the present
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paper, we investigate this second link using a design that takes into account some
of the limitations of prior work. We use new and improved eye tracker technol-
ogy to assess aversive arousal in response to meaning violations, after which we
measure compensatory behavior, and do so repeatedly to achieve higher power.
Pupillometry and psychophysiological arousal
Recent advances in eye tracker technology have led to some significant im-
provements over previous models. Eye trackers are now more affordable, easy
to use, and, more importantly, less of a burden to participants. Unlike previous
models that often required the participant’s head to be fixed in place, modern eye
trackers are integrated in computer monitors so that, after a short calibration pro-
cedure, it is no longer noticeable that an actual eye tracker study is taking place.
This noninvasive design is much desired as it likely lowers the possibility for par-
ticipants to attribute any felt arousal to the device, thereby allowing us to more
reliably investigate the effect of aversive arousal on compensatory behavior.
This aversive arousal can be measured using eye tracker technology. Pupil-
lary reactivity (i.e., changes in pupil size) can serve as an index of physiological
arousal. This relationship between pupil size and arousal stems from its associa-
tion with the locus coeruleus (LC)-norepinephrine (NE) system. The LC-NE system
is involved in the regulation of engagement or withdrawal behavior by releasing
NE through projections from the LC in the forebrain (for a review, see Aston-Jones
& Cohen, 2005). Pupil size has been found to correlate with LC activity in mon-
keys (Rajkowski et al., 1993) and humans (Gilzenrat et al., 2010). Additionally,
Beatty and colleagues have demonstrated that pupil reactivity is consistent with
LC responses to task-events (Beatty, 1982; Jackson, 1982; Richer & Beatty, 1987).
Further support is found in studies linking pupil dilation to arousing stimuli such
as positive or negative pictures (Bradley et al., 2008) and the experience of pain
(Chapman et al., 1999; Ellermeier & Westphal, 1995; Höfle et al., 2008). Impor-
tantly, pupil dilation has also been found to increase in response to task error (i.e.,
being mistaken; Brown et al., 1999; Critchley et al., 2005) and expectancy vio-
lations (Preuschoff et al., 2011; Raisig et al., 2012, 2010; Sleegers et al., 2015).
Consequently, pupillometry is a valuable tool to assess physiological activation, in
a way that is noninvasive and therefore unlikely to be seen as a potential source
for felt arousal.
Pupillometry, like many other physiological assessment tools, requires re-
peated measurements to attain a reliable signal. As a result, a sizeable number
of experimental trials is needed, which will elongate the time between a meaning
violation and compensatory behavior if a standard design is used. One possi-
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ble solution is to present repeated meaning violations and assess compensatory
behavior after each meaning violation. Such a within subject design would po-
tentially achieve high enough power to detect the theorized relationship between
aversive arousal and compensatory behavior. However, the majority of studies on
compensatory behavior (e.g., affirmation) use between subject designs in which
compensatory behavior is measured once, so using common compensatory behav-
ior assessments is not possible. Therefore, we use a different paradigm to assess
assimilation compensation behaviors based on a popularly research psychological
phenomenon: hindsight bias.
Hindsight bias as a compensatory response
Hindsight bias, or the ’knew-it-all-along’ effect, is the tendency for individu-
als with outcome knowledge (hindsight) to claim that they did in fact know the
outcome or estimated its occurrence with a higher probability than they would
have estimated without the outcome information (foresight). Several processes
have been proposed to underlie the hindsight bias (for a review, see Hawkins &
Hastie, 1990). One of these proposed processes is the tendency for participants
to enhance their own ego. It has been suggested that the hindsight bias is caused
by a relatively automatic and unconscious sense-making process (Fischhoff, 1975)
and research on individual differences in the tendency to demonstrate hindsight
bias has revealed that people high in need for predictability and control more fre-
quently show hindsight bias (Musch, 2003). These findings suggest that some
motivational processes underlie the hindsight bias, similar to, or perhaps even
identical to, the processes underlying compensatory responses following meaning
violations. In short, hindsight bias itself can be considered a compensatory assim-
ilation response i.e., reinterpreting experiences to be consistent with accessible
meaning frameworks.
From this perspective, hindsight bias is a compensatory response to infor-
mation that violates participants’ expectations. For example, if participants are
asked to estimate the shortest distance between Russia and America (likely to be
upwards of several hundreds of kilometers), and are then given the correct answer
(3.6 km), it violates their expectations. In line with the MMM, this could result
in compensatory assimilation behavior. In this case, a hindsight bias that would
result in the participant indicating a second response that is closer to the correct
answer than their initial response.
Assessing hindsight bias as a compensatory assimilation response has the
methodological benefit of allowing for a repeated measures design. Using a so-
called ‘memory paradigm’, participants first answer a series of questions to es-
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tablish their prior beliefs, which is followed by a second presentation of these
questions together with their correct answers. After the presentation of the cor-
rect answer, the participant is prompted to report their original response (in hind-
sight). If the recalled response is different from the initial response, and closer
to the correct answer (i.e., assimilated), a hindsight bias has been demonstrated.
For our purposes, the advantage is that there is no limit to how many questions
can be asked, except for taking into account participant fatigue and the question
pool. This makes making it a viable design to repeatedly assess compensatory
affirmation behaviors.
5.1 Hypothesis
In the present study we use pupillometry and the hindsight bias to investigate
the directly mediating role of physiological arousal in the relationship between
meaning violations and compensatory assimilation behavior. We will present par-
ticipants with a series of questions that vary in how unexpected the correct an-
swers are. Using an eye tracker, arousal levels will be assessed at the moment
of the presentation of the correct answer, after which they are once again asked
what they believed the answer to be. We hypothesize that when the correct answer
violates the expectations of the participant, this results in greater pupil dilation.
This increased pupil dilation should motivate participants to indicate a different
response than initially given, in the direction of the presented correct answer, i.e.,
display an assimilative hindsight bias. Such relationship would support the pre-
diction of the MMM that compensatory behaviors are a direct response to aversive
arousal in response to a meaning violation.
5.1.1 Method
Participants
Students (N = 44; 31 women; Mage = 20.93 years) at Tilburg University
participated in exchange for course credit or a monetary reward. The majority
of participants (34) were undergraduate students in psychology. Sample size was
based on prior research using pupillometry (e.g., Bradley et al., 2008; Laeng et
al., 2011; Partala & Surakka, 2003). No additional data was collected after data
analysis.
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Design and procedure
The present study consisted of a full within-subjects design, with a hindsight
bias paradigm to present meaning violations and to measure compensatory be-
havior. Specifically, we used a memory hindsight bias design (Calvillo, 2013; Pohl,
2007) in which participants answered a series of factual questions, first before
seeing the correct answers and again later after seeing the correct answer to each
question. Each question was presented individually. After participants indicated
what they believed to be the correct answers, the eye tracker was calibrated and
participants saw each question again, followed by the presentation of the correct
answer to said question. Pupil size was measured during the presentation of the
correct answer. Immediately following the correct answer the participant had to
indicate what their original answer was. At the end, participants filled in several
demographics questions.
Materials
Factual questions. The questions for the hindsight bias task were selected from
various online sources and books on the topic of misconceptions (e.g., van Maa-
nen, 1994). We selected 80 questions that we believed participants thought they
could answer, but that varied in terms of whether they would answer correctly.
In other words, we selected questions that varied in the extent that the correct
answer would surprise them. A full list of the questions is available in section 8.2
of the Supplemental Materials.
Hindsight bias task. The hindsight bias task consisted of two parts, each part
consisting of 80 trials. In the first part, a trial consisted of a single question and
participants were asked to indicate what they believed to be the correct answer.
Questions were presented in random order, without a time limit. In the second
part of the hindsight bias task, a trial consisted of a single question, shown for
a minimal duration of 3000 ms, after which the participant could click with the
mouse to continue. Hereafter, there was a blank screen for a duration of 1000,
1500, or 2000 ms, followed by a fixation cross (3000 ms). After the fixation cross,
the correct answer to the quest was presented for a duration of 5000 ms. Hereafter,
participants were asked to indicate what their answer was, identical to that in the
first part.
Hindsight bias. Hindsight bias was defined as the difference between the second
and the first response to each question, with the requirement that the second
response was closer to the correct answer than the first (Pohl, 2007). Because it is
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not possible to get closer to the correct answer when the initial answer is already
correct, these trials were removed (20.73%). We also created a percentage-based
solution to reduce the influence of questions with extremely large numeric answers
(e.g., “How many earthquakes occur every year?" Answer: 50000). Hence, the
amount of hindsight bias was divided by the absolute distance between the correct
answer of the question and the participant’s initial response. This resulted in a bias
that could range from 0 to 1 or above. If the bias was greater than 1, it indicates
an overcorrection (e.g., if the first response is 30, the correct answer is 40, and the
second response is 45). Due to the difficulty of interpreting the meaning of such
an overcorrection in terms of a hindsight bias, we chose to remove these trials
(1.59%).
Pupillometry. A Tobii T60 eye tracker (Tobii, Stockholm, Sweden) was used to
record pupil data. The Tobii T60 is a noninvasive eye tracker that is integrated in
a 17′′ TFT monitor, resembling a standard PC monitor. It records at a rate of 60
Hz. Each measurement has a validity indication that ranges from 0 (the system
is certain that all data belongs to the particular eye) to 4 (gaze data is missing or
incorrect). Only recordings with a validity score of 0 were used. Pupil size from
each eye were averaged together to create a single pupil size score and filtered
with a modified repeated median filter (outer width: 25, inner width 15) using
the ‘robfilter’ package (Fried et al., 2014). Gaps in the pupil data (for example due
to blinks) were filled using linear interpolation, using the ‘zoo’ package (Zeileis &
Grothendieck, 2005). Hereafter, the pupil size was controlled for baseline differ-
ences by subtracting the average pupil size during a 500 ms pre-event period from
the subsequent pupil measurements (Beatty & Lucero-Wagoner, 2000). Pupil size
was averaged across a period of 500 ms to 2500 ms following the presentation of
the correct answer. The initial 500 ms were seen as the light reflex period.
Data analysis
Data was prepared and analyzed in R (R Core Team, 2016). We report hind-
sight bias descriptives to determine how often hindsight bias occurred and also
tested whether pupil dilation was linked to being mistaken in order to validate the
response feedback as indeed affecting the participant’s physiology. To this end, we
created a binary variable that indicated whether the participant gave a correct or
incorrect answer (i.e., not taking into account the magnitude of the error). We
performed a linear mixed model with error (yes/no) as the predictor and aver-
age pupil size as the outcome variable. We defined random intercepts for each
participant.
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To investigate the hypothesis that pupil size is positively linked to the amount
of hindsight bias, we performed several linear mixed model analyses in which
hindsight bias served as the outcome variable and average pupil dilation in re-
sponse to the question’s answer as the predictor. We defined random intercepts
for each participant. We only included trials with hindsight bias, that is, trials in
which participants gave a second response that was closer to the correct answer
than their initial answer (e.g., Pohl, 2007).
The ‘lme4’ package (Bates et al., 2015) was used for the mixed model anal-
yses in combination with the ‘lmerTest’ package (Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, & Chris-
tensen, 2016) in order to determine p-values. Confidence intervals were created
with Bayesian regression models using the ‘brms’ package (Bürkner, n.d.).
5.1.2 Results
Descriptives
Participants adjusted their second answer towards the correct answer (i.e.,
displayed a hindsight bias), on average, on 20.72% of the trials. Variability be-
tween participants was great, however (SD = 12.49, min = 1.49, max = 58.73).
It thus appears that there were large individual differences in demonstrating a
hindsight bias.
Pupil dilation and error
To test whether being mistaken was associated with an increase in pupil size,
we conducted a linear mixed model with average pupil dilation as the outcome
variable and error (the initial response to the question being different from the
correct answer) as the predictor. This revealed a significant effect of error, t(3354)
= 2.30, p = .021, b = 0.014, 95% CI [0.0027, 0.026], see Figure 5.1. When
participants saw an answer that differed from their initial response, there was a
larger change in pupil size (M = 0.02, SD = 0.16) compared to when their answer
matched the correct answer (M = 0.01, SD = 0.015).
Pupil dilation and hindsight bias
We selected the trials in which a hindsight bias was demonstrated and con-
ducted a linear mixed model with hindsight bias as the outcome variable and pupil
dilation as the predictor. This revealed a significant positive relationship between
hindsight bias and pupil size, t(506) = 2.26, p = .024, b = 0.25, 95% CI [0.036,




































Figure 5.1: Average pupil size change in response to the correct answer.
Participants either gave an initial answer that differed from the correct answer
(incorrect response) or that matched the correct answer (correct response).
Because of individual differences in the number of trials that showed a hind-
sight bias we performed an additional analysis on the relationship between pupil
dilation and hindsight bias, but only including participants who showed a hind-
sight bias on more than 10 trials (N = 39). This again revealed a significant
positive relationship between pupil dilation and hindsight bias, t(404) = 2.80, p
= .0054, b = 0.38, 95% CI [0.11, 0.70]. These results also confirm our hypothesis
that pupil size is linked to the amount of hindsight bias following negative feed-
back and show that this relationship is especially visible when the participant has
the tendency to display a hindsight bias.
5.1.3 Discussion
In the present study we successfully demonstrated a link between physio-
logical arousal and compensatory behavior. Greater pupil dilation in response to
an unexpected correct answer was associated with more hindsight bias. That is,
participants shifted their second answer more towards the factual question’s cor-
rect answer, relative to their first answer, when they showed a larger physiologi-
88


















Figure 5.2: Relationship between average pupil size in response to the correct
answer and amount of hindsight bias.
cal response to the correct answer of the question. This compensatory response
following increased arousal is consistent with the MMM, as well as other threat
compensation theories that postulate the causal role of aversive arousal (e.g., Fes-
tinger, 1957; Heider, 1958; Janoff-Bulman, 1992; McGregor et al., 2010; Piaget,
2000; van den Bos, 2001)
Contributions of the present study
Two reasons might explain why we were able to demonstrate a link between
arousal and compensatory behavior. First, recent developments in eye tracker
technology have made this technology exceptionally non-invasive. No electrodes
are placed on the skin and nor is the participant severely restrained, as is the case
with the majority of physiological assessment tools. Consequently, an eye tracker
is less likely to evoke arousal that can interfere with proposed arousal process un-
derlying threat compensation reactions. Additionally, the non-invasive attribute of
modern eye trackers make it less likely for participants to attribute any felt arousal
to the recording device, which would remove the impetus for a compensation re-
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sponse. Second, we used a full within subjects design in which we repeatedly pre-
sented participants with a meaning violation (unexpected correct answers) and
an opportunity to compensate. This repeated design has the benefit of increased
power, as well as a temporal benefit in that there is no significant delay between
the meaning violation and the opportunity to compensate. Although research has
shown that a short delay can promote a compensatory response in the form of
affirmation (e.g., Burke et al., 2010) a relatively long delay can interfere with the
need to compensate, as alternative compensatory responses might already take
place (e.g., trivialization).
Aside from providing evidence for the role of arousal in responding to mean-
ing violations, the present study also informs research on the hindsight bias phe-
nomenon. As mentioned in the Introduction of this chapter, several processes have
been proposed to explain the hindsight bias (Hawkins & Hastie, 1990). Most of the
processes involve cognitive processes, such as memory processes and anchoring-
and-adjustment processes. However, a motivational account has also been pro-
posed. Ego-enhancing and sense-making motives are positively related to the dis-
play of a hindsight bias (Campbell & Tesser, 1983; Fischhoff, 1975; Musch, 2003).
Our current integration of the hindsight bias in the MMM, and the supporting
data from the present study, offers further evidence that a motivational account
can underly the hindsight bias phenomenon.
Limitations and future research
In the present study we used a memory design to measure hindsight bias
and found a large variation in displayed hindsight bias between participants. This
could be due to the type of hindsight bias design we employed. In the memory
design participants provide an answer twice, once before seeing the correct answer
or outcome and once after. On the second measure participants are asked to
recall their first answer. Importantly, this memory-based design, although effective
in demonstrating a hindsight bias, might be relatively less effective in evoking a
hindsight bias than other hindsight bias designs such as the hypothetical design
(e.g., Campbell & Tesser, 1983; Fischhoff, 1975; Pennington, 1981; Powell, 1988;
Wood, 1978, experiment 2), in which participants are asked to respond as if they
had not been told the correct answer. After all, a memory task is about recalling
a previously reported answer; and when the time-lag is not substantial, people
can with relative ease recall their answer. For this reason, the memory design can
be improved upon by extending the retention interval between the pre-answer
response and post-answer response (e.g., Fischhoff, Beyth, Kahneman, Tversky, &
Slovic, 1975; Hell, Gigerenzer, Gauggel, Mall, & Müller, 1988; Pennington, 1981).
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In future studies one could have participants first come into the lab for the first part
of the experiment (initial answers) and later for the second part (correct answer
feedback and post-feedback answers). This would likely increase the likelihood of
observing hindsight bias and would constitute a more powerful design.
In our current work we discussed the first and second line of evidence for the
role of arousal in compensatory behavior following meaning violations. However,
there is also a third line of evidence (Townsend et al., 2013). Aside from mean-
ing violations inducing physiological arousal, and physiological arousal motivating
compensatory behavior, compensatory behavior should also reduce the physiolog-
ical arousal. Elliot and Devine (1994) provided evidence for this third link with
a cognitive dissonance paradigm. They found that making a counterattitudinal
argument caused psychological discomfort, assessed by a self-report measure of
affect, and that the discomfort was reduced following attitude change. This study
offers support for the third link, but research on this specific link is scarce. In fact,
we are not aware of any studies demonstrating this link using physiological mea-
surements of arousal. There is empirical work showing that reflecting on mean-
ingful values (e.g., religion) prior to a meaning violation serves as a buffer and
reduces the aversive arousal following the meaning violation. However, it would
be more persuasive if the entire link of meaning violation to aversive arousal to
compensatory behavior to reduced aversive arousal can be demonstrated in a sin-
gle experiment. Using the present study’s design, it might be possible demonstrate
the entire causal link by having participants again see the correct answers. We
predict that instead of the positive relationship between pupil size and hindsight
bias found in the present study, a negative relationship between hindsight bias and
pupil size should be found.
5.2 Conclusion
We found that the magnitude of hindsight bias was positively related to the
size of pupil change in response to seeing the expected and unexpected correct
answer to a set of questions. This finding is consistent with the MMM and other
threat compensation theories that postulate a role of aversive psychophysiological
arousal in producing compensatory behavior following meaning violations. The
findings also provide further support for a motivational account of hindsight bias.
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The Social Pain of Cyberball
Decreased Pupillary Reactivity to Exclusion Cues
Based on Sleegers, W.W.A., Proulx, T., & van Beest, I. (2017c). The social pain of
Cyberball: Decreased pupillary reactivity to exclusion cues. Journal of Experimen-
tal Social Psychology, 69, 187-200. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2016.08.004
92
The Social Pain of Cyberball
Abstract
A heavily investigated topic in the ostracism literature is the manner in
which being ostracized impacts immediate psychophysiological reactivity. Despite
the prevalence of this research, it is still unclear which psychological mechanism
underlies the immediate reaction to cues of ostracism. According to the social-
physical pain overlap theory, cues to ostracism induce a social pain response akin
to physical pain due to shared neurological substrates between social and physical
pain. Alternatively, it is possible that the immediate reaction to ostracism reflects
a conflict detection mechanism responding to a violation of the expectation that
one should be socially included. In the present studies, we used pupillometry to
distinguish the immediate reaction to ostracism in terms of it primarily represent-
ing a pain-oriented response or a conflict-detection response. We continuously
measured the pupillary reaction during games of Cyberball, which contained so-
cial inclusion events (a ball thrown to the participant) and exclusion events (a ball
thrown to another player). We find that participants show a diminished pupil-
lary reaction to cues of exclusion but not to cues of inclusion, consistent with the
social-physical pain overlap theory.
Keywords: ostracism; social pain; conflict; pupillometry; physiology
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Humans face a variety of existential concerns. One of these concerns is re-
flected in our ubiquitous need to belong to a group (Baumeister & Leary, 1995).
Research has consistently demonstrated that people are greatly affected by the
loss of acceptance within a group. Indeed, research on ostracism—i.e., being ig-
nored and excluded—has shown that being socially excluded affects one’s sense
of belonging and also causes a decrease in self-esteem, control, and meaning in
life (Williams & Sommer, 1997). This socially painful experience results in the
display of various behaviors aimed at restoring social standing, such as pro-social,
or even aggressive behavior (for reviews, see Hartgerink, van Beest, Wicherts, &
Williams, 2015; Williams, 2009; Williams & Nida, 2011). Taken together, these
studies demonstrate the varied impact of ostracism experiences.
Importantly, the psychological impact of ostracism is measured well after the
experience of exclusion. In the case of behavioral studies, this delay serves the
research question as it addresses the downstream psychological consequence of
the experience of ostracism. In contrast, many self-report studies are focused on
people’s subjective experience while being ostracized, which brings the validity
of retrospective self-assessments into question. This shortcoming has likely—in
part—motivated studies assessing the online physiological response to the experi-
ence of ostracism. Unlike most self-report based studies, the use of psychophysio-
logical and neuroaffective measures allows for an investigation of the immediate
and continuous reaction to ostracism.
Immediate reactions to ostracism: social pain or conflict
One of the most heavily investigated topics in the ostracism literature is how
exclusion impacts neural activity. Dozens of studies have been performed in which
participants are ostracized while their brain activity was concurrently measured
using fMRI technology (for a review, see Cacioppo et al., 2013; Eisenberger, 2012).
Many of these studies point towards the involvement of the anterior cingulate cor-
tex (ACC), the anterior insula, and the prefrontal cortex—areas that have been
linked to the experience and regulation of emotional distress. Although it is clear
from these studies that certain brain areas are active during ostracism, their func-
tion remains somewhat ambiguous (Rotge et al., 2015).
Ostracism as social pain
Eisenberger (2015) argues that the involvement of the ACC relates to the
experience of social pain, that is, the painful feelings that follow from social re-
jection, exclusion, or loss. Eisenberger (2012) also cites a substantial portion of
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fMRI studies that show correlations between activity in this region and self-report
measures of emotional distress, showing that there is a relationship between the
ACC and the experience of social pain, ultimately postulating that this experience
of social pain relies on the same neural underpinnings that are involved in the
experience of physical pain. This idea stems from Panksepp (1998), who pro-
posed that as animals evolved to become more social, they co-opted the same
physiological systems used for physical events to monitor social events (i.e., re-
jection/ostracism), and is now known as the social-physical pain overlap theory
(Eisenberger, 2012).
The social-physical pain overlap theory is also supported by other findings in
the literature on ostracism. For instance, research has shown that acetaminophen
reduces the emotional experience of social pain (Dewall et al., 2010; Vangelisti,
Pennebaker, Brody, & Guinn, 2014) and being socially excluded reduces pain sen-
sitivity, both in terms of higher pain thresholds and higher tolerance (DeWall &
Baumeister, 2006). It also has been found that physical pain, like social pain, can
threaten basic need satisfaction. Riva, Wirth, and Williams (2011) had partici-
pants submerge their hands in cold water or be socially excluded and found that
both types of pain produced feelings of being excluded. This also negatively af-
fected their sense of self-esteem, control, and a meaningful existence. Moreover,
in spite of the impact of social pain on need satisfaction, it is not always found
that being ostracized impacts subsequent mood (DeWall & Baumeister, 2006). In
fact, when an effect on mood is found, an absolute interpretation of the results in
terms of scale midpoint frequently indicates a neutral state of mind, rather than
one of emotional distress (Twenge, Catanese, & Baumeister, 2003). This poten-
tially counterintuitive finding has now been interpreted as one consistent with a
numbing reaction caused by the body releasing opioids in response to social pain
(for an overview of this idea, see MacDonald & Leary, 2005; but also see Gerber
& Wheeler, 2009). This conception is consistent with the previously mentioned
brain-imaging studies showing that the brain’s response to physical pain and so-
cial pain involves common underlying neural circuitry.
Ostracism as cognitive conflict
Others, however, do not interpret the functions of the ACC is the same man-
ner, and consequently, do not view ACC activation as primarily indicative of pain,
social or otherwise. For example, brain activation in the dorsal ACC could also be
understood in terms of its function as a conflict monitor (Botvinick et al., 2001;
Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004; Bush et al., 2000). Conflicts in information
processes, resulting from events such as task errors (i.e., providing an incorrect
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response during a judgment task), incompatible response tendencies, and trivial
expectancy violations (e.g., perceptual anomalies, oddball events) trigger activa-
tion in the ACC. Unlike pain, these conflicts in information processing are not
experienced as aversive to the extent that social pain is experienced, but rather
serve as a benign and frequent signal of any change in the environment, which ac-
tivates an attentional orienting response (Sokolov, Spinks, Näätänen, & Lyytinen,
2002; Vinogradova, 2001, but see Hajcak & Foti, 2008).
Some researchers have suggested that a conflict detection mechanism could
play a role in being ostracized because being ostracized is often unexpected, and
therefore constitutes a violation of expectations (e.g., Bolling et al., 2011; Kawamoto,
Nittono, & Ura, 2013; Kawamoto et al., 2012). These expectations can result from
prior events, such as one’s personal history of being included or excluded, or from
our ubiquitous need to belong (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), which motivates us to
follow the unwritten rule to err on the side of including others in everyday events.
Additionally, research has shown that we tend to hold unrealistically positive self-
illusions (Taylor & Brown, 1988), which makes the prospect of being excluded
subjectively unlikely. For these reasons, we can expect that expectations play a
role in the ostracism experience.
In sum, prior research provides evidence that ostracism may evoke two kinds
of psychological responses: a pain-based reaction that results from the shared neu-
ral circuitry between physical pain and social pain, and a conflict-based reaction
that results from a violation of expectations. It is likely that both of these reac-
tions play a role in the response to ostracism, yet it remains unclear whether these
processes differ in their temporal dominance. In the current research we investi-
gate which of these possible reactions takes precedence in the immediate response
to cues of being ostracized, using an emerging tool in the ostracism literature—
pupillometry.
Pupillometry
Pupillary reactivity (i.e., changes in pupil size) can serve as an index of neu-
roffective arousal. This relationship between pupil size and arousal stems from its
association with the locus coeruleus-norepinephrine system (LC-NE). The LC-NE
system is believed to play an important role in the regulation of engagement or
withdrawal from a task by regulating the release of NE through projections from
the LC in the forebrain (Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005). Research has shown that
pupil size correlates with LC activity in monkeys (Joshi et al., 2016; Rajkowski
et al., 1993; Varazzani et al., 2015 as cited in Gilzenrat et al., 2010) as well as
in humans (Gilzenrat et al., 2010; Murphy et al., 2014), and work by Beatty and
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colleagues has demonstrated that pupil reactivity is consistent with LC responses
to task-events (Beatty, 1982; Jackson, 1982; Richer & Beatty, 1987). The link be-
tween pupil size and the LC-NE system allows researchers to infer a broad range
of both cognitive processes (e.g., stimulus identification, working memory main-
tenance) and emotional processes (e.g., stimulus valence) from the extent of pupil
dilation. To illustrate, Bradley et al. (2008) have shown that the pupil dilates
more in response to both positively and negatively valenced pictures, compared to
neutral pictures. This response co-varies with skin conductance, thereby demon-
strating that the sympathetic nervous system can modulate pupillary reactivity.
Importantly, other research has provided evidence that pupil size can also
be used to differentially infer cognitive processes such as conflict detection and
emotional processes such as pain. For example, the pupil dilates in response to task
error and incongruent trials during the Stroop task (Brown et al., 1999; Critchley
et al., 2005; Laeng et al., 2011). Similarly, the pupil also responds to violations
of expectations (Preuschoff et al., 2011; Proulx, Sleegers, & Tritt, 2017; Raisig et
al., 2012, 2010; Sleegers et al., 2015). Sleegers et al. (2015) have shown, for
example, that repeated presentations of reverse-colored playing cards (e.g., black
Two of Hearts) lead to a sustained and consistent increase in pupil dilation across
dozens of trials. In terms of pupillary response to pain, several studies report a
change in pupil size correlated with noxious stimulation and self-reported pain
(Chapman et al., 1999; Ellermeier & Westphal, 1995; Höfle et al., 2008). The
pupil dilates in response to pain stimulation, and importantly, appears to diminish
when the subjective experience of pain is lessened, for example, through hypnosis
(Walter et al., 2006) or opioids (Connelly et al., 2014). Based on these findings,
it seems that pupillary reactivity can serve as an index for physiological arousal in
a broad array of cognitive and emotional processes that are likely to play a role
during social exclusion.
Pupillometry and social exclusion
Pupillometry is an emerging tool in studies on ostracism, and several studies
have used pupillometry in combination with social feedback paradigm (e.g., Silk et
al., 2012; Vanderhasselt et al., 2015). In a social feedback paradigm, participants
look at photos of other people, who either accept or reject them for a certain
task or provide feedback on the desirability or likability of the participant. These
studies show that negative social feedback elicits an increase in pupil dilation,
thereby demonstrating the involvement of cognitive and/or emotional processes.




Although social feedback paradigms involve a painful social event, this paradigm
differs in various respects from another commonly used social exclusion manipu-
lation: Cyberball (Williams, Cheung, & Choi, 2000). Cyberball is a ball tossing
game in which three or more people toss a ball amongst each other. In a belong-
ing game, participants receive an equal amount of ball tosses as the other players.
In an ostracism game, participants receive substantially fewer ball tosses from the
other players, often after having received a few ball tosses at the start of the ses-
sion. This ostracism game consequently comprises a prolonged exclusion event,
with the same players in a constant context, in which the presence of exclusion is
not immediately noticeable. We believe this paradigm has several benefits over so-
cial feedback paradigms. First, Cyberball is a prolonged ostracism event in which
several players socially exclude the participant. In contrast with other social exclu-
sion paradigms, Cyberball is a holistic ostracism experience that unfolds over time.
This temporal component enables researchers to look at the consequences of being
ostracized over time, without intervening factors such as the setting, the people
involved, and stimuli presented to the participant, as these remain constant. This
allows for a more reliable assessment of a potential numbing response in response
to the pain of being excluded. It also allows certain predictions to be made, such as
the absence of a numbing response at the start of the Cyberball game. Second, the
Cyberball paradigm allows us to investigate people’s concrete expectations (e.g.,
the number of ball tosses they expect), thereby enabling us to investigate the role
of expectations in ostracism. The Cyberball paradigm thus enables us to investi-
gate what kind of immediate reaction predominates upon receiving a cue that one
is being ostracized.
6.1 Hypotheses
As we have noted, it is unclear what kind of reaction predominates in re-
sponse to cues of ostracism. A first hypothesis is that the immediate reaction to
cues of ostracism primarily reflects social pain, based on the social-physical pain
overlap theory of ostracism. If it is indeed the case that the social pain activated
by cues of ostracism uses the same neural circuitry as those involved in physical
pain, we could observe a numbing response due to the release of endorphins that
diminish experiences of pain (MacDonald & Leary, 2005). Given that the pupil
can be used both as a proxy for sympathetic nervous system arousal in response
to pain (Chapman et al., 1999; Ellermeier & Westphal, 1995), and opioid impact
on this response (Connelly et al., 2014), we can predict a decrease in pupil di-
ameter in response to ostracism cues. Additionally, we can predict that this effect
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increases over time. As more endorphins are released throughout the course of
being excluded, more numbing should take place.
Alternatively, it could be the case that the online reaction primarily reflects
a conflict detection process. Ostracism events consist of an initial detection of
being ostracized and the subsequent regulation of the emotional distress caused
by the ostracism event. Pupillary reactivity can reflect this detection of ostracism
in Cyberball due to a probable violation of the expectation that one should be
equivalently receiving ball tosses. If the initial response to cues of ostracism is
indeed primarily a violation of expectations, we should see an increase in pupil
dilation in response to these cues. This is based on the research showing the pupil
unilaterally dilates following cognitive conflict induced by a variety of expectancy
violations, such as task error and perceptual discrepancies (e.g., Brown et al.,
1999; Critchley et al., 2005; Preuschoff et al., 2011; Raisig et al., 2012, 2010;
Sleegers et al., 2015). Since it takes some time to realize one is being excluded
during a game of Cyberball, we can additionally predict that this increase in pupil
dilation appears gradually, once it is clear that each ball toss not received is indeed
a signal of being ostracized.
In summary, our investigation of the immediate response to social exclu-
sion could reveal two distinct and divergent outcomes. Either participants show a
gradual decrease in pupil size (Hypothesis 1) based on the notion that a growing
awareness of being ostracized is painful, which evokes a physiological numbing
response consistent with the social-physical pain overlap theory, or a gradual in-
crease in pupil size (Hypothesis 2), based on the notion that the immediate reac-
tion is a detection of conflict—the result of a violation of the expectation that one
should be included.
6.2 Study 1
We set out to investigate the immediate reaction to cues of ostracism us-
ing pupillometry and the Cyberball paradigm. We looked for evidence to support
Hypothesis 1 (gradually diminished pupil diameter in an ostracism game) or Hy-
pothesis 2 (gradually heightened pupil diameter in an ostracism game). In this first
study, all participants started with a game of Cyberball in which they were equally
included (belonging game), after which they played another game in which they





Thirty-nine participants participated in this study (6 males; 32 females; 1
unknown). The average age was 19.44 (min: 18; max: 25). Participants were
rewarded with course credits or e8. The design was a 2 (Cyberball game: belong-
ing/ostracized) within-subjects design, in which participants were first included
and then excluded. We report all data exclusions, all manipulations, and all mea-
sures in the study.
Since no prior studies have been conducted using pupil dilation as an out-
come measure in the Cyberball paradigm, we are unsure about the anticipated
effect size of the main effect of interest (i.e., the effect of ostracism on pupil di-
lation). Hence, we conducted a power analysis, using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder,
Lang, & Buchner, 2007), assuming a small to medium effect size. With a repeated
measures design and default settings, this resulted in a required sample size of
10 to 32 participants. This sample size is consistent with prior work using pupil
dilation as the measure of interest (e.g., Bradley et al., 2008; Preuschoff et al.,
2011).
Procedure
Participants were welcomed into the lab and seated in a cubicle. On-screen
instructions informed the participant that they were going to participate in sev-
eral visualization tasks and that their eyes were going to be measured using an
eye tracker. They were also informed they could experience feelings common in
everyday life, that their participation was voluntary, and that at any moment they
could stop the experiment.
After giving their consent, the test leader made sure the participant was
seated about half a meter from the eye tracker display (Tobii T60) and the eye
tracker was calibrated using the built-in calibration procedure in Tobii’s Exten-
sions for E-Prime 2.0. Hereafter, participants played the first Cyberball game.
After the Cyberball game, two filler tasks followed, in counterbalanced or-
der. These tasks included a painting preference task and a snowy pictures task
(for more information on these tasks, see section 8.3 in the Supplemental Materi-
als). Afterwards, participants contacted the test leader who asked them to take a
short break before contacting the test leader again to start the second part of the
experiment.
The second part was identical to the first part, again starting with the Cyber-
ball task, followed by the painting preference task and snowy pictures task. Differ-
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ent than the first part, after the filler tasks, participants were also presented with
a fundamental needs questionnaire that was followed by demographic questions
and checks. These were administered on average about 5 min after the Cyberball
game. They were then debriefed and thanked for their participation.
Materials
The experiment was designed and administered in E-prime 2.
Cyberball game. Cyberball was presented as a mental visualization game—a
common instruction in the Cyberball paradigm. Participants were asked to take
a minute and to imagine actually playing a ball tossing game with other peo-
ple. This was followed by questions about the scene they imagined, such as the
color of the ball and where the game takes place. Importantly, we also asked
how many ball tosses the participant expected to receive. During these questions
information about the game was displayed on the screen. This information in-
cluded the number of players (3) and the number of total ball tosses (90). After
this, the game ‘connected’ to the other players, at which point the participant saw
two avatars with common male and female names representing the other players,
named Maarten (left player) and Anne (right player) in the inclusion condition
and named Lotte (left player) and Thomas (right player) in the exclusion condi-
tion. Note that in each game we used common male and female names and that
we also changed the order in which the gender was associated to the position of
the left or right avatar (also see Figure 6.1).
Cyberball event. A Cyberball event was defined as a ball toss, which consists of
three components: a baseline period (500 ms), the ball toss animation (900 ms),
and the period during which the computer or participant decides whom to toss
the ball to (a varying period). The start of the ball toss animation was denoted
at the start of an event (t = 0). To assure a reliable assessment of pupil size,
we extended the standard duration of the Cyberball game to 90 ball tosses in
total. Before each ball toss there was a randomly varying period during which the
computer (900 to 4300 ms) or participant (determined by participant) considered
whom to toss the ball to. This was followed by an animation of the ball being
tossed to the selected player. Each ball toss was either to the player (an inclusion
event) or not (an exclusion event). During the first game, the participant was
equally included (belonging game), thus receiving a total of 30 out of 90 ball tosses
during the entire game. In the second game, the player was generally excluded
and received only 10 out of the 90 ball tosses (ostracism game). Note that in
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both the belonging game and the exclusion game, participants experienced both
inclusion and exclusion events. This allowed us to directly compare exclusion
events across both a belonging and ostracism game. And, also to directly compare
inclusion events across both a belonging and ostracism game.
Ball tosses were randomly determined and could take place throughout the
game, thereby assuring that the participant remained involved in the task and also
remained unsure about what to expect for each given ball toss. The participant
could click on another player’s avatar to toss the ball to that player.
We also added a visual frame around the players (see Figure 6.1). This
extra object can divert the participant’s attention from the game and allowed us to
investigate where people may divert their attention to during the Cyberball game.
Pupillometry. Pupil data was collected using a Tobii T60 eye tracker (Tobii,
Stockholm, Sweden). The Tobii T60 is integrated in a 17′′ TFT monitor and records
at a rate of 60 Hz. Each measurement has a validity indication that ranges from 0
(the system is certain that all data belongs to the particular eye) to 4 (gaze data
is missing or incorrect). Only recordings with a validity score of 0 were used.
Figure 6.1: A depiction of the Cyberball game with its various objects that served
as regions of interest.
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Pupil size from each eye were averaged together to create a single pupil size score
and filtered with a modified repeated median filter (outer width: 25, inner width
15) using the ‘robfilter’ package (Fried et al., 2014) in R (R Core Team, 2016).
Because the Cyberball task is a black and white task with a continuous sequence
of events (i.e., no discrete presentations of stimuli) no light reflex period was
present. Missing data (e.g., blinks) were corrected with linear interpolation using
the ‘zoo’ package (Zeileis & Grothendieck, 2005). Hereafter, the pupil size was
controlled for baseline differences by subtracting the average pupil size during a
500 ms pre-event (Beatty & Lucero-Wagoner, 2000) period from the subsequent
pupil measurements. Events with more than 25% missing data were removed
(6.75%), resulting in an average of 84.26 usable trials in the inclusion game and
83.54 in the exclusion game. Additionally, we also used the pupil data to inves-
tigate what people looked at on the screen by defining regions of interest (e.g.,
the players, their names, the area in which the game took place; see Figure 6.1).
This allowed us to rule out alternative explanations such as participants looking
away from the screen and becoming more disinterested in the game as a function
of being ostracized or included.
Fundamental needs and mood. The fundamental needs and mood question-
naire consisted of 16 items that measured the participant’s need for belonging,
self-esteem, meaningfulness, control (α = .84), and mood (α = .87) after the Cy-
berball game (van Beest, Williams, & van Dijk, 2011). Example are: “During the
game I had the sense that I belonged”, “I had the feeling that I had control over
the game”, and “I felt tense during the game”. The questions were answered on
a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (‘Completely disagree’) to 7 (‘Completely
agree’) and presented in a fixed order.
Checks and demographics. Before both the belonging and ostracism games we
asked participants how many ball tosses they expected to receive (0-90). This
question allowed us to assess our assumption that all participants would expect
to receive an equal number of ball tosses prior to playing the game, and exclude
outliers who did not expect to receive a fair number of ball tosses. After all, if
participants expect to receive no ball tosses prior an ostracism game then expec-
tations are not violated when this happens. Alternatively, if participants expect an
equal number of ball tosses prior to a belonging game expectation are not violated
when this happens.
At the end of the experiment, we also assessed age, gender, whether partici-
pants had participated in a Cyberball task before (yes/no), whether they realized
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the other players were not real (yes/no), and what they thought the research
questions were (open ended).
6.2.2 Results
Expectations
Before playing the first Cyberball game (belonging), participants reported
expecting to receive an average of 31.46 (SD = 16.54) ball tosses, compared to
an average of 29.77 (SD = 12.72) ball tosses before playing the second Cyberball
game (ostracism). This later average does not differ significantly from expecting
an equal number of ball tosses (30 ball tosses, t(38) = 0.11, p = .910), 95% CI
[25.65, 33.89], d = 0.02, nor from the average expected number of ball tosses
before the belonging Cyberball game, t(38) = 0.98, p = .335, 95% CI [-1.81,
5.20], gav = 0.11. A total of four participants expected to receive only a few
ball tosses (20 or fewer) and were removed from the data analysis, leaving 35
participants.
Gaze durations
We calculated what percentage of time the participants spent looking at each
region of interest (ROI) during each of the two Cyberball games and compared
these percentages for each ROI with paired t-tests. The findings are displayed
in Table 6.1. To see whether participants did not look away from the Cyberball
events, we looked at the time spent in the ROIs surrounding the players. During
the ostracism Cyberball game, participants looked significantly more at the white
area between the frame and the players and marginally significantly more at the
frame surrounding the screen. These results point at participants looking more
at the fringes of the screen. Notably, there was no significant difference in the
amount of missing data, indicating that participants did not look away from the
screen during the ostracism experience compared to the belonging experience to
any significant extent.
Pupillometry
Exclusion events. To test our main hypotheses, we first looked at the events
during which the participant did not receive the ball. In the belonging Cyberball
game, these events do not necessarily represent an ostracism cue, as not receiving
the ball is part of tossing a ball to each player equally. However, in the ostracism
Cyberball game, where these events are more frequent, these events do represent
an ostracism cue because they show one is not being included to the same extent
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as the other player. On these events we performed a repeated measures GLM
analysis with Cyberball game (belonging/ostracism) and event period (0 to 2000
s, in 100 ms bins) as within-subject factors, with the average pupil size as the
dependent variable (see Figure 6.2). This revealed a significant main effect of the
Cyberball game, F(1, 34) = 14.29, p = .001, µp2 = 0.296. There was a smaller
pupil size increase upon not receiving a ball in an ostracism Cyberball game (M
= 0.026 mm, SE = 0.005, 95% CI [0.017, 0.036]) compared to not receiving a
ball in a belonging game (M = 0.046 mm, SE = 0.007, 95% CI [0.032, 0.060]).
There was also a main effect of the event period, F(20, 15) = 13.35, p < 0.001,
µp
2 = 0.947. Pupil size increased after a ball was tossed to another player, and
decreased after about 600 ms. There was no significant interaction effect, F(20,
15) = 1.13, p = .412, µp2 = 0.601.
Inclusion events. We repeated the same analysis for the events that did have
the participant as the recipient of a ball toss. The total duration of each event
was shorter due to the fact that participants more quickly tossed a ball to an-
other player upon receiving it than the other players were programmed to do,
leading to an event period of 0 to 1600 ms. A GLM with Cyberball game (belong-
ing/ostracism) and event period (0 to 1600) did not yield a main effect of the
Cyberball game, F(1, 34) = 0.002, µp2 < 0.001. It did reveal an effect of event
period, F(16, 19) = 14.94, p < 0.001, µp2 = 0.926, and a significant interaction ef-
fect, F(16, 19) = 4.24, p = .002, µp2 = 0.781, see Figure 6.3. In both the ostracism
Table 6.1: Percentage of time spent looking at each region of interest, during a
belonging or ostracism Cyberball game in Study 1.
ROI Inclusion Exclusion t(34) p
M SD M SD
Frame 0.31 0.60 1.83 5.02 1.782 .084
Player 1 7.07 3.48 4.97 2.97 -0.235 .815
Player 1 name 0.38 0.38 1.03 0.78 -3.432 .002
Player 2 29.00 5.42 30.66 6.69 4.722 <.001
Player 2 name 0.60 0.66 0.95 1.19 1.902 .066
Player 3 30.38 7.41 28.38 7.79 2.921 .006
Player 3 name 0.63 1.01 0.97 1.58 -1.887 .068
White area 0.47 0.79 1.08 1.64 2.575 .015
Playing field 21.18 5.44 20.42 6.65 2.702 .011




























Figure 6.2: Change in pupil size during exclusion events in two games of
Cyberball—first a belonging game, followed by an ostracism game (Study 1).
and belonging Cyberball games, the pupil size increased rapidly upon seeing the
ball being tossed to the participant, but slowly decreased soon after when playing
a belonging game, while it remained somewhat level in an ostracism game.
Effect across the duration of a Cyberball game. Above we analyzed the overall
pupillary change in response to both inclusion and exclusion events (i.e., across
all ball tosses). We anticipated that it might take participants some moments
to realize that they are being excluded, so the decrease in pupil size should be
more pronounced as a function of the time that has passed playing the Cyberball
game. Additionally, this should not be the case in the belonging game. Hence,
we performed two planned comparisons. We combined the average pupil change
into three event bins of 30 events each and conducted a two 3 (Cyberball period:
event 1 to 30/event 31 to 60/event 61 to 90) repeated-measures analyses). This
revealed an effect of event bin during the ostracism game, F(2, 68) = 9.50, p <
0.001, µp2 = 0.218, but not during the belonging game, F(2, 66) = 0.72, p =
.491, µp2 = 0.021.1 Additionally, we conducted three separate t-tests to compare
1We also performed a 2 (Cyberball condition: belonging/ostracism) × 3 (Cyberball period:
event 1 to 30/event 31 to 60/event 61 to 90) repeated-measures GLM to test for a possible inter-
action effect. This revealed a main effect of ostracism, F(1, 33) = 12.80, p = .001, µp2 = 0.279
and of event bin, F(2, 66) = 5.60, p = .006, µp2 = 0.145, but not a significant interaction, F(2,
32) = 1.57, p = .223, µp2 = 0.089.
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Figure 6.3: Change in pupil size during inclusion events in two games of
Cyberball—first a belonging game, followed by an ostracism game (Study 1).
the average pupil size change in response to exclusion events between the two
Cyberball games, per event bin. During the first 30 ball tosses, there was no
statistically significant difference between the belonging game and the ostracism
game, t(34) = 1.50, p = .151. In the later two bins (events 31 to 60 and events 61
to 90), the difference was statistically significant, t(34) = 3.48, p = .001 and t(33)
= 2.29, p = .028, respectively. These results are consistent with Hypothesis 1; we
see that after the first bin there is a substantial decrease in average pupil size in
response to an exclusion event during the ostracism Cyberball game (Mevent 1 to 30
= 0.088 mm, SDevent 1 to 30 = 0.040; Mevent 31 to 60 = 0.060 mm, SDevent 31 to 60 =
0.036, Mevent 61 to 90 = 0.049 mm, SDevent 61 to 90 = 0.013), while it remains constant
during the belonging Cyberball game (Mevent 1 to 30 = 0.096 mm, SDevent 1 to 30 =
0.047; Mevent 31 to 60 = 0.081 mm, SDevent 31 to 60 = 0.051; Mevent 61 to 90 = 0.085 mm,
SDevent 61 to 90 = 0.059).
Fundamental needs
To test whether the ostracism manipulation induced self-reported threat to
needs and decrease in mood, t-tests were performed between the average scores
of the fundamentals needs subscales and the mid-point of the response-scale (4).
Results show that all but mood differed from the mid-point (see Table 6.2) in a
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manner consistent with feeling ostracized.
Checks
Six participants (15.4%, 1 missing) reported having experience with the Cy-
berball paradigm2 and 19 participants (47.5%, 2 missing) did not believe the par-
ticipants they were playing with were real participants.
Table 6.2: Difference average fundamental needs scale and subscales from mid-
point and descriptives from Study 1.
Scale Statistics
t(34) p M (SD)
Belonging -14.05 <.001 1.91 (0.88)
Control -11.28 <.001 1.97 (1.06)
Self esteem -2.01 .052 3.41 (1.72)
Meaning -4.18 <.001 3.11 (1.27)
Mood 0.26 .798 4.05 (1.31)
All combined -3.07 .004 3.44 (1.08)
6.2.3 Discussion
We found that participants showed a gradually decreased pupillary reaction
to exclusion events in a game of Cyberball in which they were generally ostracized
(ostracism game), but not when they were equally included (belonging game). For
inclusion events, no such difference in pupillary dilation was observed relative to
either version of the game. Additionally, we found that mood was not affected by
being excluded. These findings are in support of Hypothesis 1. That is, the results
are consistent with a numbed reaction towards exclusion events that fits with the
social-physical pain overlap theory. The findings do not support Hypothesis 2, or
a conflict-based reaction due to a violation of the expectation that one should be
equally included.
6.3 Study 2
In Study 2 we continued to test the two hypotheses by including a manip-
ulation to further disentangle our two competing hypotheses. For this purpose,
2Excluding these participants did not substantially impact the results (e.g., the effect of os-
tracism on pupil size during exclusion events remained, F(1, 27) = 8.66, p = .007).
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we selected value affirmation. Recent research has shown that beliefs, such as
religious convictions, can serve as a buffer and mute neurophysiological activity
in response to expectancy violations (Inzlicht et al., 2009; Inzlicht & Tullett, 2010;
Sleegers et al., 2015). For example, Inzlicht and Tullett (2010) primed participants
with their religious affiliation before performing a Stroop task and subsequently
found decreased activity in the ACC as measured by error related negativity (ERN),
compared to those who were not primed. Similarly, Sleegers et al. (2015) found
that participants who strongly affirmed their moral beliefs decreased pupillary di-
lation in response to reverse-colored playing cards. These findings indicate that
the affirmation of values can mute the physiological response to cognitive conflicts
following from expectancy violations such as task error and perceptual anomalies.
In contrast, studies have shown that self-affirmation has no buffer effect on the
negative effects of ostracism (Dingwall, 2011; Howell & Shepperd, 2017; and see
Williams, 2009). Consequently, if the pupillary reactivity in response to cues of
ostracism similarly reflects a conflict detection process, then we should expect a
muted pupillary response as a function of value affirmation, which would support
the hypothesis that pupillary reactivity following ostracism cues reflects an under-
lying conflict detection mechanism. Alternatively, if we fail to find an effect of
value affirmation and again find a decreased pupillary reactivity in response to os-
tracism cues, this would constitute a further lack of support for a conflict detection
hypothesis.
We also changed the design of Study 2 to address some methodological
trade-offs present in Study 1. In Study 1, participants always played the belonging
game first, and the ostracism game second. To address potential ordering effects,
we changed this order in Study 2 by having participants first play the ostracism
game first and then the belonging game. Moreover, in order to better track the
self-reported effects of our ostracism manipulation, we administered the funda-
mental needs and mood questionnaire twice, after each game, together with an
additional questionnaire that measures anxiety caused by a state of uncertainty.
This was added to gain more insight into the self-reported consequences of the
ostracism experience. Previous research has shown that anxiety is an important
construct related to how people cope with uncertainty arousing experiences (e.g.,
McGregor et al., 2013), with uncertainty likely to play a role in ostracism as there
is often an initial an element of uncertainty. We can therefore expect that being
ostracized causes an increase in anxious uncertainty. The fundamental needs and
mood scale does not include any items related to felt anxious uncertainty, so we






Seventy-one participants participated in this study (14 males; 56 females; 1
unknown). The average age was 19.57 (min: 17; max: 24). Participants were
rewarded with course credits. The design was a 2 (Cyberball game: belong-
ing/ostracism) x 2 (values prime: present/absent) mixed design with ostracism
as a within-subjects factor and the prime as a between-subjects factor. Participants
were excluded in the first game and equally included in the second game. A power
analysis on a between subjects test for the effect of the values prime on pupil di-
lation revealed a required sample size ranging between 34 (medium effect) and
122 (small effect).
Procedure
The procedure was identical to the first study, except that half the partici-
pants were primed with a questionnaire on various controversial topics immedi-
ately prior to the first Cyberball game, which allowed them to affirm their values.
This questionnaire was framed as being part of a different experiment. After fill-
ing in this questionnaire, participants contacted the test leader and the procedure
identical to Study 1 would commence.
Materials
The same material was used as in Study 1, except for some key differences
noted below.
Pupillometry. Pupil data was prepared identical to that in Study 2. Events with
more than 25% missing data were removed (3.17%), resulting in an average of
86.34 usable trials in the inclusion game and 87.90 in the exclusion game.
Values prime. To buffer the potential negative impact of ostracism, half of the
participants were presented with a values prime before the start of the experiment.
To this end, participants indicated to what extent they agreed or disagreed with
various controversial topics (e.g., gay rights, nuclear energy, multiculturalism; see
Sleegers et al., 2015).
Anxious uncertainty. Anxious uncertainty was measured after each Cyberball
game, after the administration of the fundamental needs (after exclusion: α =
.71, after inclusion: α = .78) and mood questionnaire (after exclusion: α = .88,
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after inclusion: α = .66). Participants were asked to what extent they felt certain
emotions related to anxious uncertainty (e.g., conflicting, concerned, nervous) on
the same 7 point Likert scale (after exclusion: α = .87, after inclusion: α = .81),
following McGregor, Zanna, Holmes, and Spencer (2001) and McGregor et al.
(2010).
Checks and demographics. We again assessed how many ball tosses partici-
pants expected to obtain prior to playing both Cyberball games and used this to
exclude outliers. We also assessed age, gender, and experience with similar tasks.
This time, we did not assess whether participants realized that the other players
were fake. We feared that presentation biases likely motivated many participants
to indicate that that they were not fooled, regardless of what they believed over
the course of the experiment.
6.3.2 Results
Expectations
Before playing the ostracism Cyberball game, participants reported expect-
ing to receive an average of 29.48 (SD = 7.16) ball tosses. This average does not
differ significantly from expecting an equal number of ball tosses (30 ball tosses,
t(65) = 0.584, p = .561, 95% CI [27.72, 31.25], d = 0.07). This time, how-
ever, expectations did change between conditions. Before the belonging Cyberball
game, participants expected on average 24.54 (SD = 10.4) ball tosses. This was
a significant change from the expectations before the ostracism Cyberball game,
t(63) = 3.389, p < .001, 95% CI [-8.16, -2.62], gav = 0.55, as well as significantly
different from expecting an equal number of ball tosses (30), t(66) = 4.30, p <
.001, 95% CI [22.00, 27.07], d = 0.48. There were also nine participants who
already expected to be excluded at the start of the experiment (expected to re-
ceive 20 ball tosses or less). They were subsequently removed from data analysis,
leaving 63 participants.
Values prime
To investigate the effect of the values prime buffering the impact of os-
tracism cues on pupillary reactivity, and find support for Hypothesis 2, we looked
at whether the presence or absence of the values prime impacted the average
pupil change during exclusion events in the ostracism Cyberball game. The aver-
age pupil change in the values prime condition was 0.024 (SE = 0.005, 95% CI
[0.014, 0.034]) while the average pupil change in the no values prime condition
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was 0.021 (SE = 0.005, 95% CI [0.011, 0.031]). A GLM-repeated measures with
the values prime as a between-subjects factor and event period (0 to 2000, in 100
ms bins) as within-subject factor revealed an effect of event period, F(20, 36) =
18.70, p < 0.001, µp2 = 0.912, but no main effect of the prime, F(1, 55) = 0.23,
p = .634, µp2 = 0.004, nor a significant interaction with event period, F(20, 36)
= 1.50, p = .348, µp2 = 0.390. Hence, the values prime did not seem to have an
impact on the average pupil change.
Additionally, all pupil analyses from the next sections were performed with
the presence or absence of the prime as a between-subjects factor. These analyses
also failed to reveal a main effect or show any interactions between the prime and
the variables of interest (all Fs < 1). As a result, both the prime condition and
the no prime conditions were collapsed to increase the sample size and therefore
achieve higher power.
Gaze durations
We again looked at whether participants maintained their attention through-
out the Cyberball games by recording where they looked at during each game (see
Table 6.3). We found a difference in the amount of missing data between condi-
tions, t(56) = -1.97, p = .054, in that there was more missing data during the
belonging condition than during the ostracism condition. Participants also spent
more time looking at the frame in the ostracism condition compared to the be-
longing condition, t(56) = 2.82, p = .007. Taken together, these results point at
Table 6.3: Percentage of time spent looking at each region of interest, during a
belonging or ostracism Cyberball game in Study 2.
ROI Inclusion Exclusion t(56) p
M SD M SD
Frame 0.32 0.43 0.72 0.98 2.82 .007
Player 1 6.59 3.38 5.72 3.70 -1.77 .082
Player 1 name 0.55 1.74 0.57 0.74 0.072 .943
Player 2 28.80 6.86 27.53 7.31 -1.31 0.197
Player 2 name 0.83 1.55 0.93 1.17 0.46 .648
Player 3 30.70 5.00 32.24 6.41 2.06 .044
Player 3 name 0.74 1.31 0.71 0.60 -0.14 .889
White area 0.87 3.25 0.98 1.95 0.50 .618
Playing field 21.81 6.24 23.09 8.71 1.21 .229
Missing data 8.77 5.40 7.51 3.23 -1.97 .054
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some disengagement of participants during the belonging game, while participants
remained attentive during the ostracism game.
Pupillometry
Exclusion events. Identical to Study 1, we investigated pupillary reactivity dur-
ing events in which the ball was not thrown to the participant. A repeated mea-
sures GLM analysis was performed with Cyberball game (ostracism/belonging)
and event period (0 to 2000 s, in 100 ms bins) as within-subject factors, with av-
erage pupil change as the dependent variable. This did not reveal a main effect
of the Cyberball game, F(1, 56) = 0.932, p = .338, µp2 = 0.016. It did reveal an
effect of event period, F(20, 37) = 19.32, p < 0.001, µp2 = 0.913, and an interac-
tion effect between the Cyberball game and event period, F(20, 37) = 1.92, p =
.042, µp2 = 0.510.
Visual inspection (see Figure 6.4) showed that the pupil size change in the
ostracism game is smaller than in the belonging game at the start of a ball toss,
but reverses after about 700 ms. In fact, a separate analysis on the initial event
period reveals a significant difference, F(1, 56) = 4.02, p = .05, µp2 = 0.067.
Pupillary reactivity to a ball toss of which participants were not the receiver was



























Figure 6.4: Change in pupil size during exclusion events in two games of






























Figure 6.5: Change in pupil size during inclusion events in two games of
Cyberball—first an ostracism game, followed by a belonging game (Study 2).
compared to a belonging game (M = 0.069 mm, SE = 0.004, 95% CI [0.062,
0.077]). After this moment, the pupil size in the ostracism game seems to remain
larger than in the belonging game, and a separate analysis across this event period
confirms a significant effect of the Cyberball game, F(1, 56) = 4.00, p = .05, µp2
= 0.067. The pupil change is now larger in the ostracism game condition (M =
-0.014 mm, SE = 0.004, 95% CI [-0.022, -0.005]) than in the belonging game
condition (M = -0.02 mm, SE = 0.006, 95% CI [-0.035, -0.012]).
Inclusion event. We again repeated the same analysis for events in which the
participant received the ball: A repeated measures GLM analysis with Cyberball
game (ostracism/belonging) and event period (0 to 1600 s, in 100 ms bins) as
within-subject factors, with average pupil change as the dependent variable. This
revealed a main effect of the Cyberball game, F(1, 55) = 61.11, p < 0.01, µp2 =
0.526, an effect of event period, F(16, 40) = 44.55, p < 0.001, µp2 = 0.947, as
well as an interaction, F(16, 40) = 11.05, p < 0.001, µp2 = 0.815, see Figure 6.5.
Pupil size increased quickly in the first second, but increased even more in the
ostracism game, after which the pupil size slowly decreased in both conditions.
Effect across the duration of a Cyberball game. We again tested for an effect of
time across the entire Cyberball game, as it might take participants some moments
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Table 6.4: Difference in fundamental needs, its subscales and mood, and the anx-
iety questionnaire between the belonging and ostracism condition in Study 2.
Scale Statistics Inclusion Exclusion
t(56) p M (SD) M (SD)
Belonging 27.20 <.001 6.10 (0.66) 1.98 (0.67)
Control 15.82 <.001 5.10 (1.00) 2.01 (0.91)
Self esteem 11.53 <.001 5.52 (0.76) 3.20 (1.23)
Meaning 10.98 <.001 5.82 (0.79) 4.29 (1.34)
Mood 11.54 <.001 5.82 (0.52) 4.29 (0.91)
Above combined 16.66 <.001 5.74 (0.48) 3.63 (0.74)
Anxious uncertainty 4.50 <.001 1.80 (0.57) 2.07 (0.72)
to realize they are being excluded. Given the findings that revealed a difference
between being included and excluded in pupillary reactivity in the initial phase
of an event (0-700 ms) and the later phase of an event, we specifically focused
on this event period across the duration of a Cyberball game. Identical to Study
1, we performed two planned comparisons, which revealed an effect of event bin
during both the ostracism game, F(2, 112) = 36.39, p < 0.001, µp2 = 0.394, and
the belonging game, although the effect is smaller during the belonging game,
F(2, 112) = 9.71, p < 0.001, µp2 = 0.148.3 Separate paired t-tests reveal that
there is no significant difference between the two Cyberball games in response to
exclusion events during the first 30 ball tosses, t(56) = 0.99, p = .326. However,
during the next 30 ball tosses this difference is significant, t(56) = 2.13, p =
.037, but not during the last 30 ball tosses, t(56) = 1.51, p = .137. In summary,
it appears that the average pupil size decreases both during the ostracism game
and the belonging game, but this decrease was relatively faster in the ostracism
game (ostracism: Mevent 1 to 30 = 0.085 mm, SDevent 1 to 31 = 0.038; Mevent 31 to 60 =
0.058 mm, SDevent 31 to 60 = 0.027; Mevent 61 to 90 = 0.053 mm, SDevent 61 to 90 = 0.028;
belonging: Mevent 1 to 31 = 0.080 mm, SDevent 1 to 31 = 0.036; Mevent 31 to 60 = 0.069
mm, SDevent 31 to 60 = 0.036; Mevent 61 to 90 = 0.060 mm, SDevent 61 to 90 = 0.037).
Fundamental needs and mood. The fundamental needs and mood question-
naire was administered twice in this study, after each Cyberball game. Results
showed that participants experienced an increase in their fundamental needs, as
3A 2 (Cyberball condition: belonging/ostracism) × 3 (Cyberball period: event 1 to 30/ event
31 to 60/event 61 to 90) repeated-measures GLM revealed no main effect of ostracism, F(1, 56)
= 1.94, p = .169, µp2 = 0.033, a main effect of event bin, F(2, 112) = 34.63, p <0.001, µp2 =
0.382, and an interaction effect, F(2, 112) = 3.81, p = .025, µp2 = 0.064.
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well as elevated mood, after the belonging game compared to after the ostracism
game (see Table 6.4). We also compared the average scores on each of the scales
administered after the ostracism Cyberball game to the neutral mid-point (4) and
found that all scores fell significantly below the mid-point, except for mood, which
was found to be significantly greater than 4 (M = 4.29, SD = 0.91, t(56) = 2.43,
p = .018, 95% CI [0.052, 0.533], see Table 6.5).
Anxious uncertainty. We performed an identical analysis on the results of the
anxious uncertainty scale, and found that participants expressed more anxious
uncertainty after being excluded (M = 2.07, SD = 0.72) compared to being in-
cluded (M = 1.80, SD = 0.57), t(56) = 4.50, p < .001, 95% CI [0.15, 0.39].
These scores were significantly below the mid-point (exclusion: t(56) = 20.30, p
< 0.001; inclusion: t(56) = 28.87, p < 0.001, 95% CI [-2.12, -1.74]).
Checks. Two participants (2.78%) reported having experience with the Cyber-
ball paradigm.4
6.3.3 Comparison between Study 1 and 2
Given that we conducted two similar studies, we performed additional analy-
ses in which the responses to the Cyberball game that participants played first (be-
longing in Study 1, ostracism in Study 2) can be compared between the two stud-
ies. This controls for any ordering effects caused by having just participated in a
4Excluding these participants did not substantially impact the results (e.g., the effect of os-
tracism on pupil size during exclusion events in the 0 to 600 ms period remained, F(1, 54) = 4.28,
p = .043).
Table 6.5: Difference from neutral mid-point (4) of fundamental needs, its sub-
scales and mood, and the anxiety questionnaire administered after the ostracism
Cyberball game in Study 2.
Scale Statistics M (SD)
t(56) p
Belonging 22.58 <.001 1.98 (0.67)
Control 16.54 <.001 2.01 (0.91)
Self esteem 4.89 <.001 3.20 (1.23)
Meaning 3.21 .002 4.29 (1.34)
Mood 2.43 .018 4.29 (0.91)
All combined 3.71 <.001 3.63 (0.74)
Anxious uncertainty 20.30 <.001 2.07 (0.72)
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Figure 6.6: Change in pupil size during exclusion events in two games of
Cyberball—the belonging Cyberball game from Study 1 vs. the ostracism
Cyberball game from Study 2.
Cyberball game. This analysis was done by performing a repeated-measures GLM
with the 100 ms time bins as repeated measure and study (belonging first/ostracism
first) as between-subjects factor. This revealed a significant effect of study (i.e., os-
tracism), F(1, 90) = 13.57, p < 0.001, µp2 = 0.131, event period, F(20, 71) =
25.92, p < 0.001, µp2 = 0.880, and an interaction effect, F(20, 71) = 1.86, p =
.029, µp2 = 0.344. Pupil size increased upon not receiving the ball, although in
Study 2 (ostracism), this change in pupil size was consistently smaller (M = 0.021
mm, SE = 0.004, 95% CI [0.012, 0.029]) than in Study 1 (belonging; M = 0.046
mm, SE = 0.005, 95% CI [0.035, 0.057]), see Figure 6.6.5
6.3.4 Discussion
In Study 2 we again found that participants showed a gradually decreased
pupillary reaction to exclusion events in an ostracism game of Cyberball compared
to a belongingness game of cyberball. This lends additional support to the hypoth-
5We also repeated the analyses for the prime and no prime conditions separately and find
largely consistent results in each condition, as well as some differences. Notably, separate anal-
yses during the 0-700 ms and 700+ time period did not reveal significant effects of ostracism,
potentially the result of a smaller effect of ostracism due to ordering effects and the loss of power.
Importantly, the effect of ostracism remained in the between study comparison, in both the prime
and no prime condition.
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esis that a social-physical pain overlap mechanism underlies the pupillary response
to cues of ostracism. We also did not find any moderating effects of primed values
on pupillary reactivity, a null effect which failed to support the hypothesis that
exclusion is primarily experienced as an expectancy violation.
Although we obtained a similar pattern of results between the two studies,
the pattern was not identical. In Study 1 we found a decreasing average pupil
size across the duration of an exclusion event. In Study 2 we found this trend to
occur at the beginning of the event, during the period in which a ball is tossed
to another player, but before it is clearly visible to where the ball is being tossed.
Possibly, this different pattern of results may be caused by the order in which
participants played the belonging or ostracism games. Research on ostracism has
shown that threats to people belonging evoke a variety of emotional and motiva-
tional responses. One of these responses is an enhanced state of vigilance during
which there is a stronger concern for preventing further losses of social connection
(Molden, Lucas, Gardner, Dean, & Knowles, 2009). Possibly as a result of having
just played the ostracism game, Study 2 participants became more wary and were
specifically impacted by the uncertain period during which a ball was tossed. The
higher average pupil size change after a ball was tossed in the subsequent belong-
ing game could indicate a higher level of arousal, therefore reflecting this state of
increased vigilance for social cues. Alternatively, but relatedly, it could have been
the case that due to the initial acceptance in Study 1, an expectation of inclusion
was established, which was violated in the subsequent ostracism game, thereby
increasing the severity of the ostracism experience. Severity of ostracism has been
related to numbing (Bernstein & Claypool, 2012), with more numbing when the
ostracism experience is severe. This could also potentially explain the difference
between Study 1 and Study 2.
6.4 General discussion
In two experiments we tested two possible hypotheses that link pupillary
reactivity to the experience of ostracism. Based on prior theorizing, we argued
that ostracism necessarily consists of an initial detection of the fact one is being
ostracized, and emotion regulatory processes to deal with the distressing event
that is the ostracism experience. We hypothesized that pupillary reactivity could
reflect either a social-physical pain overlap process which would be reflected in
decreased pupillary reactivity, or an conflict detection process which would be
reflected in increased pupil dilation in response to exclusion events. In two studies
we demonstrated that the pupil dilates to a lesser extent in response to exclusion
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events in a game during which the participant is generally ostracized (ostracism
game), compared to the same event during a game in which the participant is
equally included (belonging game), thereby supporting the social-physical pain
overlap theory of ostracism.
Social-physical pain overlap theory
Being ostracized is a painful experience akin to being physically hurt. Re-
searchers in the field of ostracism have suggested that this analogy is more than
just a metaphorical way of speaking. The experience of social pain seems to rely
on some of the same neural underpinnings that are also involved in the expe-
rience of physical pain, as supported by neuroimaging studies (for an overview,
see Cacioppo et al., 2013; Eisenberger, 2012), studies on pain sensitivity after a
belonging threat (DeWall & Baumeister, 2006), and studies in which analgesics
reduce the emotional experience of social pain (Dewall et al., 2010; Vangelisti et
al., 2014). We have shown that this diminished response to ostracism might also
be reflected in the pupil. The pupil can reflect a variety of cognitive and emo-
tional processes, some of which are related to sympathetic nervous system arousal
(Bradley et al., 2008) the experience of pain (Chapman et al., 1999; Ellermeier &
Westphal, 1995; Höfle et al., 2008; Walter et al., 2006), and diminished pupillary
dilation as a function of opioid impact on pain response (Connelly et al., 2014).
One alternative line of evidence for the social-physical pain overlap theory
is that self-reports of experienced distress as a result of being ostracized often
show no effects on mood, i.e., a numbing effect, whereby an absolute interpreta-
tion of the results in terms of its scale frequently indicates a neutral state of mind
rather than one of emotional distress (Twenge et al., 2003). In both our stud-
ies, we find no significant impact of ostracism on mood in terms of a significant
decrease towards the lower end of the response-scale. We do find differences in
fundamental needs and anxious uncertainty depending on whether participants
were included or excluded. These results lend some support to the social-physical
pain overlap theory, although it is unclear why we observe only a numbing ef-
fect of ostracism on mood. It is possible that self-report responses can be affected
by unrelated factors such as demand characteristics, making it harder to detect
numbing effects that follow from the social-pain overlap theory. Or alternatively,
it is possible that fundamental needs items do not tap into the affective compo-
nent associated with a pain response. Instead, fundamental needs items tap more
into a factual/affective response to being ostracized. For example, the item “I feel
excluded” is likely to be immediately impacted upon noticing that one is being
excluded, not just because one feels excluded but also simply because one is ex-
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cluded. Immediately following the ostracism experience, the latter remains true,
so even though a defensive numbing response took place, it remains true that one
was excluded, making it likely that participants report feeling excluded, despite
already coping with the experience due to the defensive numbing response. If
this is indeed the case, our pupillometry findings further bolster the advantages of
using physiological measures to investigate ostracism, which circumvent some of
the limitations of self-report measures.
Alternative explanations
An alternative explanation for our findings is that pupil sizes decreases be-
cause the participants became bored. However, we do not believe that this is a
viable alternative explanation, insofar as there was no evidence for general dis-
engagement on the part of the participants during the ostracism games. First, we
also did not observe any increases in missing data during the ostracism Cyberball
game compared to the belonging Cyberball game. Second, the diminished pupil-
lary response in the ostracism game was associated only with exclusion events,
as we saw no decreased pupillary reactivity during events in which participants
received a ball toss and only observed it during ostracism-specific events. If partic-
ipants were generally disengaged, we would have predicted a decreased pupillary
response to both exclusion and inclusion events in the ostracism game. Finally,
we observed a similar pattern of results in two studies, despite reversing the or-
der in which they were included or excluded. If the decreased pupillary reactivity
was due to boredom, we should have observed the decreased pupillary reactivity
in the belonging game in Study 2, as this was the second Cyberball game they
played. Instead we observed more numbing during the ostracism game, which
was presented first.
We hypothesized that exclusion events could initially cause an increase in
pupillary reactivity, possibly reflecting a conflict detection mechanism (e.g., Brown
et al., 1999; Preuschoff et al., 2011; Sleegers et al., 2015; Smallwood et al., 2011)
based on the violation of the expectation that one will be equally included in so-
cial interactions. We did not find any discrete evidence of a conflict detection
mechanism. However, we acknowledge the possibility that a violation of expec-
tations process might still have occurred. For instance, it could still be the case
that conflict detection plays a role, but that the numbing response that we ob-
served overshadowed a conflict-based response. Possibly, and we concur that this
remains an empirical question, the type of experience is likely to be of great impor-
tance in how people respond, even in terms of initial physiological reactions. It has
already been demonstrated that the severity of the threat can impact the numbing
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response, with more severe threats inducing a numbing response whereas less se-
vere threats can cause increased sensitivity to threat (Bernstein & Claypool, 2012).
Other potentially aversive experiences such as task error or trivial violations of
expectations might noticeably elicit physiological changes consistent with a con-
flict response, but fail to elicit a more downstream coping response such as the
numbing effect. Future research could be focused on comparing different types of
aversive experiences and how they elicit unique physiological changes.
Additionally, it is possible that expectations are more likely to be quickly up-
dated in a holistic experience such as Cyberball. That is, Cyberball can be seen as
one social exclusion experience, rather than a sequence of social exclusion events.
At the start of a Cyberball game, participants have the expectation that they will
be included, as shown in the data of the questions we asked before each Cyberball
game. Soon after, however, participants will likely update their expectations by
realizing they are being excluded, thus coming to expect to not receive the ball.
If the expectation of receiving the ball decreases over the course of the Cyberball
game, this could potentially explain the decreased pupillary reactivity we observe
within the exclusion condition. Regarding inclusion cues (i.e., receiving the ball)
we should see the opposite pattern. Receiving the ball in the exclusion condition
should be a violation of expectations, thus resulting in an increase in pupil size.
We did not observe this effect in Study 1, although we did in Study 2, so more
research appears to be warranted to both investigate this difference between the
two studies, as well as this potential explanation.
Due to our interest in the physiological response to violation of expectations,
we are performing a study in the lab that addresses these possibilities. In this study
we improve upon our work in two ways. First, we include an overinclusion con-
dition in which participants are disproportionally included, rather than excluded.
That is, they receive more ball tosses than the other players in the game. The
effects of being overincluded have been shown to be positive (Niedeggen, Sarauli,
Cacciola, & Weschke, 2014) and are therefore unlikely to cause social pain, while
it should have clear effects on expectations. The more frequent social inclusion
cues in an overinclusion condition should have the same effect on pupil size as
the social exclusion cues in an exclusion condition, thereby demonstrating an ex-
pectation process rather than social pain process. Second, an additional limitation
in our studies is that it is difficult to compare inclusion and exclusion cues due
to the confound that after an inclusion cue, a response from the participant is
needed while this is not the case following an exclusion cue. This confound might
interfere with pupil size due to increased arousal as a result of having to decide
whom to toss the ball to. A solution to this problem might be to observe another
person playing Cyberball, rather than playing oneself. A participant can be in-
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structed to observe a specific person play Cyberball, who is then either included or
excluded. This kind of vicarious exclusion has been shown to show similar results
to that of personal exclusion (Wesselmann, Williams, & Hales, 2013) and might
therefore prove to be a valuable improvement as it will allow a direct comparison
between inclusion and exclusion cues. This could provide further insights into the
underlying process of each kind of cue.
Limitations
A potential limitation arises from the fact that pupillary reactivity can be
linked to a variety of cognitive and emotional processes. Although several studies
have shown the size of the pupil to be related to the experience of physical pain
(e.g., Chapman et al., 1999; Ellermeier & Westphal, 1995), we have not directly
demonstrated such a relationship in the present studies. Future research could
provide further support by manipulating the presence and absence of opioids such
as acetaminophen before participants play the Cyberball game. If the decreased
pupil dilation is indeed a result of a numbing response, then this might be en-
hanced under the influence of pain suppressing drugs such as acetaminophen.
Future directions
In our two studies we used pupillometry as a proxy for physiological arousal.
Our findings contribute to the ostracism literature that so far has revealed a syn-
drome of sympathetic nervous system arousal findings. It has been shown that
being ostracized can increase blood pressure (Stroud, Tanofsky-Kraff, Wilfley, &
Salovey, 2000), cortisol levels (Blackhart, Eckel, & Tice, 2007), and skin conduc-
tance (Kelly, McDonald, & Rushby, 2012). It has also been demonstrated that
being ostracized decrease one’s skin temperature (IJzerman et al., 2012) and skin
temperature in the face area (Paolini, Alparone, Cardone, van Beest, & Merla,
2016). We contribute to this literature by showing that also the pupil indicates the
involvement of sympathetic nervous system arousal in the ostracism experience.
It is possible to combine these measurement techniques, for example by combin-
ing pupillometry with other proxies for arousal such as the galvanic skin response
(Bradley et al., 2008). To gain a more comprehensive insight into how people re-
spond to ostracism events, future research could combine physiological measures
to provide convergent evidence on the underlying defense mechanisms.
Pupillometry can also be used as a tool to bolster existing models of os-
tracism. Recent development in eye tracker technology have made eye tracking
an affordable and easy-to-use tool. This tool is, as demonstrated by the present
122
The Social Pain of Cyberball
research, applicable to the investigation of ostracism. Heretofore immediate re-
sponses to ostracism are measured using self-report measures such as the funda-
mental needs scale (e.g., van Beest et al., 2011) or a negative affect dial (Wes-
selmann, Wirth, Mroczek, & Williams, 2012) that is tuned during the ostracism
experience. These measures rely on the ability of participants to accurately intro-
spect their affective responses to being ostracized. Physiological measures such as
pupillometry do not rely on this ability and also record more immediate responses
to ostracism cues than self-report measures. The use of pupillometry could provide
new insights for models that make specific predictions about immediate reactions
to ostracism cues, such as William’s need-threat model of ostracism, which makes
the prediction that reflexive responses to ostracism are less likely to be moderated
by external factors. The absence of an effect of our value affirmation could per-
haps be seen as initial support for this prediction, although it must also be noted
that the value affirmation test might be underpowered.
As mentioned in the Introduction of this chapter, Silk et al. (2012) have
demonstrated an increase in pupil dilation following rejection. In the present pa-
per, we demonstrated a decrease in pupil size in response to an ostracism cue. We
believe a reason for this discrepancy is likely to be the paradigm of choice. A game
of Cyberball is a single event in which the players remain constant throughout
the game. The ostracism cues (i.e., not being on the receiving end of a ball toss)
actually represent a single holistic ostracism experience. Following a realization
that one is being excluded, defensive mechanisms such as a pain response can
become active to cope with the experience. In contrast, the paradigm of Silk and
colleagues consisted of receiving repeated rejections from multiple people. Im-
portantly, Silk and colleagues randomized acceptance and rejection blocks, thus
potentially interfering with a numbing response as acceptance blocks could alle-
viate the negative experience resulting from the rejection blocks. This, however,
remains conjecture and the literature would benefit from a future investigation of
this possibility.
6.5 Conclusion
Across two studies we demonstrated a decreased pupillary reaction to cues
of ostracism in the Cyberball paradigm. This response was found to be consistent
with a numbing response based off of the social-physical pain overlap theory rather







People seek meaning in understanding. This understanding is found in ex-
pectations. Through the adoption of an almost innumerable number of beliefs,
people structure the experiences that allow them to expect specific relationships,
whether it is color of playing cards, the behavior of people, or the unfolding of
world events. People’s beliefs are, however, imperfect. Many beliefs do not ac-
curately reflect reality or are entirely mistaken. As a result, people regularly face
violated expectations. The violation of expectations results in the loss of meaning
and constitutes a negative experience. People are therefore motivated to prevent
the loss of meaning, for example by interpreting events in a manner that it consis-
tent with prior beliefs (i.e., assimilation) or to restore meaning after such loss has
occurred, for example by changing one’s beliefs (i.e., accommodation). A frequent
alternative response is that following the loss of meaning in one domain, meaning
in an unrelated domain is affirmed. This particular response to meaning violations
is strong evidence for a domain general process underlying meaning maintenance.
That is, rather than specific meaning violations (e.g., mortality salience, the loss
of control) eliciting specific, related, compensatory behaviors (e.g., striving for
symbolic immortality, restoring control), the loss of meaning in a general aversive
state that can be resolved in a flexible manner. This idea is the foundation of the
Meaning Maintenance Model (MMM).
The MMM is an integrative model that unites multiple theories in the threat
compensation literature (e.g., Terror Management Theory; Burke et al., 2010;
Greenberg et al., 1986, 1997a; Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997b; Rosen-
blatt et al., 1989, uncertainty management; McGregor et al., 2010; van den Bos,
2001; van den Bos & Lind, 2002, cognitive dissonance theory; Festinger, 1957;
Harmon-Jones & Harmon-Jones, 2007) by seeing various threats to meaning as a
violation of expectations, which result in common syndrome of aversive arousal.
It is this state of aversive arousal that is the motivating force behind compen-
satory behavior. People are motivated to reduce the aversive arousal, which can
be achieved either by resolving the source of the original meaning violations (i.e.,
assimilation and accommodation strategies) or by resolving the aversive arousal
directly through palliative efforts such as affirming unrelated personal values (i.e.,
affirmation) or the construction of new meaning frameworks (abstraction, and
assembly).
Many studies have shown that meaning violations induce a state of physi-
ological arousal, but its relationship to compensatory behavior has yet to be di-
rectly demonstrated. So far, the causal role of arousal has been inferred indirectly
by means of misattribution of arousal manipulations or through self-report assess-
ments, rather than direct, physiological measures of arousal following a violation.
In the current dissertation we provide further evidence for the role of arousal in
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meaning making by reviewing the literature on this topic and empirical studies
in which we applied pupillometry as a proxy for physiological arousal to provide
further evidence for the role of arousal in response to meaning violations. Below
we provide an overview of the main findings, a discussion on how these findings
inform us on the role of arousal in meaning maintenance, and directions for future
research.
7.1 Main findings
In Chapter 2 we reviewed the literature on the physiological substrates re-
sponsible for how people respond to threats. We discussed a variety of studies
showing that upon detection of a threat, people initially respond with increased
anxiety, vigilance, and avoidance—a set of reactions produced by the behavioral
inhibition system (BIS). While the exact underlying neurological substrates of the
BIS is still under debate, one of the likely contenders is the anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC). This brain area has been shown to activate in response to errors,
conflicts, and, particularly of interest, violations of expectations. Consistent with
the MMM, the ACC is active in response to what we call meaning violations, such
as the experience of cognitive dissonance, mortality salience, social exclusion, and
the loss of control. These meaning violations not only activate neurological sub-
strates such as the ACC, but also induce sympathetic nervous system arousal as
measured by skin conductance and cardiovascular reactivity measures. Crucially,
it has been demonstrated that the experience of BIS is an aversive experience,
thus motivating subsequent behavior to reduce BIS activation. This is achieved by
the behavioral activation system (BAS). The activation of the BIS or BAS can be
detected using frontal asymmetry and recent research has shown that meaning vi-
olations indeed result in an increased approach motivation. We argue that it is this
state that is responsible for the often observed meaning seeking strategies such as
the affirmation of personally held values and ideals, consistent with the MMM.
Chapter 3, 4, and 5 each consist of studies relating arousal to compensation
strategies. In Chapter 3 we used a different meaning violation and investigated
a different meaning maintenance strategy. Specifically, we presented participants
with feedback about commonly held but incorrect beliefs, i.e., misconceptions. In
line with predictions of the MMM, a disconfirmation of one’s beliefs should result
in increased arousal. Indeed, we found that when participants were shown to be
mistaken, their pupils dilated to a greater extent, indicating more arousal. This
response was moderated by the commitment to their beliefs, with stronger effects
of feedback as the commitment towards the belief increases. We also varied the
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ambiguity of the feedback, thus giving participants an opportunity to interpret
the feedback in such a way as to confirm their beliefs. This assimilation of the
feedback occurred for positively framed feedback, with participants not making a
distinction between wholly positive and partially positive feedback, as indicated
by the absence of a difference in pupil size. When feedback was negative, partic-
ipants’ pupillary reaction differentiated between partly negative and wholly neg-
ative feedback, and both were associated with a larger pupil size reaction than
to positive feedback. These findings demonstrate an arousal response in response
to negative feedback, as well as a bias to confirm one’s belief, but only when the
feedback is positively framed.
In Chapter 4 we presented participants with perceptual anomalies and gave
them an opportunity to affirm their moral values. We found that the perceptual
anomalies—reverse colored playing cards—elicited a larger pupil size, indicating
greater sympathetic nervous system arousal. Curiously, we did not find a rela-
tionship between this arousal response and affirmation. We did, however, find
a moderating effect of extremism. Participants who give extreme answers to a
variety of personal-value questions showed less pupillary reactivity and more af-
firmation. We will discuss these findings and how it relates to the role of arousal
in meaning maintenance more generally.
In Chapter 5 we tested the entire process as outlined in the MMM. In the
first part of the study we had participants answer a series of factual questions that
varied in difficulty. In the second part of the study they were presented with the
correct answers, during which we measured their pupil size. Immediately after
seeing the correct answer to each question, they were asked what their initial an-
swer was. Assuming participants would answer some of the questions correctly
and some incorrectly, we could relate the physiological response for incorrect an-
swers to their tendency to display a hindsight bias, that is, indicate that their
initial answer was closer to the correct answer than it actually was. This hindsight
bias was interpreted as an accommodative meaning maintenance response that al-
lowed us to test whether the physiological arousal response, as measured through
pupillometry, could predict the extent of this bias. Indeed, we found that pupil
size could predict whether people would display the hindsight bias. This finding is
consistent with one of the central tenets of the MMM: meaning violations result in
aversive arousal that motivate subsequent compensatory behaviors to reduce this
arousal.
In Chapter 6 we presented our work on the role of arousal in response to a
common and important meaning violation—social exclusion. Social exclusion is
a complex meaning violation in that it can be regarded as either a direct threat
to people’s need to belong or a violation of expectations due to the often present
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norms of inclusion, causing one to be surprised upon being excluded. Conse-
quently, some argue that social exclusion is predominantly a pain-evoking event
while others see it as predominantly a violation of expectations. In two studies, we
applied pupillometry to a common social exclusion paradigm—Cyberball—to test
these two interpretations. The results were consistent with a pain-based response,
as indicated by decreased pupillary reactivity following exclusion cues (i.e., not
receiving the ball) but not following inclusion cues (i.e., receiving the ball). Par-
ticipants appeared to numb to the pain caused by exclusion cues, resulting in
decreased pupillary reactivity.
7.2 The role of arousal in meaning maintenance
One of the central questions of this dissertation is whether a physiological
arousal response can be observed following meaning violations and whether this
arousal is related to compensatory behaviors such as assimilation and accommo-
dation efforts, or the affirmation of personal values; as described in the Meaning
Maintenance Model (MMM). Each chapter, although independent and addressing
more specific research questions, provides new findings on the topic of arousal in
maintaining meaning; and together these studies offer new evidence that strength-
ens the idea of a role of arousal between meaning violations and the compensatory
efforts they induce.
According to the MMM, meaning violations induce a state of aversive arousal
that motivates compensatory behavior. Compensatory behavior can take various
forms. For example, feedback can be assimilated into existing meaning frame-
works, beliefs can be accommodated to fit feedback about those belief, and re-
lated or unrelated beliefs can be affirmed. In our review (Chapter 2) we found
evidence for physiological substrates responsible for these compensatory behav-
iors. The system believed to be responsible for this is the behavioral activation
system (BAS). The BAS responds to reward cues, non-punishment, and escape
from punishment; it is thus aimed at resolving the issue that led to the activation
of the BIS. Consequently, the activation of this system can counteract the aversive
arousal associated with the activation of the BIS. This idea of the BAS underlying
the compensatory behaviors following meaning violations is not new. For exam-
ple, McGregor and colleagues have postulated that a common meaning violation,
uncertainty, can induce reactive approach motivation (McGregor et al., 2010). In
our review of the literature on threat compensation we discussed these theories
and showed that findings in this literature are consistent with this view.
In our empirical work we attempted to demonstrate a link between physio-
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logical arousal and compensatory behavior. In Chapter 3 we had participants an-
swer a series of factual questions, indicating whether they believed each statement
to be true or false. After each question, they received feedback. In Study 2, this
feedback either confirmed or disconfirmed their belief and was either ambiguous
or unambiguous. We found that when feedback confirmed people’s belief, there
was relatively less pupillary reactivity compared to disconfirming feedback. Inter-
estingly, there was no difference in pupillary reactivity between ambiguous and
unambiguous confirming feedback, while there was such a difference when feed-
back disconfirmed their beliefs. The absence of a difference between ambiguous
and unambiguous confirming feedback appears to indicate a confirmation bias—
ambiguous positive feedback was interpreted as unambiguously confirming their
belief. In other words, they assimilated their feedback into their existing belief.
This is an initial study demonstrating a link between physiology and compensatory
behavior.
Of course, the most relevant test to demonstrate a link between physiologi-
cal and compensatory behavior is by testing whether the amount of physiological
arousal is correlated with the amount of compensatory behavior that follows. We
tried to test this link in Chapter 4, in which we presented participants with percep-
tual anomalies, recorded their pupil size, and provided them with an opportunity
to affirm moral values. Although we found that pupil size did indeed increase in
response to anomalous cards, this was not associated with a stronger affirmation
of values. This absence can perhaps be explained by the fact we used a between-
subjects design with only one moment during which personal values could be
affirmed. The affirmation opportunity was at the end of the experiment, after the
perceptual anomaly task that lasted around half an hour. This long task period is
required due to the necessity of repeated pupil size measures. Pupil data is noisy
and repeated observations are necessary to obtain a reliable signal. As a result,
the meaning violation task is of a relatively long duration. It could be that after
the first moment that perceptual anomalies were introduced, participants already
started to resolve any felt aversive arousal in different ways, so that by the time
the affirmation opportunity was presented, there was no need to affirm anymore.
This also explains we did not find any differences in affirmation between the two
conditions.
A solution is to use a fully within-subjects design, in which meaning vio-
lations and compensatory behavior opportunity are repeatedly presented. This
allows for multiple pupil size recordings, as well as providing participants imme-
diately with an opportunity to reduce the arousal by performing a compensatory
behavior. This is what we did in Chapter 5. To repeatedly present a meaning
violation and a compensation behavior opportunity, we used a memory hindsight
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bias paradigm. In this paradigm, participants are first presented with a series of
questions that warrant a numerical response. Then, in a second part of the exper-
iment, participants are presented with the correct answers to each question, and
asked to again indicate what their initial answer was. Due to the hindsight bias,
people are sometimes inclined to indicate an answer closer to the correct answer
than their initial answer actually was. We interpreted this behavior as an accom-
modation response; by telling the experimenter (and yourself) that you actually
were not as wrong as you actually were, any negativity felt due to being wrong
is alleviated. Crucially, this design allows for a full within-subject design, as each
correct answer and compensatory behavior opportunity can be presented repeat-
edly, so that reliable pupil measurements can be obtained. We recorded the pupil
size in response to seeing the correct answer and knowing their initial answer, we
could determine their pupillary reactivity to being mistaken. We regressed the av-
erage pupil size change in response to a surprising correct answer on the amount
of hindsight bias, and demonstrated a positive relationship. The average size of
the pupil in response to surprising correct answers was positively related to the
amount of hindsight bias. Thus, with this study we provide direct evidence that
arousal is linked to compensatory behavior, as postulated in the MMM.
7.3 Theoretical implications
In this dissertation we offer evidence for the MMM’s tenet that meaning vio-
lations evoke physiological arousal and that this arousal is related to compensatory
behavior. The evidence we presented not only supports this important claim of the
MMM, but also has implications for other theories in the field. The role of arousal
is an often theorized component in psychological theories, especially in the threat
compensation literature where some kind of threat motivates subsequent behavior.
One such theory is cognitive dissonance theory. We have already mentioned
the vital role of arousal in cognitive dissonance theory, whose extensive body of re-
search contains much of the work explaining why the relationship between arousal
and compensatory behavior can be difficult to reveal. However, it appears that
the literature on cognitive dissonance theory stalled regarding the relevance of
arousal in cognitive dissonance around the 1980s (Cooper et al., 1978; Croyle &
Cooper, 1983; Elkin & Leippe, 1986). The role of arousal in cognitive dissonance
has recently been picked up by its integration in the MMM. Cognitive dissonance
arguably consists of a violation of expectations. In its most typical case, the real-
ization that one performed behavior that is inconsistent with one’s personal pref-
erence is unexpected. Additionally, research has shown that cognitive dissonance
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can lead to compensatory behaviors that are also observed after non-cognitive dis-
sonance related expectancy violations (Steele & Liu, 1983). From the integration
of cognitive dissonance in the MMM it follows that our present work on the rele-
vance of arousal both in response to meaning violations and in relationship with
compensatory behavior offers further support for the relevance of arousal in cog-
nitive dissonance theory as well. Similarly, additional theories that are integrated
in the MMM such as those related to states of disequilibrium (Piaget, 2000), im-
balance (Heider, 1958), uncertainty (van den Bos, 2001), anxiety (Janoff-Bulman,
1992), and anxious uncertainty (McGregor et al., 2010) too should see the pre-
sented work as providing evidence for the role of arousal in those states.
Our findings are also relevant for terror management theory (TMT). Accord-
ing to TMT, people experience a psychological conflict between having the desire
to live and the realization that death is inevitable. This produces an aversive state
described as the experience of terror. To reduce this negative experience, people
embrace cultural values to attain symbolic immortality (Greenberg et al., 1986;
Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991). The presence of terror seems to im-
ply a state of aversive arousal, consisting of the experience of negative affect and
heightened physiological arousal. These two components have been investigated,
but consistent with many studies in which such a mediating role is expected, none
was found (Arndt, Greenberg, & Harmon-Jones, 1996; Rosenblatt et al., 1989).
This led to the conclusion that “terror management processes are ultimately con-
cerned with implicit knowledge of death rather than with thoughts of mortality
that have recently entered consciousness.” (Greenberg et al., 1997b, p. 101). That
is, rather than considering methodological limitations that prevented the discovery
of a role of arousal, it was concluded that arousal does not play a role—the the-
ory was adjusted to incorporate the unintuitive notion of implicit terror. Although
we did not use mortality salience as one of our meaning violation manipulations,
we believe it is premature to conclude that arousal plays no role in this process
(also see Tritt, Inzlicht, & Harmon-Jones, 2012). Rather, methodological short-
comings might explain the null-effects (e.g., the use of between-subject designs
that severely lack power, significant delays between manipulation and outcome
measures, and possible misattribution of arousal). Consequently, there remains
the possibility to unite a substantial number of threat-compensation theories and
reduce the number of these conceptually distinct theories, as is attempted by the
MMM.
The MMM is, however, but a first step in integrating threat-related theories
in the compensation literature. New integrative efforts have already been made
that further integrate the body of work on threat and threat compensation, result-
ing in the general process model of threat and defense by Jonas et al. (2014). This
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model is in many ways similar to the MMM. Like the MMM, the process model is
an integration of threat defense theories such as terror management theory, need
for control theories, the unconscious vigilance model, the reactive approach moti-
vation model, as well as the MMM. Also similar to the MMM, this model’s central
tenets are that discrepancies (similar to expectancy violations) activate basic neu-
ral processes related to anxiety, causing proximal and symptom-focused defense
responses that result directly from anxious arousal and heightened attentional vig-
ilance associated with anxious states. The main difference between this model and
the MMM is the presence of more explicit acknowledgement of the BIS/BAS pro-
cess underlying the response to meaning violations and particular categorizations
of compensatory behavior. According to the model, dispositional and situational
affordances determine whether compensatory behaviors result in the resolution of
the original meaning violation or whether they are merely palliative, are concrete
or abstract, or are personal or social in nature. Theoretical work on the MMM has
not included the specific and explicit assertions of specific compensatory behav-
iors to the extent that the general process model of threat and defense has, but
it is also not inconsistent with its additional claims. As a result, both theories are
based on the same findings in the literature, and importantly, the results of this
dissertation pertain to both the MMM, as well as the process model of threat and
defense.
7.4 Limitations and future directions
7.4.1 Testing the idea of misattribution of arousal
Despite the often claimed role of arousal in psychological theories, both in
the threat defense literature as well as other literatures, the relationship between
arousal and outcome variables is seldom found. In our own work, we have also not
always succeeded in showing a relationship between arousal evoked by a mean-
ing violation and the compensatory behavior it should elicit (see Chapter 4). In
Chapter 5 we suggest two possible reasons for seemingly sporadic evidence for
the arousal-behavior link. One possible reason is that physiological measures such
as pupillometry, skin conductance, cardiovascular reactivity, or skin temperature,
require repeated trials to obtain reliable signals. Some of these measures may
require fewer trials than others, but they share the methodological problem of a
relative long measurement period. As a result, the effect of the manipulation, in
our case the presentation of a meaning violation, can dissipate before the behav-
ioral outcome measures are assessed, resulting in null effects.
133
Chapter 7
A second possible reason is that physiological assessment tools can serve as
attribution sources for felt arousal. These tools often involve placing electrodes on
the skin or being placed in technological contraptions like an fMRI machine, which
are likely to evoke aversive arousal. In one study, this notion even served as the
basis of a cognitive dissonance manipulation (van Veen et al., 2009). Participants
had to argue that the fMRI machine they were in was comfortable, rather than the
more truthful perception that it is not. We argued that this is another reason why
studies on the link between physiology and compensatory behavior might fail to
detect such relationship. Arousal evoked by a meaning violation can be attributed
to the device, rather than the meaning violation, and consequently there is no need
to perform compensatory behavior. In fact, researchers have employed this very
paradigm, the misattribution of arousal paradigm, to demonstrate the relevance
of arousal in producing compensatory behavior.
To address these two possible limitations, we implemented a full within-
subjects design and used eye tracker technology to assess the physiological arousal
response. In Chapter 5 we conducted a study in which we repeatedly presented
a meaning violation and repeatedly assessed compensatory behavior. This within-
subjects design constitutes a more powerful design in which each necessary com-
ponent (meaning violation, physiological response, and compensatory behavior) is
repeatedly measured. This prevents dissipation effects from obscuring a relation-
ship between these components of interest. Additionally, we used pupillometry to
assess physiological arousal. A benefit of pupillometry over alternative physiolog-
ical measures is that modern eye trackers are relatively non-invasive. Modern eye
trackers resemble standard computer monitors that can measure pupil movements
and size from a short distance, without the use of restraints. Participants can sit
freely in front of the monitor, identical to that in standard laboratory experiments.
Consequently, we believe that another reason we succeeded in showing a link be-
tween arousal and compensatory behavior is that participant did not ascribe their
felt arousal to the eye tracker, but at their actual source: the meaning violation.
However, despite our argument that the long measurement period and arousal
evoking properties of physiological tools can prevent the detection of an arousal-
behavior link, we have not explicitly tested this explanation. Future studies can
be performed to find evidence for our explanation. For example, to test our ar-
gument that the long measurement period of physiological arousal interferes with
observing the arousal-behavior link, the duration of the period can be manipu-
lated outside of a physiological assessment context. There is some evidence that
a delay can interfere with compensatory behavior, at least in the case of cognitive
dissonance (Crano & Messé, 1970), but other research has shown that a delay is
beneficial to the revelation of a compensatory behavior response, at least in the
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case of mortality salience (Burke et al., 2010). Hence, future studies can be con-
ducted to both find support for our argued limitation of physiological assessment
tools and the effect of a delay on producing compensatory behavior.
An alternative idea is to manipulate the arousal levels in the context of physi-
ology studies by incorporating a delay before the crucial manipulation and depen-
dent measures. This will give participants a chance to acclimate to the measure-
ment device, thereby reducing the arousal produced by the device. Researchers
regularly include a period at the start of physiological studies, but these are aimed
at creating a baseline that subsequent measures can be compared to; not for par-
ticipants to fully acclimate to the recording device. An alternative idea is to also
explicitly ask participants how they feel with regard to the recording device. If
they express any discomfort, efforts can be made to make them feel more comfort-
able. If they do not, then they will also be less likely to attribute any felt arousal
to the recording device at a later point in the experiment.
If our explanation is correct, this will have important implications for any
work on the topic of arousal and arousal-produced behavior, not just the literature
on meaning and compensatory behavior. We thus hope that future work will be
conducted to test our predictions; but we also hope that the mere realization of
this possibility will create pause in designing physiology-based experiments and
that perhaps efforts can be made to reduce the likelihood of misattribution of
arousal effects.
7.4.2 Pupillometry: positive or negative arousal?
In our studies we used pupillometry to assess the physiological arousal fol-
lowing meaning violations. We tested the prediction of the MMM that meaning
violations produce a state of aversive arousal, which then motivates compensatory
behavior to reduce this arousal. We thus assume that the arousal we measured
through means of pupillometry reflects aversive arousal, and not positively va-
lenced arousal. However, the size of the pupil cannot distinguish between arousal
produced by negative sources, such as fearful stimuli, pain, or the violation of
expectations, and positive sources, such as smiling faces, erotic stimuli, and deli-
cious foods. This has been demonstrated by multiple studies in which both posi-
tive, negative, and neutral pictures are presented to the participant, during which
the size of the pupil is recorded (Bradley et al., 2008; Partala & Surakka, 2003;
van Steenbergen et al., 2011). Both positive and negative pictures elicit greater
pupil size, compared to neutral pictures. However, we are confident that we can
infer the increased pupillary reactivity in our studies to reflect negative arousal,
rather than positive arousal, for a variety of reasons. First, meaning violations are
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negative stimuli. Meaning violations such as mortality salience and the loss of con-
trol are undoubtedly negative experiences. According to the MMM, part of why
these meaning violations are experienced as aversive is because they violate ex-
pectations. The violation of expectations is also an aversive experience, as seen in
studies demonstrated that making errors is aversive (Hajcak & Foti, 2008) as well
as the experience of surprise (Noordewier & Breugelmans, 2013). If we accept
the violation of expectations to constitute a negative experience, we must see it
as likely that the arousal we observed in response to expectancy violations is neg-
atively valenced. Second, we linked the size of pupil to compensatory behavior.
This relationship is, of course, readily explained by the MMM, while alternative
explanations seem less readily available. People are unlikely to misreport their
first answer in the direction of the correct answer after experiencing positive af-
fect. We are not aware of a plausible explanation for why people should be more
inclined to adjust their answer towards the correct answer after experiencing pos-
itive affect. For these reasons we are hesitant to see pupil size, in the context of
our studies, as reflecting positive arousal.
Despite our reluctance to accept that the pupil measures in our studies re-
flect positive arousal, we nevertheless believe it to be fruitful to conduct studies to
demonstrate that meaning violations induce aversive arousal and that this can be
achieved through means of eye tracker technology. One way in which this can be
achieved is through an anti-saccade task (Hutton & Ettinger, 2006). In this task,
participants are presented with a neutral target stimulus that appears either on the
left or right side of a fixation cross. Before each trial participants are instructed to
either focus on this target (pro-saccade) or away from the target (anti-saccade).
Saccades are generally initiated more slowly and less reliably during anti-saccade
trials than pro-saccade trials, likely due to the need for inhibiting the automatic
tendency to look at novel stimuli (Olk & Kingstone, 2003). This task was used by
van Steenbergen et al. (2011) to test whether arousal, whether it is positive or
negative, results in attentional narrowing; that is, smaller latency differences be-
tween pro-saccade and anti-saccade trials in an anti-saccade task. They presented
participants with positive, negative, and neutral pictures before each pro-saccade
or anti-saccade trial and additionally they measured the pupil size during the pre-
sentation of the picture. They found that the pupil dilated in response to both
positive and negative pictures, but only negative pictures produced attentional
narrowing. Consequently, it therefore possible to distinguish between negatively
valenced and positively valenced stimuli through means of an anti-saccade task. In
fact, in our lab we are currently employing this method to test whether the mean-
ing violations discussed in this dissertation not only produce arousal as shown in
the studies here, but also show an attentional narrowing effect, which would be
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further evidence that these events are indeed aversive.
7.4.3 Post-compensatory behavior arousal
In this dissertation, we presented work on the role of physiological arousal in
maintaining meaning. We have shown that meaning violations cause an increase
in arousal and we have also shown that this arousal is related to compensatory
behavior. These findings support the MMM’s tenet that meaning violations pro-
duce a state of aversive arousal and that compensatory behaviors are performed
to reduce this aversive arousal. However, we did not test whether the arousal is in
fact reduced after performing compensatory behavior. In Chapter 4 we found that
participants who tend to give extreme answers showed a muted pupillary reactive
compared to those who give more nuanced responses. This can be interpreted as
some evidence for this view, as the presence of extreme answers can indicate a
strong foundation of personal values, and thus meaning, that can serve as a buffer
to the effect of expectancy violations in unrelated domains, such as perceptual
anomalies. However, this was not a specific test of the idea that compensatory be-
havior reduces aversive arousal. In the general literature, research on this specific
link is scarce. This is perhaps no surprise, given the challenge of linking arousal
to compensatory behavior in the first place, but there is some work that seems
to offer support for this idea. For example, Elliot and Devine (1994) provided
evidence for this link with a cognitive dissonance paradigm. They found that mak-
ing a counterattitudinal argument caused psychological discomfort, assessed by a
self-report measure of affect, and that this produced attitude change. Crucially,
they again assessed the discomfort following the attitude change and found that
it was reduced. There is also additional work on potential buffering effects of
compensatory behaviors. Affirmation of personal values, such as religious values,
before a meaning violation can prevent compensatory behaviors such as world-
view defense (Jonas & Fischer, 2006; McGregor, Haji, & Kang, 2008; Schmeichel
& Martens, 2005). These buffering effects have also been observed on physiolog-
ical measures. For example, writing about personal values or group, ideological,
or religious commitment relieve cortisol reactions and ERN amplitude (Creswell
et al., 2005; Inzlicht & Tullett, 2010). There is also the evidence that trait levels of
religiosity are negatively related to the ERN (Inzlicht et al., 2009) similar to how
we found that more extreme participants showed a reduced pupillary response.
However, it would be more persuasive if the entire link of meaning violation
to aversive arousal to compensatory behavior to reduced aversive arousal can be
demonstrated in a single study. In Chapter 5 we offered a potential study that
could test this sequence of events. In our hindsight bias paradigm we could add
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another phase in which the participants again see the correct answers. Participants
that have demonstrated a hindsight bias and thus adjusted their answers closer to
the correct answer should then display a lower level of arousal upon seeing the
correct answer again. This relationship should not be visible among those who did
not adjust their answer. In this study the entire process of meaning maintenance
is tested, from meaning violation to arousal, from arousal to compensatory behav-
ior, and compensatory behavior to reduced arousal. The literature would benefit
greatly from these designs.
7.4.4 Individual differences
A final suggestion for future research involves the study of individual dif-
ferences. On multiple occasions throughout this dissertation we have suggested
that individual differences can affect how people respond to meaning violations,
both in terms of their physiological response as well as compensatory behavior. In
Chapter 2 we discussed various individual differences in responding to meaning
violations, in that some people might be more likely to interpret a meaning viola-
tion as a threat or as a challenge, thereby prolonging BIS activation and delaying
the activation of the BAS.
In Chapter 4 we found that participants who tend to give extreme answers
on questions about personal values show a muted physiological response to per-
ceptual anomalies, a finding consistent with other work on the buffering effects
of personal values. This shows that certain people might be better equipped to
deal with violations of expectations, at least when those violations appear to be
unrelated to the source of their meaning.
In Chapter 5 we found individual differences in the tendency to display com-
pensatory behavior in terms of hindsight bias. While some participants frequently
adjusted their answers to be closer to the correct answer, others rarely did so. We
observed that if we excluded the ones who did not change their answer frequently,
the relationship between arousal and compensatory behavior strengthened. This
seems to show that certain people are more likely to use particular compensatory
behavior strategies than others; a finding we also discussed in our review of the
literature. Differences in self-esteem, for example, have been shown to affect
whether people engage in compensatory behavior after a loss of meaning. People
with high levels of self-esteem do not show the typical defensive behavior seen
in response to these violations (Pyszczynski et al., 2004), while those with low
levels of self-esteem appear to be more cautious and inhibited following mean-
ing violations (Cavallo et al., 2009; McGregor, Nash, & Inzlicht, 2009; Vohs &
Heatherton, 2001). Similarly, those high in neuroticism are more likely to inter-
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pret cues as a violation (e.g., Goldenberg et al., 1999) and respond with greater
discomfort to certain meaning violations, like being made aware of their mortal-
ity (Arndt & Solomon, 2003). Also physiologically, they respond with increased
severity to experiences that arouse uncertainty (Hirsh & Inzlicht, 2008). Based on
these findings it is clear that personality differences and specific meaning sources
are of great influence in how people respond to meaning violations. Future work
could be conducted to further test these differences, and the studies reported in
this dissertation can easily be extended by adding individual different measures to
test for these effects.
7.4.5 The five A’s of meaning maintenance
According to the MMM, there are five different strategies to maintain mean-
ing: assimilation, accommodation, affirmation, abstraction, and assembly. In this
dissertation we offer empirical work on the relationship between physiological
arousal and the first three of these meaning maintenance strategies, in Chapters
3, 4, and 5. We focused on these three strategies as they are the most commonly
investigated meaning maintenance strategies. A rich theoretical background ex-
ists for these strategies, found in such theories as Festinger’s cognitive dissonance
theory (Festinger, 1957), Piaget’s schemata (Piaget, 2000), Janoff-Bullman’s as-
sumptive worlds (Janoff-Bulman, 1992), and numerous other theories (see Park,
2010). An investigation of the relationship between arousal and particularly these
meaning maintenance strategies seemed most informative for understanding the
meaning maintenance process.
Future work could address the relationship between physiological arousal
and the two remaining strategies, abstraction and assembly. As mentioned in the
first chapter, support for these two strategies is based on empirical evidence of
an increased tendency for pattern detection following meaning violations (Proulx
& Heine, 2009; Randles et al., 2011)—indicative of an abstraction strategy—and
increased creativity following meaning violations (Maddux et al., 2010; Markman
et al., 2007)—indicative of assembly. An example of how the relationship be-
tween arousal and one of these strategies could be demonstrated is by observing
arousal levels following a meaning violation, followed by a creativity task that
is either successfully or unsuccessfully completed. Following successful comple-
tion, arousal levels should diminish relative to the condition in which there is no
creative satisfaction. This would also address the previous suggestion of investi-
gating the third link in the arousal-compensatory behavior link (see the section on
Post-compensatory Behavior Arousal).
Besides the five strategies postulated in the MMM, it is also argued there
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might be a 6th strategy: avoidance (Hirsh, 2012). Using this strategy, one would
respond to a meaning violation by avoiding, suppressing, or ignoring conflicting
information. This particular strategy readily lends itself to an empirical test using
eye tracker technology. In this dissertation we have used eye tracker technology to
measure the size of the pupil, but eye tracker technology can also be used for gaze
detection, arguably the more common use-case for this technology. To test the idea
of avoidance following meaning violations, participants could be presented with
meaning violations (e.g., inconsistent word-pairs, reverse colored playing cards,
negative belief feedback), followed by a grid of pictures of which one picture
contains a second meaning violation (e.g., an astronaut in a desert, a tree under
water). An inconsistency might draw initial attention, but if an avoidance strategy
is implemented, this would result in attention quickly being drawn away from the
meaning violation.
Finally, the different strategies should also be compared to each other. The
five (or six) strategies differ in numerous ways. Some of the strategies are directly
related to resolving the source of the meaning violation (assimilation and accom-
modation) while others indirectly address the meaning violation. These appear to
serve a mere palliative function to restore meaning. The strategies likely also dif-
fer in terms of their ease of implementation. For example, changing one’s beliefs
to resolve a violation of expectations is likely to be more effortful than interpret-
ing a situation to be consistent with one’s beliefs; similarly, creating a wholly new
meaning framework (assembly) is also likely to be a more effortful response to
lost meaning.
The present state of the literature does not offer any empirical work on when
which strategy is preferred. In fact, most studies offer only one single compen-
sation strategy option. This likely forces participants to use the provided strat-
egy, leaving open the possibility that the participant actually preferred a different
strategy. Given a set of options, participant may prefer to chose less effortful
strategies or perhaps strategies that directly resolve the source of the meaning
violation, rather than a mere palliative strategy (e.g., Shepherd, Kay, Landau, &
Keefer, 2011). Relatedly, if the only compensatory behavior opportunity is one
that does not appeal to the participant (e.g., offering an opportunity to affirm re-
ligious values when the participant holds atheist beliefs) compensatory behavior
might not be observed. For these reasons it appears to be fruitful to create experi-
mental designs in which not one but multiple meaning maintenance strategies are
offered. This would also impact the relationship between meaning maintenance
and arousal. It is possible that the severity of the arousal response can predict
whether a specific, perhaps more effortful, strategy is preferred and some strate-
gies might be more successful in restoring meaning for the individual, thereby
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reducing the experienced arousal.
7.5 Practical application
The work presented in this dissertation was aimed to test specific predictions
of the MMM and thus was driven by a motivation for basic research, rather than
practical application. Our work is limited in that all studies were conducted in lab
settings, with non-representative samples. Nevertheless, our work informs theory
that shows strong potential for informing important questions in society. Some
of the implications for society have already been made clear by others. Janof-
Bullman’s (1992) work on the double dose of anxiety shows that traumatic events
such as natural disasters and personal tragedies should receive two types of atten-
tion: attention aimed at managing the initial threat, often to physical health, and
attention to the loss of understanding. Terrible events often violate our expecta-
tions related to the working of the world or personal estimations of vulnerability.
The discomfort associated with the realization that we are mistaken should be
seen as an important reason for helping victims of these events to make sense of
what happened.
An important implication of the MMM is that meaning is not just found in
grand world views, but also in the most trivial of beliefs. Trivial expectancy viola-
tions like seeing reverse colored playing cards or being informed that the shortest
distance between Russia and the United States is only 3.6 kilometers also induce a
state of arousal, despite their seemingly innocent nature. The presence of a phys-
iological response to these violations indicate that these violations are possibly
experienced as aversive, and therefore motivates efforts to resolve that arousal. It
is an indication of a motivation to maintain these views. This might explain why
certain views that seem trivial remain prevalent in society. Misconceptions such
as that switching among different types of alcohol is more likely to lead to drunk-
enness than sticking to one type of alcohol, that reliable trait inferences such as
trustworthiness can be derived from a person’s face, that lie detectors work, or that
we use only 10% of our brain are believed by many. At first sight it might appear
that a quick correction can change a person’s belief; but the findings in this disser-
tation speak against that view. Even trivial violations induce a state of arousal that
motivates people to perform defensive behaviors—which are not always aimed at
correcting the source of the meaning violation.
The realization that meaning can be found in understanding should motivate
us to strive towards developing accurate beliefs. Simply put, we can help people
maintain meaning by helping people be wrong less frequently. As academics, we
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should feel comfortable with this suggestion. We have a responsibility to inform
the public about our scientific discoveries and assist them in developing accurate
world views. This can be achieved by popularizing our scientific findings and by
combating sources of misinformation, of which there are many. Various forms of
media are riddled with false information that are likely for a large part responsi-
ble for the prevalence of incorrect beliefs. Even our textbooks, the foundation of
education, contain long-known falsehoods (Ferguson, Brown, & Torres, 2016). Be-
sides these sources of misinformation, we must also dissuade people from adopt-
ing unscientific values. Recent movements, as exemplified in the US politics of
2016, appear to move towards values of relativism; that there is no such thing as
facts and that feelings are as valid as empirical data and logic. These attitudes
have resulted in a spread of false information that are more likely to result in dis-
confirmation; and consequently a loss of meaning. It thus appears to be warranted
that a greater emphasis on the adoption of reasonable beliefs is warranted.
Although we have focused on trivial beliefs and their invalidity, beliefs part of
large world views are equally susceptible to being invalidated. Grand world views
such as religious doctrines often contain scientific falsehoods, such as that we are
at the center of the universe and that the Earth is 6000 years old. The inclusion of
these beliefs is further evidence that people indeed seek meaning through under-
standing. It is unfortunate then, that these beliefs are often incorrect. To this day
certain people have a difficult time accepting scientific discoveries because they
are inconsistent with their expectations about what the world is like; that is, they
experience a meaning violation. In fact, it is inevitable that meaning violations will
continue to be experienced when belief systems are adopted that do not consist of
accurate beliefs.
Religion excels, however, in providing meaning through means other than
understanding. Religion particularly offers individuals feeling that their existence
is of significance, importance, and value in the world; that is, a feeling that they
matter. Religion also offers purpose, as many religious doctrines include specific
ideals to live up to. Recently, certain attempts are being made to offer people a sat-
isfying meaningful perspective without the inaccurate beliefs present in religious
doctrines. For example, Sam Harris’ book entitled “Waking Up” offers a guide
to spirituality without religion. Endeavors such as these might enable people to
live more satisfying meaningful lives, without the relatively larger risk of experi-
encing meaning violations due to inclusion of false beliefs. This movement also
appears warranted, as more and more people identify themselves as spiritual but
not religious (Funk & Smith, 2012). Movements such as these show us alterna-
tive meaning frameworks are possible that do not require inaccurate beliefs to be
maintained. Consequently, these alternative meaning frameworks offer meaning
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by providing a sense of mattering and purpose, together with a reduced chance of
experiencing meaning violations due to a misunderstanding of the working of the
world.
In summary, the MMM reveals that an important component of meaning is
a sense of understanding. Meaning is lost when this understanding is violated.
Hence, to prevent the loss of meaning, beliefs based on evidence must be adopted
in order to minimize their risk of being violated. These beliefs are but one com-
ponent of meaning, and attention must be paid not just to the adoption of correct




“All right,” said Deep Thought. “The Answer to the Great Question ...”
“Yes ...!”
“Of Life, the Universe and Everything ...” said Deep Thought.
“Yes ...!”




“Forty-two,” said Deep Thought, with infinite majesty and calm.
— Douglas Adams, The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy
If we could have tracked the eyes of the Magratheans as they were told
the answer to Life, the Universe, and Everything, we likely would have seen an
increase in pupil size as their expectation of a meaningful and satisfying answer
was violated by the number 42. They experienced a state of aversive arousal that
motivated them perform compensatory behaviors, in their case the construction
of a new super computer that will calculate the question, rather than the answer.
In this dissertation we have produced several contributions, hopefully answers, to
question in the literature on meaning. We have shown that meaning violations,
even trivial ones, produce a physiological arousal as seen in the size of the pupil.
We demonstrated that this arousal is linked to compensatory behavior, thereby
finding support for crucial tenets of the MMM.
After the Magratheans discovered the answer to life, the universe, and every-
thing, they set out to discover the ultimate question to life, the universe, and ev-
erything, so that they could understand the answer. They constructed the planet-
sized computer named Earth to calculate this question. It is on this planet that
we provided some answers to questions of meaning, but as is common in science,
we raised more questions, too. We hope that these questions will motivate more
research on the topic of meaning and continue the admirable integrative efforts









8.1 Supplemental materials from Chapter 3
Table 8.1: Misconceptions used in Chapter 3, in Dutch (left) and English (right)
Misvatting Misconception
1 paard levert 1 PK. 1 horse equals 1 HP.
Aan Napoleon danken wij al die rare
achternamen.
Thanks to Napoleon we have those weird
surnames.
Albert Einstein heeft in zijn schooltijd on-
voldoendes gehaald voor wiskunde.
Albert Einstein was bad at math in school.
Alcohol zorgt voor het afsterven van
hersencellen.
Alcohol kills brain cells.
Als je een aardworm in tweeën splijt kun-
nen beide helften doorleven.
When you split an earthworm in two, both
part can still live.
Als je een bepaalde plek vaak scheert wor-
den de haren daar harder en stugger.
If you shave frequently, the hairs will be-
come harder and more rigid.
Apen verlossen elkaar van vlooien. Apes rid each other of fleas.
Beren gaan in winterslaap. Bears hibernate.
Bij een pas overleden persoon groeien de
haren nog even door.
The hairs of a recently diseased person
continue to grow for a short while.
Marco Polo bracht de spaghetti mee uit
China.
Marco Polo brought spaghetti from China.
Bliksem gaat van boven naar beneden. Lightning travels from top to bottom.
Dankzij goede administratie werden
zoveel joden in Nederland opgepakt.
Thanks to the Dutch’s excellent adminis-
tration, many Jews were arrested in the
Netherlands.
Botten zijn van kalk. Bones are made of calcium.
Cleopatra was een Egyptische koningin. Cleopatra was an Egyptian queen.
Columbus ontdekte Noord-Amerika. Columbus discovered North America.
Concentratiekampen zijn door de Nazi’s
bedacht.
Concentration camps were invented by the
Nazis.
Cowboys droegen revolvers. Cowboys carried revolvers.
Boeddha was dik. Buddha was fat.
De Big Ben is het uurwerk op het Londense
parlementsgebouw.
The Big Ben is the clock tower on top of
London’s parliament building.




Table 8.1 – continued from previous page
Misvatting Misconception
De bulten van een kameel zitten vol met
water.
The back of camels is filled with water.
De evolutietheorie van Darwin is ontwor-
pen om een verklaring te geven voor het
ontstaan van leven op aarde.
Darwin’s theory of evolution was designed
to explain the origin of life on Earth.
De kern van de aarde is vloeibaar. Earth’s core is fluid.
Door vlees snel dicht te schroeien verliest
het vlees minder vocht.
By cauterizing quickly, there is less loss of
fluid.
Een gouden medaille bij de Olympische
Spelen is van goud.
A golden Olympian medal is made of gold.
De Russische winter brak Napoleon op. It was the Russian winter that caused
Napoleon’s defeat.
De Sahara ligt vol zand. The Sahara Desert is mostly sand.
De zon komt op in het oosten. The Sun rises in the East.
De zwarte weduwe doodt haar partner. The Black Widow kills her partner.
Diamanten ontstaan vanuit steenkool. Diamonds are created out of charcoal.
Dichtbij een TV of computerscherm zitten
is slecht voor je ogen.
Sitting close to a TV or computer screen is
bad for your eye sight.
Mensen gebruiken maar 10 procent van
hun hersenen.
Humans only use 10% of their brain.
De maag rammelt van honger. The stomach growls due to hunger.
Een harnas was zo zwaar dat ridders op
hun paard gehesen moesten worden.
The armor of knights was so heavy that
they had to be lifted onto their horses.
Een hond kwispelt omdat hij blij is. A dog wags its tail because it’s happy.
Newton kwam op zijn natuurwetten door-
dat een appel op zijn hoofd viel.
Newton discovered his laws of nature be-
cause an apple fell on his head.
Luther spijkerde zijn stellingen op de
kerkdeur.
Luther nailed his theses to the church door.
Napoleon Bonaparte was klein. Napoleon Bonaparte was short.
Een kapitein is verplicht als laatste het
zinkende schip te verlaten.
It is mandatory for a captain to be the last
person to leave a sinking ship.
Een zonnebloem draait met de zon mee. A sunflower turns in the direction of sun-
light.
Eskimo’s wonen in iglo’s. Eskimo’s live in igloos.
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Table 8.1 – continued from previous page
Misvatting Misconception
Frankenstein was een monster. Frankenstein was a monster.
Gaius Julius Caesar was een keizer. Gaius Julius Ceasar was an emperor.
Galilei vond de telescoop uit. Galileo invented the telescope.
Galileo liet kogels van de toren van Pisa
vallen.
Galileo dropped cannonballs from the
tower of Pisa.
George Washington was de eerste presi-
dent van de Verenigde Staten.
George Washington was the first president
of the United States.
Haar kan in 1 nacht grijs worden door
schrik of zorgen.
Hair can turn gray within 1 night due to
fear or worry.
Henry Ford bedacht het principe van de
massaproductie.
Henry Ford invented mass production.
Wanneer je in het vliegtuig het toilet ge-
bruikt, word het afval direct tijdens de
vlucht gedumpt.
When you use a toilet in an airplane, the
waste is dumped mid-flight.
Vleermuizen zijn blind. Bats are blind.
Suiker veroorzaakt hyperactiviteit bij
kinderen.
Sugar causes hyperactivity in children.
Een meteoriet die de aarde bereikt is een
hete vlammende vuurbal.
A meteorite that hits Earth is a hot flaming
ball of fire.
In een gerecht waar een alcoholische
drank in zit, zit ondanks het koken nog
steeds alcohol.
A dish whose recipe contains alcohol
maintains, despite boiling, still alcohol.
Een vomitorium was een ruimte waar
Romeinen braakten.
A vomitorium is a place where Romans
went to throw up.
Het hart zit links. The heart is on the left side of the torso.
Het Kremlin staat in Moskou. The Kremlin is located in Moscow.
Het is zo dat hoe hoger je gaat hoe kouder
het word.
The greater the altitude, the lower the
temperature.
Het kunnen oprollen van de tong is erfe-
lijk.
The ability to roll your tongue is hereditary
Het verteren van ingeslikte kauwgom du-
urt 7 jaar.
It takes 7 years to digest a swallowed piece
of gum.
Iemand moet 24 uur vermist zijn voor
hij/zij als vermist kan worden gemeld bij
de politie.
A person needs to be missing for 24 hours
before it should be reported to the police.
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Misvatting Misconception
Hitler was een atheïst. Hitler was an atheist.
Hitler voorzag Duitsland van de Autobahn. Hitler provided Germany with the Auto-
bahn.
In de Middeleeuwen dachten mensen dat
de aarde plat was.
In the Middle Ages, people thought the
Earth was flat.
In de Middeleeuwen werden heksen ver-
volgd.
In the Middle Ages, witches were prose-
cuted.
Bij judo is de zwarte band het hoogst. The black belt in Judo is the highest possi-
ble level.
Je moet een halfuur wachten met zwem-
men nadat je hebt gegeten.
You need to wait half an hour after eating
before swimming.
Je voelt het als iemand naar je staart. You can feel it when someone is staring at
you.
Kaapstad is de zuidpunt van Zuid-Afrika. Cape Town is the most southern point of
South-Africa.
Kapers zijn zeerovers. Privateers are pirates.
Katten kunnen zien in het donker. Cats can see in the dark.
Katten spinnen omdat ze tevreden zijn. Cats purr because they are happy.
Koekoeksklokken komen uit Zwitserland. Cuckoo clocks are from Switserland.
Kruisridders deden hun vrouw een
kuisheidsgordels om.
Knights of the Cross put chastity belts on
their women.
Levertraan komt van walvissen. Codfish-oil comes from whales.
Lezen bij zwak licht is slecht voor je ogen. Reading in the dark is bad for your eyes.
Een hondenmond bevat minder bacteriën
dan een mensenmond.
A dog’s mouth contains less bacteria than
a human’s mouth.
Longen zijn hol. Lungs are hollow.
In het Colloseum werden Christenen voor
de leeuwen gegooid.
In the Colosseum, Christians were fed to
the lions.
De kuisheidsgordel stamt uit de Mid-
deleeuwen.
The chastity belt originates from the Mid-
dle Ages.
Mensen hebben 5 zintuigen. Humans have 5 senses.
Mollen zijn blind. Moles are blind.




Table 8.1 – continued from previous page
Misvatting Misconception
Mozart’s tweede naam was Amadeus. Mozart’s second name was Amadeus.
Muizen zijn gek op kaas. Mice love cheese.
Een kameleon veranderd van kleur om op
te gaan in zijn omgeving.
A chameleon changes its color to match its
surroundings.
Nederland werd op 5 mei bevrijd. The Netherlands was liberated on May
5th.
Een hond met een natte neus is altijd
gezond.
A dog with a wet nose is always healthy.
Olifanten gaan naar een olifantengraf net
voordat ze doodgaan.
Elephants travel to an elephant’s grave be-
fore they die.
Rood vlees is bloederig. Red meat is bloody.
Samenlevende vrouwen gaan op den duur
tegelijk menstrueren.
The menstrual cycle of women that live to-
gether eventually synchronize.
Thomas Edison is de uitvinder van de
gloeilamp.
Thomas Edison invented the light bulb.
Sperma komt uit de zaadballen. Sperm is produced in the testicles.
Struisvogels steken hun kop in het zand als
er gevaar nadert.
Ostriches stick their head in the sand when
danger is near.
Sperma overleeft maar een paar dagen. Sperm only survives a few days.
Scharrelkippen lopen vrij rond op het erf. Free-range chicken get to roam free on the
farm.
Van Gogh sneed zijn oor af. Van Gogh cut off his own ear.
Vikingen droegen gehoornde helmen. Vikings wore horned helmets.
Vitamine C beschermt ons tegen verkoud-
heid.
Vitamin C protects against the common
cold.
Vleermuizen oriënteren zich met sonar. Bats use sonar to orient themselves.
In de Middeleeuwen werden mensen
gemiddeld 30 jaar oud.
In the Middle Ages, people had a life ex-
pectancy of 30 years.
Vrouwen hebben een G-plek. Women have a G-spot.
Walvissen spuiten water. Whales spout water out of their blowholes.
Het gehoor en de tastzin zijn bij blinden
bijzonder goed ontwikkeld.
Blind people have an exceptionally well-
developed sense of hearing and taste.
We knipperen om de ogen nat te houden. We blink to keep our eyes wet.
Witte wijn komt van witte druiven. White wine is made of white grapes.
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Misvatting Misconception
Water in een afvoer draait onder de eve-
naar dezelfde kant op.
Water in a sink located below the Equator
turns in the same direction.
Weinig nadenken kost even veel energie
als diep nadenken.




8.2 Supplemental materials from Chapter 5
Table 8.2: Questions used in Chapter 5, in Dutch (left) and English (right)
Vraag Question Answer
Hoeveel zintuigen heeft de mens? How many senses does a human
have?
20
Voor hoeveel procent bestaat het
menselijk lichaam gemiddeld uit
water?
What percentage of the human
body consists of water?
60
Hoeveel procent van het brein ge-
bruikt de mens?
What percentage of the brain do
people use?
100
Hoeveel dagen kan een persoon
blijven leven zonder eten?
How many days can a person stay
alive without eating?
28
Hoeveel dagen kan een zaadcel
(van een mens) blijven leven?
How many days can a sperm cell
(of a human) survive?
7
Voor hoeveel procent bestaat het
brein uit water?
What percentage of the brain con-
sists of water?
75
Hoeveel procent van al het voed-
sel in Westerse landen belandt in
de prullenbak?
What percentage of all food in
Western countries ends up in the
trash?
27
Hoeveel spinnen eet je gemiddeld
per jaar in je slaap?
How many spiders do you eat in
your sleep every year, on aver-
age?
0
Na hoeveel dagen zal je sterven
als je geen slaap hebt gehad?
After how many days will you die
if you do not sleep?
11
Hoeveel procent van al het water
op aarde is zoet?
What percentage of all water on
Earth is fresh water?
3
Hoeveel procent moet de hoeveel-
heid water in je lichaam dalen om
dorst te krijgen?
By what percentage does the con-
centration of water in your body
have to drop before you experi-
ence thirst?
1
Hoeveel spieren gebruikt een per-
soon terwijl hij praat?
How many muscles does a person
use while talking?
78
Om de hoeveel weken wordt de
huid van je lichaam vernieuwd?
How many weeks does it take for
your skin to renew itself?
4
Hoeveel doden vallen er elk jaar
door het slechte handschrift van
doktoren?
How many people die every year





Table 8.2 – continued from previous page
Vraag Question Answer
Wat is de kleinste afstand in
kilometers waarin Rusland en
Amerika van elkaar af liggen?
What is the shortest distance be-
tween Russia and the U.S. in kilo-
meters
3.8
Hoeveel procent van het aantal
botten in je lichaam bevindt zich
in je voet?
What percentage of the amount of
bones in your body is in your feet?
25
Hoeveel haren verliest een gemid-
deld persoon per dag?
How many hairs does a person
lose every day?
200
Hoeveel procent van de mensen
die roken lukt het om in ëën keer
te stoppen?
What percentage of people who
quit smoking succeed on their
first try?
3
Hoeveel procent van ons DNA
komt overeen met een slak?
What percentage of DNA do we
share with a snail?
70
Hoeveel gezichtsuitdrukkingen
kan een hond maken?
How many expressions can a dog
make with its face?
100
Hoeveel aardbevingen vinden er
per jaar plaats?
How many earthquakes take
place every year?
50.000
Hoelang leeft een huisvlieg in
uren?
How many days does the life of
the average housefly count?
72
Hoeveel baby’s worden er per jaar
wereldwijd aan de verkeerde oud-
ers gegeven?
How many babies are given to the
wrong parents every year world-
wide?
84
Wat is de totale lengte van ie-
mands bloedvatenstelsel in kilo-
meters?
What is the total length of a per-
sons vascular system in kilome-
ters?
100.000
Hoeveel keer meer bacteriën dan
cellen zijn er in je lichaam?
How many times does the human




bacteriën leven er in je mond?
How many different kinds of
bacteria live inside a human’s
mouth?
700
Hoeveel procent van de cellen
van een boom is levend?
What percentage of the cells in a
tree are alive?
1
Hoeveel verschillende talen wor-
den er gesproken in Afrika?
How many different languages




Table 8.2 – continued from previous page
Vraag Question Answer
Hoeveel procent van alle massa
van het zonnestelsel bestaat uit
de zon?
What percentage of the total mass
in our solar system consists of the
Sun?
99.8
Hoeveel procent van de dieren op
aarde heeft 6 poten?
What percentage of all animals on
Earth has six legs?
80
Hoeveel uur besteedt de gemid-
delde persoon in zijn of haar
leven aan reclame kijken?
How many days does the average
person spend watching advertise-
ments in his or her life?
13.000
Hoeveel keer past de aarde in
Jupiter?
How many times does the Earth
fit into Jupiter?
1300
Wat is de langste tijd in uren
tussen de geboorten van een
tweeling?
What is the longest recorded in-
terval in hours between the birth
of twins?
3625
Vanaf hoeveel meter kunnen
olifanten water ruiken?
From what distance in meters can
an elephant smell water?
4800
Hoeveel uur slaapt een olifant
gemiddeld per dag?
How many hours does an ele-
phant sleep every day?
2
Hoeveel zwerfhonden leven er in
New York?
How many stray dogs live in New
York city?
1.000.000
Hoeveel traptreden telt de Eiffel-
toren?
How many steps does the Eiffel
Tower count to the top?
1665
Hoeveel stranden heeft Australië? How many beaches does Australia
have?
10.000
Hoeveel keer past Rusland qua
oppervlak op Pluto?
How many times does the surface
of Russia fit onto Pluto?
1
Hoeveel spinnen leven er gemid-
deld per vierkante meter in
groene gebieden?
How many spiders live on average
per square meter in green areas?
130
Wat is de gemiddelde leeftijd
waarop Nederlanders gaan
trouwen?
At what age do people in the
Netherlands get married?
30
Hoeveel sneetjes gaan er uit een
gemiddeld brood?
How many slices of bread can you
get out of a loaf of bread?
24
Wat is de gemiddelde fietssnel-
heid van Nederlanders in km/h?
What is the average biking speed




Table 8.2 – continued from previous page
Vraag Question Answer
Wat is het gemiddeld aantal
TV-toestellen per Nederlands
huishouden?
What is the average number of
TVs in the Netherlands per house-
hold?
1.7
Wat is de gemiddelde leeftijd van
ontmaagding in Nederland?
At what age do people in the
Netherlands first have sex?
16.7
Wat is de gemiddelde schoenmaat
van de Nederlandse vrouw?
What is the average shoe size of a
Dutch woman?
39
Hoeveel centimeter is de lengte
van een A4’tje?
What is the length of an A4 pa-
per?
29.70
Hoeveel graden Celsius is de
gemiddelde temperatuur in Ned-
erland in juli? (zowel dag als
nacht)
What is the average temperature
(in Celsius) of a day in July in the
Netherlands?
17.9
Wat is de gemiddelde leeftijd
waarop een vrouw haar eerste
kind krijgt in Nederland?
At what age does a women get her
first child in the Netherlands, on
average?
29.4
Wat is de gemiddelde lengte van
de Nederlands man in centime-
ters?
What is the average length of a
Dutch man in centimeters?
184
Wat is de gemiddelde lengte van
de Nederlands vrouw in centime-
ters?
What is the average length of a
Dutch woman in centimeters?
170
Wat is de gemiddelde prijs van
een glas fris op het terras in
euro’s?
What is the average price of a
soda at a terrace in euros?
2.2
Hoeveel kinderen krijgen Neder-
landers gemiddeld?
What is the average number of
children per household in the
Netherlands?
1.8
Hoeveel jaren oud is de wereld? How old is the world? 4.000.000.000
Wat is de gemiddelde lev-
ensverwachting in Nederland?
What is the average life ex-
pectancy in the Netherlands?
80
Hoeveel procent alcohol bevat
een standaard glas bier?
What is the alcohol percentage of
a glass of beer?
5
Wat is het gemiddelde wandel-
tempo (km per uur) van een vol-
wassen persoon?
What is the average walking





Table 8.2 – continued from previous page
Vraag Question Answer
Hoeveel tanden heeft een vol-
wassen persoon?
How many teeth does a average
adult have?
32
Hoe vaak klopt een gemiddeld
mensenhart per minuut in rust?
How many times a minute does a
human heart beat on average in
rest?
70
Hoeveel mensen wonen er op de
wereld?
What is the current population of
the Earth?
7.000.000.000
Hoeveel flesjes zitten er in een
standaard kratje bier?
How many bottles are in a crate
of beer?
24
Hoeveel volt zit er in een Neder-
lands stopcontact?
What is the voltage of Dutch
power outlets?
240
Hoeveel landen zitten er in de Eu-
ropese Unie?
How many countries are in the
European Union?
28
Vanaf welke leeftijd mogen
mensen beginnen met werken in
Nederland?
At what age are people allowed to
work in the Netherlands?
15
Hoeveel dagen duurt de Kerst-
vakantie voor de basisschool?
How many days does the Christ-
mas vacation last during primary
school?
14
Hoeveel calorieën zitten er in
drinkwater?
How many calories does drinking
water contain?
0
Hoeveel jaar is men getrouwd bij
een Gouden bruiloft?
After how many years of marriage
is a gold wedding anniversary cel-
ebrated?
50
Hoeveel mensen wonen er in
Nederland?
What is the current population of
the Netherlands?
17.000.000
Vanaf welke leeftijd gaan Neder-
landse kinderen naar de basiss-
chool?
At what age do children in the
Netherlands go to school?
4
Vanaf welke leeftijd mag men in
Nederland op voor het rijbewijs?
At what age are people allowed to
start learning how to drive in the
Netherlands?
17
Hoeveel uur werkt iemand per
week als deze persoon een full-
time baan heeft?
How many hours does a person
work a week if he or she has a
full-time job?
40
Wat is de Nederlandse pen-
sioensleeftijd?





Table 8.2 – continued from previous page
Vraag Question Answer
Hoeveel basiskleuren zijn er? How many primary colors are
there?
3
Hoeveel poten heeft een normale
spin?
How many legs does a spider
have?
8
Wat is de gemiddelde lichaam-
stemperatuur van de mens in
graden Celcius?
What is the average human body
temperature in Celsius?
37
Voor hoeveel mensen is er plaats
in een gemiddelde auto?
How many people fit in a stan-
dard car?
5
Uit hoeveel cijfers bestaat een
mobiel telefoonnummer?
How many digits are in a mobile
phone number?
10
Vanaf welke leeftijd word je
in Nederland als volwassen
beschouwd?
At what age are you considered
an adult in the Netherlands?
18
Wat is de maximale snelheid (km
per uur) dat in een auto gereden
mag worden op de snelweg?
What is the maximum speed (in
km/h) you may drive on the high-
way?
130
Hoeveel seconden zitten er in ëën
uur?





8.3 Supplemental materials from Chapter 6
In the studies described in Chapter 6 we additionally measured participants’ need
for structure by presenting people with works of art and a snowy pictures task after each
Cyberball game. Some genres of art contain more structure (still life/representational art)
and could thus be preferred after a loss of structure. The loss of structure can also increase
a need to see structure in ambiguous stimuli, such as snowy pictures. We thus expected
that participants would show an increased tendency to prefer structural art and see more
patterns in the snowy pictures.
Study 1
Method
Art task. In the art task participants saw a painting (5000 ms), after which they had
to indicate their preference for that work of art by answering three questions (e.g., “I
think the work of art is beautiful”), on a 7-point Likert scale. Participants were presented
with two times nine paintings (960 x 768 pixels), selected from three different categories:
absurd, realistic, and abstract.
Snowy pictures task. The snowy pictures task from Whitson and Galinsky (2008) was
used. Participants were presented with a single picture at the time, and could look at the
picture for as long as they wished. After each picture they were asked what they saw in
the picture.
Results
Art task. To investigate changes in painting preferences as a function of being ostra-
cized, a repeated-measures GLM was performed with Cyberball game (included/excluded)
and art type (abstract/realistic/absurd) as within subject factors. This revealed no main
effect of the Cyberball game, F(1, 33) = 0.60, p = .444, µp2 = .018. The analysis did
reveal a main effect of art type, F(2, 32) = 14.16, p < .001, µp2 = .469. Realistic art was
liked the most (M = 4.06, SD = 1.06) followed by absurd art (M = 3.65, SD = 0.97), and
abstract art was liked the least (M = 2.83, SD = 1.21). The predicted interaction was not
found, F(2, 33) = 0.25, p = .779, µp2 = .015.
Snowy pictures task. To investigate the possible effects of ostracism on increased
pattern detection, we performed a repeated measures GLM with Cyberball game (in-
cluded/excluded) and snowy picture type (hidden pattern present/hidden pattern absent)
as within subject factors. The dependent variable was the sum of detected patterns, where
each picture counted as 1 if a pattern was detected, and 0 if no pattern was detected. This
revealed only an effect of snowy picture type, F(1, 34) = 65.61, p < .001, µp2 = .659.
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Participants detected more patterns if a pattern was actually present (M = 5.59, SD =
0.78) than when it was not (M = 3.44, SD = 1.89). No main effect was found for Cyber-
ball game, F(1, 34) = 0.44, p = .513, µp2 = .013, nor an interaction effect, F(1, 34) =
0.33, p = .571, µp2 = .01.
An identical analysis was performed with the time spent looking at the snowy picture
as the dependent variable. This revealed a main effect of the Cyberball game, F(1, 34) =
12.22, p = .001, µp2 = .264, and of the type of snowy picture (pattern absent or present),
F(1, 34) = 59.90, p < .001, µp2 = .638. Participants spent less time looking for a pattern
after being ostracized (M = 15.13, SD = 6.47) compared to being included (M = 18.46,
SD = 7.70); and they spent more time looking for a pattern on pictures that did not
contain a pattern (M = 20.96, SD = 8.68) compared to pictures that did contain a pattern
(M = 12.63, SD = 5.49). No interaction was found, F(1, 34) = 0.90, p = 350, µp2 =
.026.
Study 2
In Study 2 we did not include absurd art and instead only used representational art
(structured) and abstract art (unstructured). We also added an anxious uncertainty scale
in addition to the fundamental needs scale.
Method
We extended the two art genres with two additional paintings so that in total ten
paintings of each art genre (representational and abstract) were presented to the partici-
pant. After each ostracism manipulation, five paintings of each genre were presented in a
random fashion.
Results
Art task. We did not reveal an effect of the Cyberball game, F(1, 55) = 0.51, p = .480,
µp
2 = .009. The analysis did reveal the main effect of art type, F(1, 55) = 23.93, p <
.001, µp2 = .303. Realistic art was liked more (M = 3.70, SD = 1.09) than abstract art
(M = 2.74, SD = 1.04). Again, no interaction was not found, F(1, 55) = 0.54, p = .464,
µp
2 = .010.
Snowy pictures. We again looked the sum of detected patterns as a function of snowy
picture type and Cyberball game. This again revealed only an effect of snowy picture type,
F(1, 56) = 119.29, p < .001, µp2 = .681. Participants detected more patterns if a pattern
was actually present (M = 5.44, SD = 0.80) than when it was not (M = 3.63, SD = 1.58).
No main effect of Cyberball game was found, F(1, 56) = 0.65, p = 424, µp2 = .011, nor
an interaction effect, F(1, 56) = 0.52, p = .474, µp2 = .009.
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An identical analysis was performed with the time spent looking at the snowy picture
as the dependent variable. This revealed a main effect of the Cyberball game, F(1, 56) =
11.93, p = .001, µp2 = .176, and of the type of snowy picture (pattern absent or present),
F(1, 56) = 39.73, p < .001, µp2 = .415. Contrary to the results of Study 1, participants
spent more time looking for a pattern after being ostracized (M = 18.98, SD = 10.51)
compared to being included (M = 14.91, SD = 8.61). Consistent with the results of Study
1, they did spend more time looking for a pattern on pictures that did not contain a pattern
(M = 21.01, SD = 12.21) compared to pictures that did contain a pattern (M = 12.82, SD








In this dissertation I present the work I have conducted together with my supervisors
on the role of physiological arousal in the Meaning Maintenance Model (MMM). The
MMM is an integrative model that incorporates multiple theoretical frameworks in the
existential psychology literature to explain both what meaning is and how people respond
to lost meaning. The central idea is that people adopt sets of beliefs that allow them to
make sense of the world. Through the adoption of these beliefs, people structure their
experiences and come to expect specific relationships, whether it is the color of objects,
the behavior of people, or the unfolding of world events. According to the MMM, meaning
is found in these expected relationships.
However, people’s beliefs are imperfect, causing them to regularly face events that
do not fit in their meaning frameworks. This violates their sense of meaning. Traumatic
experiences, misconceptions, and perceptual anomalies are but a few of the types of events
that constitute a meaning violation.
The loss of meaning results in a state of aversive psychophysiological arousal that
motivates people to reduce this state of discomfort. The MMM describes various ways
to do so. For example, people can reinterpret events in a manner that it consistent with
prior beliefs or they can restore meaning by changing one’s beliefs. Alternatively, they can
respond to a loss of meaning in one domain by affirming meaning in an unrelated domain.
The main topic of this dissertation is the aversive state between a meaning violation
and the response to that meaning violation: the experience of meaninglessness. According
to the MMM, the experience of meaninglessness is a state of aversive psychophysiological
arousal that motivates people to perform compensatory behavior to reduce the arousal.
We investigated this process in two ways. We conducted a review of related literature
and performed experimental studies to better understand the role of arousal in producing
meaning restoration responses.
In our review of the literature we discussed possible physiological substrates respon-
sible for how people respond to threats, including the threat of losing meaning. We discuss
how threats initially activate the behavioral inhibition system (BIS), as seen in increased
anxiety, vigilance, and avoidance following a threat, and how this is subsequently fol-
lowed up by activation of the behavioral activation system (BAS). We argue that the BAS
is responsible for the often observed meaning seeking strategies such as the affirmation of
personally held values and ideals, consistent with the MMM.
In our experimental work we used pupillometry. Pupillometry is the technique of
measuring the size and reactivity of the pupil. Although it is true that the human eye is
for seeing, the pupil also displays small fluctuations that do not seem to serve any visual
function. Instead, these small fluctuations reflect a state of physiological arousal. We
used this technique to investigate whether arousal plays a role in how people maintain
meaning.
We presented people with various meaning violations, such as false beliefs (i.e., mis-
conceptions), social exclusion, and perceptual anomalies. In one study participants were
given feedback about their misconceptions and we measured their pupillary reactivity in
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response to this feedback. We found that when participants were shown to be mistaken,
rather than correct, their pupil dilated to a greater extent. This response was moderated
by the commitment to their beliefs, with stronger effects of feedback as the commitment
towards the belief increases. In a second study we also varied the ambiguity of the feed-
back and observed a bias to confirm one’s beliefs, as assessed through pupillometry, but
only when the feedback was positively framed.
Then we presented participants with perceptual anomalies and gave them an op-
portunity to affirm their moral values. We found that the perceptual anomalies—reverse
colored playing cards—elicited a larger pupil size, indicating greater arousal. We also
found that participants who give extreme answers to a variety of personal-value ques-
tions showed less pupillary reactivity and more affirmation. Curiously, we did not find a
relationship between the arousal response and the compensatory response.
In a next study we tested the entire process as outlined in the MMM. We used the
hindsight bias to see whether people adapted their belief in response to belief-feedback
and tested whether pupillary reactivity to the feedback could predict the extent of the
hindsight bias. This is indeed what we found. This result is consistent with one of the
central tenets of the MMM: meaning violations result in aversive arousal that motivate
subsequent compensatory behaviors to reduce this arousal.
Finally, we presented our work on the role of arousal in response to social exclusion.
Some argue that social exclusion is predominantly a pain-evoking event while others see
it as predominantly a violation of expectations. In two studies, we applied pupillometry to
a common social exclusion paradigm—Cyberball—to test these two interpretations. The
results were consistent with a pain-based response, as indicated by decreased pupillary
reactivity following exclusion cues.
Together these findings offer support for the MMM’s tenet that arousal plays a sig-







This dissertation would not have been possible had it not been for a significant set
of people. In this section I would like to take a moment to thank them.
I would like to thank my supervisors, Ilja and Travis. It is actually a surprise that this
dissertation got written if you consider the meetings in which we discussed our research.
A lot of the time was spent discussing the latest movies and TV shows and it was only near
the end of the meeting that we threw some research in there. We also went to the movies
and we even played Dungeons and Dragons together. Despite this, we did actually manage
to do research! It is thanks to you that I have my first publications and it is thanks to you
that I went from feeling like a student to feeling like an academic. I want to genuinely
thank you for all your help in these last four years. I have learned a tremendous amount.
I also want to thank the people in our department. You are a weird bunch. One only
needs to have lunch in our department to attest that fact. But perhaps an even greater
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you forcing me to speak Dutch). Bastian, we’re both stupid for continuing to work after
work. We are not stupid for getting ice cream during work; that just makes sense. You two
know me very well. For example, you know how silly I find the defense ceremony (I’m
probably not helping by calling you two faeries). Thankfully I know that you two will do
everything to make this day great. Thank you for that.
Special thanks goes out to my friends. Lisanne, Byron, Gaby, Nina, Christina,
Michèle, Paulette; you guys are amazing. It is true that before I met you I did not know
how valuable friends are. It seems like a dumb platitude to say but I’m a dumb person.
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